THE ARAB CULTURE: ENCHAINED

Cambridge University Press

2009.

TAREK HEGGY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE......................................................................................pg.   4

PART I The Proliferation of the Jinni

                 Or The Emergence of Intolerant Islam

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................pg.     8

Chapter One:     The Emergence.....................................................pg.   12

Chapter Two:     Facing Emergence................................................pg.    42

Chapter Three:  The Proliferation ..................................................pg.   46

Chapter Four:   The Illusion of “Religious” Parties ......................pg.   50

Chapter Five:    “Piety”, Unveiled..................................................pg.   56

Chapter Six:       Vision... or Nightmare? .......................................pg.   60

Chapter Seven:  The Use of Force..................................................pg.    63

Chapter Eight:   The Breeder .........................................................pg.    70

Chapter Nine:    The Other Side of the Coin..................................pg.    86

PART II A Confined & Barricaded Mentality

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................pg.   95

Roadmap ........................................................................................pg.    97

Chapter One:     The Problematic of the Arab Mentality ...............pg.   99

Chapter Two:     The Blinding Effect of Allegiance........................pg. 105

Chapter Three:  The Barricade of Identity......................................pg. 109

Chapter Four:   The Absence of Tolerance and Critical Mind ......pg. 123

Chapter Five:    The Flexibility of Compromise.............................pg. 132

Chapter Six:      Negativity and Apathy: Consequences of

                           Marginalization ....................................................pg.  138  

Chapter Seven:  The “Big-Talk” Syndrome ..................................pg.  142

Chapter Eight:   The “Self-Praise” Syndrome ...............................pg.  147

Chapter Nine:    The “Staying-Put” Syndrome ..............................pg. 151

Chapter Ten:      Destructive Beliefs ..............................................pg. 156

Chapter Eleven: The Victims .........................................................pg. 184

Chapter Twelve:  The Reality That Arabs Refuse ..........................pg. 201

EPILOGUE ..................................................................................pg. 205

Preface

   After writing three critical studies of Socialism, which were published in the nineteen seventies, followed by six more books published in the eighties on the problems of Egyptian reality [as well as those facing a number of Arab countries which adopted the Egyptian model] in the political, economic and social spheres, I was afflicted with an acute case of writer's block.

   For three long years – 1994, 1995 and 1996 – and for the first time in my life, I stopped writing altogether.  However, this dry spell was not without its merits; indeed, it turned out being probably the most beneficial stage of my intellectual life.  Although I was extremely frustrated at my inability to write at the time, and felt, like the great French poet Rimbaud, that my pen had dried up, it was nevertheless a hiatus that allowed me to see the difference between the symptoms and the disease regarding the problems plaguing Egypt and other Arabic-speaking countries with more clarity.

   Between 1977 and 1994 I had written dozens of articles and nine books, and I discovered that I had only been writing about the symptoms of the disease, rather than about the disease itself.  Since 1997, all my writings have been focused on the disease.  All the political, economic, social, educational and information-related problems in Arab societies are symptomatic of a debilitating disease afflicting contemporary Arab culture, which is unique among world cultures in that it has distanced itself from the march of human progress.

   No one can accuse Japan, India, China, Russia and Western European countries of being under the tutelage of the world's only superpower at the present time, namely, the United States.  But still, they play the game according to the rules dictated by the global balance of power and the strategic realities of the post-World War II period, which I believe to have ended with the collapse of the Socialist bloc under the leadership of the former Soviet Union in 1991 rather than with the end of the war in 1945.

   However, unlike Russia, China, Japan, India and Western Europe, the Arab countries, despite their economic and educational weakness and their complete dependence on others in matters of security, refuse to play by the rules of the game or in accordance with its internal dynamics and mechanisms.

   The conclusion I have drawn from my in-depth study of Arabic-speaking societies is that if these societies have come to form a bloc standing outside the march of human progress, it is because of their current cultural conditions, and not because of any other factor [even though I do not deny the existence of a diversity of other factors].

   The culture prevailing in Arabic-speaking societies today is a culture of complaining and finger-pointing, blaming others for any misfortune, seeing enemies and conspiracies where none exist or blowing minor existing dangers out of all proportion.  It is also a destructive close-minded culture that does not accept any criticism.  Indeed, I would go as far as saying that it is virtually devoid of any critical thinking.  Other negative features include a tendency to indulge in excessive self-praise, glorification of past achievement and an exaggerated sense of self-importance, not to mention an alarming and unprecedented increase in aggression.

   During the last twelve years, I have written many articles and several books in Arabic and English, which I have since revisited and, in many cases, rewritten in the light of my new understanding of the difference between the disease and its symptoms.  Among the works I rewrote over and over until it settled into its present form is this book, which contains the essence of my theory, namely that Arab culture today is shackled with two heavy chains.  At the end of the first chain hangs a heavy iron ball-weight bearing the inscription "the negative, medieval and regressive understanding of Islam", while at the end of the second chain, hangs an equally heavy weight bearing the inscription "defective thought processes, intellectual distortions and negative delusions that produced the educational systems in Arab societies, rendering them the worst systems in the world".  Arab educational systems are not only based on memory tests and learning by rote rather than on fostering creativity, research, critical thinking and team work, but they are also designed to actively discourage critical thinking, tolerance and acceptance of the other, respect of pluralism and diversity, and a belief in the universality of science and knowledge.  As a result, they have built high walls between most of the Arab youth and the dynamics of the age in which we live, with its scientific achievements and breakthroughs.  They have also deprived them of the skills with which to engage in the global game according to the rules currently in force; they are like football players who withdraw from a match and sit on the sidelines shouting insults at the referee and the players still on the pitch, while absolving themselves of all blame.

   Contemporary Arab societies are living a painful reality fraught with danger, not only to themselves but to humanity as a whole.  The only way out of this untenable situation is through a two-pronged approach, one is political, the other educational.  What is required on the political front can be summed up as the need for quality leadership.  As for the educational front, it requires nothing less than an educational revolution, a complete overhaul of the five components of the educational system:

1. Educational philosophy

2. Educational programs

3. Teachers

4. Students

5. Educational buildings and infrastructures

   Quality leadership can bring about a relative improvement in the short term as well as in the medium term; but only an educational revolution can bring about the desired change in the long term. This book is an attempt to cast light on these two heavy chains shackling contemporary Arab culture: religion and education.

Tarek Heggy.

Cairo.

July 1st, 2008.         

PART I

The Proliferation of the Jinni

Or

The Emergence of Intolerant Islam

INTRODUCTION

In numerous talks I gave at research centers and universities in Europe and North America, I tried to introduce my audience to what I call “Turkish-Egyptian Islam”. Until the nineteen forties, “Turkish-Egyptian Islam" stood as a unique example of tolerance and flexibility. Outside the Arabian Peninsula, Muslims have always known extremely tolerant societies, in countries like Egypt, Syria, Andalusia and the Arab Maghreb. Under the Ottoman Empire,[1] non-Muslims enjoyed more protection than any other minority living anywhere else in the world at the time. Christians and Jews of the Levant and these countries lived in conditions very similar to the ones in which the Muslim subjects of the empire were living. Even when they were persecuted by certain rulers, like Al-Hakem bi Amr Allah,[2] it was part of a general policy that discriminated equally, without any distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims. As Bernard Lewis[3] said, the Jews played their greatest roles in history twice: once with the Muslims (in the past), and once with the Christians (in the present).

   “Turkish-Egyptian Islam” was noted for its acceptance of the other.  It was not pathologically obsessed with the fine print of scripture. While recognizing the divine character of the revealed laws and the prophetic additions, it also recognized that some of their provisions were formulated to suit the context of a different time, place and varying circumstances. Thus divinity was reserved for religion and did not extend to how mortals understood or chose to interpret its strictures. It was tacitly understood that there is a subjective dimension to the interpretation of any text, and that interpretation is necessarily colored by the interpreter’s predilection shaped by his cultural formation, knowledge and intellectual abilities.

   A comparison between Islamic and Arab societies today and those of a century ago reveals how much more widespread the ‘mentality of violence’ has become in today’s societies.  However, the real danger lies less in the mentality of violence that has come to permeate many - if not all - sectors of Islamic and Arab societies than in the spread of the culture that is conducive to its growth and development. This culture is what spawns militants who nurture the mentality of violence and thus create a general climate that allows it to take a firm grip. There have always been people like Al-Mawdoody, Sayed Qutb, Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawy[4] in the history of Islam, but – until recently - they were a renegade and marginal minority. The tragedy today is that they are no longer marginal.  Their message is reaching huge numbers of people now, and they are gaining new supporters and sympathizers every day.

Why?

   It can be argued that Islam is one of the most important shapers of the culture, mind-set, way of life, thought processes, opinions and reactions of Muslims. That, however, is not a satisfactory answer for analysts concerned with both diagnosis and cure. So let us flesh out the answer by trying to define what is meant by Islam here.

· Is it Islamic Scripture?

· Is it how people interpret Scripture?

· Is it Islamic jurisprudence?  If so, which school of jurisprudence? Is it Islamic jurisprudence according to Abu Hanifah,[5] Ibn-Malik, Al- Shafi^ci[6] or Ibn-Hanbal[7] and his disciples (notably Ibn-Taymiyah,[8] Ibn-Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya[9] and the proselytizer Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab)?[10]  Or is it Islamic jurisprudence according to the Imameya[11] school (whose most prominent exponent was Ja'far Al-Sadiq)[12] or to the Khawarij[13] (who had four subdivisions, the most important being the Abadeya Khawarij)?

· Is it historical experience? If so, what particular experience?

· Is it Islam as understood by the Umayyads[14] or by the Abbasids[15]?

· Indeed, which Islam?

   Can one really talk of a single homogeneous Islamic experience? After all, the experience of Umayyad Damascus was very different from the experience of Abbasid Baghdad, while both were very different from the historical experience of Andalusia, where a unique bonding between Muslims and Jews produced such great thinkers as the Muslim Ibn Rushd (Averroes)[16] and the Jew Ibn Maymoun (Maimonides).[17]

   In truth, Scripture in and of itself, means little when invoked out of context.  Here the quality, mind and vision of the person dealing with the text are all-important.  I believe five factors to be responsible for the phenomenon of violence:

· Political oppression (at the hands of autocratic forms of governments marked by a lack of democracy).

· The rise of the Wahhabi brand of Islam[18] (along with the retreat of the tolerant model which had prevailed for centuries).

· The renewed introduction of tribal values which came with the spread of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam; (Islam had tried to abolish tribal loyalties and redirect the loyalty to the Muslim Super-tribe, namely the whole Ummah).

· Educational systems that are completely divorced from modernity. Widespread corruption, which is the inevitable result of political oppression.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EMERGENCE

 I. The Fuel of Intolerant Islam

   Many have attributed the spread of religious extremism today in countries like Egypt, for example, to external factors, such as foreign incitement and foreign financing of extremist movements in general, and of fundamentalist Islamic groups in particular. This attribution is extremely dangerous, because by presenting the issue of religious extremism as a security problem - to be dealt with by the police and other security bodies – it removes it from the realm of problems amenable to political solutions. Those who are quick to point an accusing finger at external forces should realize that if Egypt had been a haven of social tolerance, brotherhood and peace, it would not have been susceptible to interference from abroad and that means that other local factors have created a favourable climate for such attempts to succeed.

    A. Political Oppression

   Over the last few decades, many societies in Islamic countries were subjected to various types of despotic rulers, governing their countries with an iron fist in the context of widespread autocracy. This led in many cases to a downward spiral.  The most dangerous of the many negative effects of political oppression is the impediment of social mobility, in the sense that it impairs the opportunity for the most qualified citizens to rise to leading positions in various fields. The disappearance of a healthy process of social mobility makes for a static situation in which inept and mediocre persons come to occupy top positions by dint of accepting, indeed, of supporting, oppression through unquestioning loyalty to their superiors.  In other words, Arab and Islamic societies in general are caught today in an equation which I call ‘the equation of destruction’:  Oppression and autocracy produce followers, not competent people.   Lack of social mobility destroys competence across the board at all societal levels.  Lack of competence in turn results in the collapse of all institutions and in widespread mediocrity which becomes the norm.  This consecutively engenders a powerful evil energy, namely despair and rage, which breed the mentality of violence.  That mentality attends to the devaluation of the worth of human life, whether of one’s self or of others, as well as spreads a desire for revenge.  This acquired “mentality of violence” came to permeate many of these societies.

   By the same token, oppressors prevent the growth of civil society, generalize incompetence and divide political life into two levels:

· a level above ground (which belongs exclusively to the rulers and their cohorts)

· a level below ground (which belongs to symbols of Wahhabi, Qutbi,[19] or other such versions of  Islam, who receive the best possible training in the art of growing underground in secrecy). 

In the absence of civil society, with the lack of social mobility and the prevalence of incompetence, the stage is set for a new group of oppressors who are at the same time themselves incompetent.  No sooner are there changes causing the downfall and removal of the despotic ruler in these societies (Suharto in Indonesia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq)[20] than there emerge on the scene symbols of the fanatical interpretation of Islam by the only political force which existed underground, putting themselves forward as saviours! However, they will only lead their societies to greater depths of backwardness, distance them still further from the modern age and sink them even deeper into social problems.  Some people are fooled into thinking that these fanatic symbols are the only political power produced by those societies.  But as explained, there is a compound error here: this state of affairs is produced by the despotic rulers and their autocratic regimes who kill social mobility.

   Both sets of oppressors, those operating above ground and those belonging to clandestine underground organizations, are products of this equation to which I repeatedly refer. A valid question here is why this is the only model that emerges whenever an oppressive regime falls in a Muslim or Arab country. The answer is simply that this is a natural result of the widespread despair felt by those living under an autocratic regime that allows no political activities above ground. Hence, the only organizations that can survive in its shadow are those operating underground. The cure must start with the first link in the chain, not with the last. The educational and media institutions are incapable of redressing this disaster, because they too have been corrupted at the hands of incompetent leadership. 

   B. Wahhabism and Tribal Values

   In the years between 1967 and 1973, when I was studying towards a degree in law and a Masters in comparative law, I acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Later, while teaching at universities abroad, I set out to develop a wider knowledge of the subject. My readings took me beyond the circle of the four Sunni[21] schools of jurisprudence to those of the Shi’ites[22] and the four main doctrines of the Khawarij[23], as well as to other schools, such as the eponymous Al-Tabari[24] and Al-Laith[25] and their interpretations.  My readings did not stop there, and I found myself exploring other worlds closely linked to the field of Islamic jurisprudence, the most important being the doctrine of the Mutakallimun[26] (dialectical theologians), and delving deeply into the philosophical teachings of the Mu’tazalites[27] and the Ash’arites.[28]  There was also the world of the Bateneyites[29] in the history of Islam, to which I was introduced by a close friend, Dr. Mahmoud Ismail,[30] whose writings on the thinking of the Khawarij, the Qarametta[31] and of what he calls the other “secret sects” of Islam (radical fringe movements that never became part of mainstream Islam), served as one of my primary sources while studying the history of Islamic jurisprudence.  In short, we are dealing here not just with one single model of Islam but with a multitude of interpretations by different schools. Islamic texts are amenable to many interpretations. Some of the earliest converts to Islam admitted as much some one thousand four hundred years ago when they said “The Qur'an displays many faces”.[32]  Again, what counts is not the scripture or text but the person who reads, understands and presents it. 

   The practice of relying on one text while ignoring another is a destructive process that lends itself to abuse. As a student of the Torah and the Talmud, particularly the Babylonian Talmud, known as the Gemara, I do not allow myself to take at face value the words spoken by Joshua, son of Nun, on a certain occasion in a given context. By the same token, I cannot accept that “saddaq” (dowry) is an article of Jewish faith just because King Saul demanded it from David, son of Jesse of Bethlehem (King David for the Jews, the Prophet David for the Muslims) for the hand of his daughter Michal. I cannot go around brandishing this text as a divine revelation outside its historical, human and chronological framework.

   For example, the sources of jurisprudence and the number of the Prophet's “Hadiths” regarded as sources of religious doctrine and practice vary widely from one school to another. The great jurist Abu Hanifah[33] accepted just over a hundred as apostolic precept, while the conservative theologian Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal accepted over ten thousand in his book Al-Musnad.  Thus, the Hanafites[34] rely on istihsan (literally preference, which means using few traditions and extracting from the Qur'an the rulings which fit their ideas) while the Malikites[35] rely on istislah (public advantage). Then we have those who insist on a dogmatic interpretation of holy texts and others who, like Ibn Rushd, eschewed narrow interpretation in favor of deductive reasoning (al ta'weel).

   Even when it comes to the consumption of alcoholic drinks, we have different opinions. Whereas most jurists interpret the text addressing the subject as banning drinking altogether, others like Abu Hanifah believe the ban applies only to intoxication. He makes his views on the subject clear in the following passage:

"If it gets me thrown into Hell I will not drink it,

But even if I am thrown into Hell I will not call it sinful."

   1. The Roots of Wahhabism

Having different trends, creeds and schools of thought, Islam has had its share of fanatical hard-liners through the ages, from its inception up to the present. As early as the first century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects who demanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles of faith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents eschew violence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth. The phenomenon began with the emergence of Al-Khawarij[36] (the Seceders) in 660 AD - the middle of the first Hijra century -,[37] (their most important doctrine is the Abadeya School still prevalent in a small region of Algeria and in most of the Sultanate of Oman). This was a sect which preached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture and practiced a version of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt its teachings as heretics. This was the first such sect, but by no means the last. Throughout the history of Islam the quiet rhythm of religious life was disrupted many times by marginal groups who tried to impose their extremist views on the majority by violent means.[38]

   Among the earliest was Hamdan Ibn Qarmat,[39] who carried away the Black Stone of the Ka'bah,[40] and the latest is the man now hiding in the caves of Wazirstan, Osama bin Laden.[41] In between these two, was Sayed Qutb, who came up with a theory that will continue to be a wall separating Muslims from the rest of humanity and from any hope of progress until it is torn down. Known as the "theory of divine dominion," it postulates that mortals are not ruled by mortals but by God. And who, you might well ask, will make God's wishes known to humans? The answer is, of course, "we, the 'ulemas"!  It is a theory that holds Muslims hostage to a theocracy overtaken by the march of human progress and places them at the mercy of a power structure dominated by a caste of clerics, even though in most Muslim doctrines there is no such thing as a clergy in Islam and no intermediaries between Man and God. As to the farcical notion of men of religion passing themselves off as men of wide learning, which is the English translation of the word 'ulema, a recent incident illustrates just how limited their fund of knowledge really is. In the course of a debate which took place recently, someone asked one of these 'ulemas, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,[42] whether he knew who Bill Gates was. His reply: "I don't, and it is not important to know!" This amazing reply also shows how insular and isolated from the realities of modern life these self-appointed authorities truly are.

   Alongside the groups and sects whose members insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life, there was the general trend represented in the main Sunni[43] schools (the most important being the Hanafi[44], Maliki, Shafi^ci and Hanbali, and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tabari),[45] as well as the Shi’ites, who are split into a number of sects. The most important Shi’ite[46] sect is the Imamiyah, or Ithna'ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), so called because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of Ali Ibn-Abi Talib.[47] (According to their belief, the twelfth imam, who disappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return). It is within this general trend that prominent proponents of deductive reasoning emerged, like the great jurist Abu Hanifah, as well as uncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal.[48] The conservative Ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy and tradition against any intellectual endeavor and for a time exerted a considerable hold on public imagination. His influence eventually waned, but prior to the decline that preceded recent resurrection in 1744 AD, in his heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little room was left for reason. The two main disciples of Ibn-Hanbal were Ibn-Taymiyah[49] and Ibn-Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya,[50] who, like their mentor, allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic adherence to the Hadiths as authoritative sources of all matters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to govern every aspect of daily life. In addition, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali[51] (Algazel), a strict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd[52] (Averroes), who championed the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schools waged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazali with his book, “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” (Tahafut al-Falasifah). Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense of rationality, “The Incoherence of the Incoherence” (Tahafut Al Tahafut). But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearly in Al-Ghazali's favour, and the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appeal to the authority of tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun,[53] (dialectical theologians), who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazali, over that of reason ('aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd.

   In the course of a journey extending for over twenty years, I developed a strong aversion for those I call “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition”, and a profound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, of course, Ibn Rushd (Averroes).  His championship of the primacy of reason, though rejected by the Muslim world, took root strongly in Europe, particularly in France, which embraced his vision wholeheartedly.  Europe’s gain was our loss; as in turning our backs on Ibn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development.  A close reading of all of Ibn Taymiyah’s works, as well as the works of his disciples, from Ibn Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya to Mohamed Ibn- Abdul Wahhab at the end of the eighteenth century, only deepened my aversion towards this trend and my admiration for the Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters of religion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason over that of dogma, like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna)[54], Al-Farabi[55] and the leading exponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.

   When I compare some of the works of Al-Ghazali (Algazel) - like “The Revival of the Religious Sciences” (Ihya’ Ulum ad-Din), “The Criterion of Knowledge” (Mi’yar al-‘Elm), “The Criterion of Work” (Mi’yar al-‘Amal), “Salvation From Perdition” (Al-Monqedh Min al’Dallal), “The Essence of Orthodoxy” (Al-Mustafa Min Elm al-Osoul) and the “Incoherence of the Philosophers” (Tahafut al-Falasifah), which are distinctly lacking in rationality - with the writings of Ibn Rushd - like “The Distinguished Jurist's Primer”  (Bidayat al-Mujtahid Wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid), “Relationship of Religious Law with Philosophy” (Fasl al-Maqal fi ma bayn al-Shari`a wa al-hikma min al-Ittisal), “Islamic Doctrine and Its Proofs”  (Al-Kashf `an Manahij al-Adilla fi `Aqa'id al-Milla) -,  in which rationality reigns supreme, I am amazed that the battle waged between the exponents of these two distinct schools ten centuries ago should have ended up in a clear victory for Al-Ghazali and a crushing defeat for Ibn Rushd. Nowhere is the difference in the approach of the two men more evident than in their defining works mentioned here above: Al-Ghazali’s “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” and Ibn Rushd’s “The Incoherence of the Incoherence.”

   I spent years trying to understand why the Muslims had chosen to follow the line advocated by Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition for whom knowledge meant only knowledge of religion and who cancelled the role of the mind altogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge through intuition, over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd, who upheld the primacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not to reap. Why Al-Ghazali’s ideas were so readily accepted, while Ibn Rushd’s were rejected? I believe the answer to this paradox can be summed up in one word: despotism. I am also amazed at how historians of Islamic thought concealed the fact that Al-Ghazali was unfailingly supportive of despotic rulers, contrary to Ibn Rushd, who was a constant source of irritation for tyrants determined to keep their subjects in a state of intellectual inertia, thereby guaranteeing the perpetuation of the status quo and their continued unchallenged authority.  For an active mind is the source of questions and questions lead to accountability and, as an enlightened friend put it, questions have eyes and answers are blind!

At a time when despotism in our part of the world was at its height, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should have found Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd. The orthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under the yoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with the views of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension of their critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenment were locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifled intellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat. This explains why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious centre of learning like the University of Paris supported the ideas of the Arab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.[56]

   The Muslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challenge to their authority and an equally despotic religious establishment which decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to the authority of tradition. Closely linked as to methods, motivations and goals, these two factors created an atmosphere that was inimical to the unhindered pursuit of knowledge. Still, things were not only either black or white.  True, the Muslims lost a historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard that could have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europe from the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to the vigorous intellectual climate encouraging debate, free thinking, general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. But it is also true that Muslims have known both an Islam, which allowed for the acceptance of the “Other”, and another rigid, doctrinaire, violently repressing free thought.  The first took hold in the more intellectually vibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancient civilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, which I call the “Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam”.  The second can best be described as the Bedouin model, and was espoused by the secret sects[57] (limited in number and influence) who emerged in remote areas of the Arabian Peninsula together with the rise of Wahhabism, a puritan revival movement launched by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab from Najd,[58] where he was born in 1703.

   Although the first model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, it adopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as a system of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled all aspects of life and governed the affairs of society.  Even if it cannot claim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinking and freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it was nevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could and did coexist with others. 

   The altogether different Bedouin model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolated communities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to the outside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground for the ideas of Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya and, towards the end of the eighteenth century; those of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.  This was the model that produced the Saudi Brotherhood who waged war on King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud (1870-1953) in the nineteen twenties. It has since metamorphosed into a powerful ideology thanks to the combination of the ideas of Sayed Qutb, petrodollars and a series of blunders on the part of international, regional and local players. One such blunder was what happened in Afghanistan at the end of the seventies. Another was the late President Sadat's[59] ill-advised decision to give free rein to Islamic groups and consider them allies in his war on the Left.  Not surprisingly, the move was orchestrated by senior members of the Muslim brotherhood acting through their mouthpiece, the wealthy businessman and close confidante of Sadat, Osman Ahmed Osman.

   2. The Growth of Wahhabism

   The man who founded Wahhabism was not a theologian but a proselytizer who was determined to convert the faithful to his harsh brand of Islam.  Intellectually close to the dialectical Islamic theologians who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql) over reason (‘aql), Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab was a disciple of Ibn-Taymiyah, a strict traditionalist who allowed little scope for reason or independent thinking. He was also a product of his geographical environment, a remote outpost of history.  Unlike Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, where ancient civilizations had flourished and left their mark on human history, or places like al-Hijaz and a number of the Gulf coastal line cities, which lay on trade routes and dealt extensively with the outside world, the desert of Najd in the Eastern Province of what is now Saudi Arabia had no civilization to speak of before Islam. Nor did it ever become a cultural centre like the various capitals of the Caliphate,[60] Medina, Damascus and Baghdad. Thanks to its arid, barren landscape, Najd remained a cultural backwater, its sole contribution to the arts a traditional form of poetry that spoke of narrow tribal matters.

In 1744, Abdul Wahhab forged an alliance with the ruler of Al-Dir'iyah,[61] a tribal chieftain by the name of Mohamed Ibn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the first incarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to control nearly one million square meters of the Arabian Peninsula.

   A collision between the two models of Islam was inevitable, and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on the battlefield. Mohamed Ali,[62] who introduced Egypt and the entire region to the modern age, sent a huge army to the Arabian Peninsula. Led first by the Egyptian ruler’s son Tousson then by Tousson’s younger brother, Ibrahim, the army had as its objective the destruction of the newly established state in the Eastern Province of the Arabian Peninsula. Based in Najd, that state was governed according to the strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. In 1818, under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army, and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, emerged victorious.   They defeated the enemy, destroyed their capital, Al-Dir’iyah, and captured their leader, who was later executed in Istanbul. Mohamed Ali's decision to first send his son Tousson followed by his son Ibrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the first Saudi state, had implications going far beyond the political or military ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a “cultural/ civilizational” confrontation between the two models of Islam.  A confrontation the enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model decided to take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanatical Wahhabi model. Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by the European model of development and saw no contradiction between the mechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs, believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstacle in the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805 (and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848) to place Egypt on a similar road to development.  However, though the moderate, tolerant, mainstream version of Islam, which accepted to coexist in peace with others and was not pathologically opposed to progress and modernity, emerged victorious in that particular round of its confrontation with the forces of obscurantism, it was later forced to retreat before the internal factors I have previously mentioned, namely, oppression, absence of social mobility, spread of incompetence, despair, outdated educational systems and corruption.

   The winds of change were blowing throughout the region, and the years that followed were not kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’s influence receded as its economy and educational system declined. At the same time, the proponents of the model of Islam which demanded a strict adherence to the letter of scripture and slammed the door shut in the face of rationality suddenly found themselves in control of vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave the Saudis an enormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extend their influence into the traditional strongholds of the Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaign to co-opt establishment personalities and institutions. The success of this campaign found its most salient expression in the emergence of fanatical movements like the Taliban.  Thus, that other stricter version of Islam found opportunities to spread its uncompromising message to every corner of the world for the first time, aided by international conditions (and lack of vision) which allowed what had once been an obscure sect confined behind the sand dunes of Najd to impose itself on the world stage and boldly proclaim its brand of Islam as the one and only true Islam.

   As the drama played out, some of the spectators chose to look the other way, because the sword-wielding hero of the piece was playing the role required of him at the time. Thus they failed to realize that the hero was no longer sticking to the script set for him, but was now playing a much more central and dangerous role. This unfortunate state of affairs could have been avoided if the majority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd’s ideas or if conditions had not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.

   The harsh and unforgiving environment in which the Najdis lived explains why Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab found a receptive audience for the equally harsh and unforgiving brand of Islam he preached. The same environment that produced the founder of Wahhabism later produced the radical Ikhwan movement which challenged the authority of King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud. In the nineteen twenties, the king took on the Ikhwan, who were openly accusing him of deviating from the true faith. When he returned to Riyadh after joining Hijaz to his kingdom, the Ikhwan said he had left on a camel and returned in an American car! This was just one of many clashes between the movement and the king over such issues as whether the radio was sinful or the telephone an invention of the devil.  In short, conflicts over any of the fruits of modernity which threatened their fundamentalist vision of the world. It is a vision that can only be understood by studying what is known as the secret sects of Islam, as well as the message of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab, the product of many factors, including the sociological and geopolitical environment of the deserts of Najd. These factors allowed the Wahhabis, after they invaded Hijaz, to impose their austere understanding of religion throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Among other things, they banned tombstones and any structures identifying burial sites, insisting on unmarked graves to flush with the land. They combated Sufism[63] in Mecca and elsewhere as contrary to the teachings of Islam. They even entered into an armed clash with the Egyptian mahmal, a splendidly decorated litter on which the Egyptians sent a new cover for the Ka’bah[64] every year. The mahmal ceremony was a merry occasion celebrated by the Egyptians with their traditional love of music, dancing and revelry. For the Najdis, who had launched their puritanical revival movement to purge Islam of what they saw as deviations from the straight and true path of orthodoxy, such unseemly displays of levity could not be tolerated.

   What I want to cast light on here is that throughout its history, the desert wasteland of the Arabian Peninsula’s Eastern Province had suffered greatly from its geography. However, it contained the richest oil fields and, following the oil price boom that turned the desert kingdom into a major financial power, it was inevitable that this part of the world should try and market its ideas. This it did with missionary zeal in the second half of the twentieth century. With a virtually endless supply of funds at their disposal, the Wahhabis were able to successfully propagate their model of Islam throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Disillusioned populations, facing massive internal problems caused by political oppression and its consequences were easy prey, and mainstream Islam gradually lost ground to the austere, puritanical Wahhabi model that was now presenting itself as the one and only true Islam.

   C. Flawed Education

   Educational systems that are out of step with the age are a vital link in the chain of destruction. Educational systems in most Islamic and Arab societies encourage insularity and reinforce a sense of isolation from the rest of humanity, promote fanaticism and lay down, without any scientific basis, religious frameworks for struggles that are purely political. By invoking religious texts taken out of context they not only promote intolerance, non-acceptance of “the Other”, and a lack of belief in pluralism, but also consecrate the lowly status of women.  Moreover, most of the curricula are designed to develop a mentality of ‘answering’ rather than of ‘questioning,’ in a world where progress and development are driven by the dynamics of questioning.  In most Islamic and Arab societies, educational programs fail to instill in the minds of the young that ‘progress’ is a human process, in the sense that its mechanisms are neither eastern nor western, but universal.  This is borne out by the fact that the list of most advanced countries in the world includes some that are Western/Christian, like the United States and Western Europe, and others with a Japanese, Chinese or Muslim background (like Malaysia).   There is a clear and growing tendency in the humanities and social sciences to disengage, as it were, from the common fund of human experience, the cumulative legacy built up over the ages by various civilizations.  

   In a lecture I delivered recently at a British University, I said that in the sixties I had read most of the classics, from Homer[65] to Sartre,[66] passing through hundreds of names, languages and backgrounds.  Like many of my contemporaries, I had read these works in Arabic. The unfettered access we had at the time to the timeless classics of world literature linked us to humanity in a way that is inconceivable today, with the paucity of translations in the cultural milieu in Arab and Islamic countries. My audience at the lecture was amazed to learn that, along with others of my generation, I had read Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Euripides, Sophocles, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Racine, Molière, Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, all the Russian classics, Flaubert, Balzac, Bernard Shaw, Pirandello, Albert Camus, Steinbeck, Faulkner and the gems of German philosophy in Arabic, translated by people predominantly from Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and published mainly in Egypt and Lebanon.  Today, the gap between the minds of young people in Islamic and Arab societies and the masterpieces of human creativity has increased dramatically. In addition, the new generations have become increasingly ‘local’, setting themselves still further apart from humanity and increasing the mentality of violence and its culture.

   D. Religious Teaching in Egypt

   According to some statistics fully one quarter of those enrolled in the educational system in Egypt today are studying in religious educational establishments (schools, academies, and colleges run by Al-Azhar).[67] Other statistics reduce the number to one fifth, while a recent survey places it at no more than one sixth. Even if we assume that the lowest estimate of one sixth, that is, slightly over 16%, is the correct one, this means that more than three million students receive their education from start to finish in religious establishments. And the number would rise to four or five million if we accept the other statistics. What is certain is that we are facing an educational phenomenon that is bound to have far-reaching social, political and economic ramifications and hence needs to be closely examined and analyzed.                          

   The first question that springs to mind here is "why". Why does a society like Egypt's end up sending such large numbers of its youth to study at religious establishments? This question evokes another question: What brought us to this? Was it planned or is it a random development that grew out of a reality not governed by strategic planning, but by reactions and bureaucracy?                            

   Before going into the question of why this phenomenon has reached such proportions in Egypt, it should be noted that, apart from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen, no similar phenomenon exists in any other of the more than two hundred states in the world. Accordingly, we need to ask ourselves whether we have allowed matters to reach this point because we aspire to be not like Japan, Singapore, France, Canada or Spain (educationally and hence culturally) but like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen. And is this what we aimed for when we laid down a strategic educational policy in full awareness of its implications and consequences?                   

   It beggars belief that we could knowingly have put in place an educational policy aimed at having one quarter, one fifth or one sixth of young people enrolled in the educational system receive their education in religious establishments. In fact, I would say that we never did lay down such a policy - or, indeed, any educational policy at all!                              

   In my view, matters evolved in the direction they have as a result of realities on the ground as well as bureaucracy. The huge amount of educational religious establishments we are now seeing sprouted up haphazardly, in reaction to specific problems, such as the lack of educational institutions within easy reach of children living in small towns and villages and as a place of educational refuge for pupils who could not, whether for lack of material means or minimal educational requirements, join the general education system. If I am right, and I believe I am, our approach to the problem of education is consistent with our approach to many other issues.                               

   Writing this, forced me to contemplate some alarming facts. Among the most disturbing is that we established the network of religious education as the solution of least resistance, so to speak, for the problems of the lowest social classes and the segments of society with the poorest learning skills. If that is so, this means that from a strategic point of view we are injecting huge numbers of the most disadvantaged elements of society - economically, socially and in terms of learning skills - into a religious educational system that is acquiring gargantuan proportions. Moreover, we have done so without making any effort to consider the strategic results - political, economic and social - of this "solution" on the future of society.                                             

   Over the years I have asked many, probably hundreds, of junior employees and workers if their children were attending Al-Azhar schools. The great majority replied in the negative and expressed disdain for the quality of education provided by these schools. Their reaction led me to believe, perhaps wrongly, that religious education in our society is perceived as the last refuge of those who, for lack of social, economic or mental abilities, have no recourse to the general education system. Once again I must emphasize that allowing this phenomenon to flourish unchecked will have dire consequences for society at large. The time has come to study the phenomenon and the adverse strategic results it is bound to produce rather than leave it to the culture of improvising ad hoc solutions that has prevailed for decades.                                         

   Over the last few decades, our society has been swept by a powerful wave of obscurantism, as evidenced by the primitive and archaic understanding of religion that has become all too prevalent. And yet no one seems to have studied the relationship between this wave and the hordes of mainly underprivileged members of society who have studied in religious educational establishments and who are, for obvious reasons, particularly vulnerable to the appeal of a simplistic understanding of religion.

   Have any of our strategic thinkers looked at the phenomenon from another angle and asked themselves what effect these huge numbers of Egyptian students enrolled in religious establishments will have on the country's scientific, technological, industrial and trade sectors? We have seen other countries expand religious education to the point which eventually gave rise to a cadre of men of religion determined to prevent their societies from joining the march of progress. Can we honestly say that we are not moving uncomfortably close to a similar scenario?                                             

   It is also to be questioned whether we have looked at the issue of religious education in Egypt from an extremely important perspective, namely that of progressive values. The values of progress are a set of values forming an integral part of the ethos of every prosperous society. Among the most important of those, are belief in human diversity, pluralism, the universality of knowledge, human rights and women's rights. I spent hours reviewing the curricula offered by Al-Azhar's educational establishments on various subjects such as culture, literature and languages, and found them to be either totally devoid of any attempt to plant the seeds of these values in their students' minds or actually actively promoting opposing values. Are we aware of the magnitude of the problem we have ourselves created by producing graduates whose conscience and mentality are inculcated with values diametrically opposed to the values of progress? In this connection, it is well to remember that progress is more a function of a set of values than it is of material resources.                                                 

   Has anyone considered the possibility that, by allowing such a huge number of religious educational establishments to mushroom in our midst, we are, from a strategic political perspective, ultimately serving the interests of a trend that has rightfully been described by the state as the worst enemy of civil society? Are we as a society and a state financing the enemies of civil society and of progress? Has anybody reflected on how such an extensive network of religious educational establishments will impact the general cultural climate, social peace and our nature as a Mediterranean society? Or is the issue of such little importance that no one considers it worthy of attention?

   E. Absence of “Competence”

   Over the last four decades, many have written about the phenomenon of rising violence in a large number of Islamic and Arab societies.  Strangely enough, none of those who wrote used the terms ‘competent’ or ‘incompetent’ in their analysis of this phenomenon. This is as true of eminent professors in top-notch universities, like Harvard’s Samuel P. Huntington,[68] and Francis Fukuyama[69] as it is of the media, which has taken up the concept and used – if not abused – this “Huntigtonian” concept and turned it more or less into a slogan.  I have never come across this key word in all my readings on the subject. This calls to mind a talk I gave a few years ago to MBA students at the American University in Cairo, in which I remarked that in hundreds of conversations I had had with various interlocutors about public figures, both local and international, the word competence never came up. It is an inexplicable omission, especially for a management man like me, who knows that problems are created by lack of competence while success in all its forms comes from competence.  In fact, as I previously said, I believe the despair felt by so many in Islamic and Arab societies, the sense of helplessness and hopelessness that breeds anger and then violence, stems from the fact that these societies are run by human resources selected not for their competence but for their subservience and allegiance. After all, competence, as defined by modern management science, is of no great concern to an autocratic political system.

   The Example of Egypt:  The roots of religious extremism in Egypt stem from three sources. The first is the harsh treatment meted out to the followers of the Islamic trend in Egypt by Nasser's[70] regime. Ever since the disputes between the regime and the Moslem Brotherhood erupted into serious conflict, the regime resorted to force and torture against the movement members. This happened in 1954 and again in 1965 when the confrontation was even more severe. Certainly the methods used by Nasser against the Islamic currents, whose members were persecuted, imprisoned, exiled and tortured, created generations of extremists among those who had suffered at his hands as well as from their progeny. Had they not been trampled upon so harshly by Nasser, the Moslem Brothers would most likely not have produced elements as extremist, as reactionary and as insular as the militant Islamic groups we see today.

   Thus, once again we can see that terror breeds terror. The repression of ideas and beliefs produces unexpected forms of extremism, violence, terrorism and even crime. Significantly, the four largest terrorist groups in the world today emerged in countries which were subjected to repressive dictatorships for long enough to produce those forms of organized violence: the Bader Meinhof Gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army in Japan and the Basque group ETA in Spain. These organizations emerged in the fascist countries which formed the Axis in World War II, with the exception of Spain which, nevertheless, was also a bastion of fascism under Franco.

   In Egypt too, the many years of repressive dictatorship generated a climate of extremism where it had never previously existed. The second source of extremism in Egypt today is the prevailing socioeconomic situation. Many factors combine to create the perfect climate for extremism and the spread of totalitarian tendencies, whether towards the left into Marxist groups or towards the right into sectarianism and religious dogmatism. These factors are: poverty, the decline in living standards, the appearance of a very wealthy minority noted for its conspicuous consumption, the harrowing problems of daily life and the social anarchy they create, as well as a breakdown in society's system of values, the cornerstone on which the system is built.

   Karl Marx's[71] famous appeal to the working class, "Workers of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!" well illustrates the link between extremism and impecunious socioeconomic conditions. Economic crises generate feelings of deep frustration, especially among the young, who despair of attaining their legitimate right to a decent life. The lack of access to such basic necessities as a home, food and clothes -and education - make them susceptible to hardliners who claim that society is corrupt and doomed and that it should be destroyed to make room for a better society. These disenchanted youngsters were never given the tools to compare their society, whatever its shortcomings, to the insubstantial dream they are offered. Thus the crushing economic crisis and the ensuing breakdown in social values provide an excellent opportunity for advocates of extremism, whether communists or militant religious elements, to peddle their ideas.

   Finding radical solutions to the social and economic difficulties besetting Egypt would certainly help extirpate some of these problems, reducing the appeal of the extremism we are witnessing today.

   The third source can be attributed to external factors. Egypt is in the eye of a storm of radicalism blowing from every direction in the Middle East, especially from Iran and Lebanon, and the contagion is helped along with foreign funding and incitement. This unhealthy climate is due to internal as well as external factors mainly that the region, which did not succeed in producing democratic regimes, has now fallen into the clutches of ruthless forces: Zionism, arms dealers and other parties with a vested interest in keeping the region in ferment.

   The protection of the Egyptian society from the scourge of foreign intervention and financing is, of course, the task of the security forces. But as important as this is, their role in dealing with the phenomenon of religious fanaticism cannot eliminate its causes nor bring it to a halt. The only proper cure is a combination of real democracy (as opposed to window dressing) and firm action by eminent religious figures who should use their moral authority to contain the problem, not fan the flames of extremism as so many do. Last but not least, we need the vigilance of the security forces, particularly in Upper Egypt where traditional tribal values combined with religious fanaticism constitute a highly explosive mixture.

II. “The Clash of Civilizations”; True or False?

   The mentality of violence produced by internal factors is thus a variable that has emerged only in the last four decades.  Its inclusion as a constant in the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm is not only forced but belongs more to the realm of science fiction than political analysis. A case in point is the famous book by Samuel P. Huntington, whose theory is closely linked to the issue of the mentality of violence.  As I mentioned, it was first published as an article in 1992 under the title “Clash of Civilizations?”  and it was then expanded into a book and published the following year under the same title – but without the question mark. The significance of the omission will not be lost on the reader. The book was a publishing event, selling more copies and provoking more controversy than any other book that year (with the exception of fiction bestsellers).  While I cannot pass the same kind of sweeping judgment against the author, his motives, aims and intentions as those passed against him in various parts of the Arab and Islamic world, I will say that I found the book to have three major flaws:

   The first is that the author talks of Islam as a monolith, as though the Wahhabi model is the only version of Islam.  In fact, Wahhabism was not a major trend in Islam, as I have previously mentioned, until the alliance that took place between Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab and Mohamed Ibn-Saud in the second half of the eighteenth century. Prior to that, there were ideas similar to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam but they were completely marginal.  Mainstream Islam was quite distinct from the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and its culture. The only relationship between the Ottoman Empire, which represented Islam politically as a superpower for several centuries, and Wahhabism was one of extreme animosity.  I would have been willing to accept most of what Huntington wrote about the probable clash between the West and Islam if he had used the term ‘Wahhabi Islam’ instead of Islam.  I can only conclude that Huntington is not very well versed in the history and factors which led to the rise of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.

   The second is that he did not present any evidence to support his theory of an impending clash between the West and what he calls ‘Confucian’[72] societies, making the theory closer to fiction, specifically to the writings of H.G. Wells,[73] than to political analysis.  It also owes much to Noam Chomsky’s[74] equally unfounded theory that the United States needs an enemy to survive, and that this role was filled by the Eastern Bloc from 1945 to 1990.  Following the collapse of communism, Chomsky believes that Islam is now the prime candidate for the role! But if so, how can one explain the enormous progress made by the United States between 1500 and 1900, without any external conflicts and without any clear enemy during this period of the development and completion of the American Dream?  How can one explain that despite Winston Churchill’s[75] efforts from 1939 to 1941 to convince the United States to join the war on the side of the Allies, it was only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 that his efforts were crowned with success?  How could the United States have resisted the opportunity to benefit from the existence of a ready-made enemy which, according to Chomsky, it needed for its very survival?

   The third is that he did not devote enough space in his book to the largest conflict in the history of humanity, namely World War II, which was fought between forces belonging to the same Western civilization. It was also a conflict within the Christian world; however, nobody ever mentioned religion as a factor in this huge conflict, which was primarily a conflict between European Fascism and European democracies

   To disprove the allegation that the violent groups and trends which turn their backs on modernity and call for a return to the Middle Ages are the true representatives of Islam, one has only to consider how some of the principal Islamic societies were functioning at the turn of the twentieth century. Countries like Egypt, Greater Syria[76] (which included Lebanon at the time) and Turkey were models of tolerance, their majority Muslim populations living peacefully with minorities of other faiths. Renowned cosmopolitan cities like Alexandria, Beirut and Cairo were home to a wide diversity of minorities. Acceptances of the “Other” and of modernity, as well as a hunger for the great masterpieces of human creativity were features shared by all these societies. Intellectuals translated Homer, the plays of Ancient Greece, the best of modern European literature and the great philosophers like Descartes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Diderot, Locke, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Although they were in complete harmony with the scientific, philosophical and artistic consequences of the Renaissance, they retained their national identity as Egyptians, Turks and Syrians. It was a time when Muslims saw no contradiction between their religious faith and their enthusiasm for the material and cultural fruits of European civilization.

   In short, while under non-Wahhabi Islam the Muslim communities in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey were forward-looking, in tune with the times and living in harmony with large Christian and Jewish communities.  It is inconceivable that Wahhabism would have tolerated the kind of cosmopolitan and broad-minded societies that flourished in Alexandria, Cairo, Istanbul, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo at the turn of the twentieth century. On the contrary, the Najdi version of Islam exhorts its followers to remain in a constant confrontation with others, with the age and with modernity. Under Wahhabism, the word jihad is interpreted as the need to carry a sword at all times; yet, mainstream Islam for centuries understood this word as requiring Muslims to resort to force only to defend themselves against outside aggression. Even semantically, the word jihad is totally unrelated to the notion of armed violence; it stems from the root “juhd”, and has the Arabic verb “yajtahid”, which means something between “to try hard” and “to struggle”.  Mainstream Islam also accepted the possibility of Muslims merging with the rest of humanity (especially before the chauvinistic tribal culture of Najd gained ground), while Wahhabism regards this as not possible and unacceptable. Indeed, it is regarded as synonymous with subservience, a term that is widely used by those whose thinking is shaped by the Wahhabi model of Islam. If Noam Chomsky’s theory is valid, it applies just as much to the Wahhabis who need a strong enemy in order to survive.

   The peaceful and harmonious coexistence of devout Muslims with the religious minorities living in their midst, their equally harmonious relationship with the fruits of Western civilization proves conclusively that the adherents of “real” Islam are not violent fanatics and that mainstream Islam has nothing to do with the Wahhabi model of militant Islam, whose success in winning over converts is due to the declining and depressing conditions in many Islamic societies.  Thus it is not the Islamic system of belief that leads inevitably to violence and clashes with the “Other”. Violence and fanaticism are features of only one fringe sect that was virtually unknown outside the deserts of Najd as recently as one century ago. Non-Wahhabi mainstream Islam prevailed in Islamic societies until two cataclysmic developments forced it to retreat: the first was the eruption of the violent model of Islam from behind the sand dunes; the second was the decline in living standards in many Islamic societies which allowed it to spread. 

III. External Factors

   Although I believe the mentality of violence is caused primarily by internal factors, I also believe that an external factor contributed to its spread, namely, the misguided attempts by some to use the forces produced by the mentality of violence for political purposes.  A case in point is the support offered by the India office of MI6 to a group that was attempting to unify the Arabian Peninsula under a political system deriving its legitimacy from a Wahhabi interpretation of Islam at the beginning of the twentieth century.  The Najdi[77] movement, known as the Ikhwan or brotherhood, was a prime example of this trend during the twenties of the last century. King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud, founder of the third dynasty of the Saudi state, was forced to go to war against them after they accused him of deviating from the tenets of what they interpreted as being “real” Islam by accepting such Western abominations as radios, cars, telephones, etc.  During the same period, Egypt saw an alliance formed between the British and the monarchy, where both had an interest in creating an alternative political entity, deriving its attractiveness from the popularity of religion in Egypt, to counterbalance the influential Wafd Party,[78] which spearheaded the Egyptian struggle for a Constitution, a parliamentary life, and independence. Forged in secret, the alliance is now known to anyone studying Egypt’s modern history.  An example of the dangerous game politicians play with the mentality of violence in the hope that they can use it to further their own ends, the game was played again in Egypt in the nineteen seventies and repeated by the United States in Afghanistan. All these cases illustrate how an external factor helped the mentality of violence reach such a level of political and military growth. Had it not been for the Cold War and for the short-sighted belief by some that religion could be used as a winning card in the confrontation, the mentality of violence could never have reached its present alarming proportions. Thus although it is largely a product of internal factors, the mentality of violence was given a huge boost by the unlimited petrodollar wealth – let aside the enormous American (USA) mistake, which can be described as the greatest miscalculation of the cold war era; i.e. the use of political Islam to counteract communism.  And so the world, having rid itself of Fascism, Nazism and then Communism, now finds itself locked in yet another confrontation, this time with a brand of militant political Islam resulting from a shift in the centre of gravity in the Muslim world, i.e. its migration from Egypt to nomadic Arabia.

   The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an extremist group was a wake-up call alerting the world to the growth and spread of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi model of Islam and the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model. A succession of similar events attested to the dangerous spread of this model in most societies with a Muslim majority, such as in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of fanatics, belonging to the Wahhabi brand of Islam, launched attacks on New York and Washington that illustrated how the members of this sect view the “Other” in general and Western civilization in particular.

IV. Progress and Modernity Obstructed

   During the first five hijra centuries,^[79] Muslims witnessed enormous intellectual breakthroughs across a broad range of subjects in Islamic thinking. I reiterate that these successes included topics such as the fundamentals of jurisprudence, linguistics, interpretation and historiography. These intellectual advances resulted in a revolution of opinions and interpretations that varied from the extreme conservative right, such as the Hanbalī school (in reference to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal),^[80] to the utmost level of reason-based interpretation proposed by the great thinker Ibn Rushd (Averroes).^[81] Between those two extremes were a multitude of other schools of thought. However, a combination of closed autocratic regimes, outdated educational systems, state-controlled media, and a rigid, often extremist, understanding of religion rendered many Muslims and Arabs wary of notions like  ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’. The internal factors I have mentioned, coupled with a number of external factors, such as the infantile culture in some highly developed nations, have led the Muslim Arab mind to think that the call for progress and modernity is a call for dependence on the West, hence, the loss of cultural specificity.  What exacerbates the situation is that many Arabs and Muslims feel that the values of Western civilization are for westerners only, and not for everyone.  I have exerted tremendous efforts to make it clear to my readers in Egypt and the Middle East that modernization is a human phenomenon first and foremost.  The prescription for progress has no nationality or religion, as borne out by the different cultural backgrounds of such developed societies as the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea.  I devoted one of my books, “The Values of Progress”, to demonstrating to the young people in my society the fallacy of the argument that progress and modernization will result in the loss of our identity and cultural specificity. As a man who has applied modern management techniques on a large scale, I know that there is ‘successful management’ and ‘unsuccessful management’, but I have no knowledge of Arab, Chinese, African, or French management.  Japan developed in leaps and bounds over the last fifty years, but Japanese society, especially outside the capital, is still quintessentially Japanese. Whoever denies that progress is a purely human phenomenon and that the process leading to it is also human has obviously never seen the mechanics of progress at first hand - which may be the reason most academics are not interested in this issue.

   Oppressive regimes are matched by the local citizen who lacks any connection with the outside world and who thinks that modernity is the other side of the coin of dependence.  He would neither believe that democracy is a human product, and a human right and not a Western commodity for westerners, nor realize that the maxim that “for each society, there is the brand of democracy that suits it” is misleading.  For while it is true that there are many forms of democracy, it is equally true that they all contain mechanisms of accountability designed to bring rulers down from the realm of masters to that of servants of society.

   I will restate that Muslims committed a grave mistake against themselves and their religion when they closed the door to ijtihad (interpretation by reasoning) and stopped searching for new concepts and solutions. They became satisfied with simply emulating and reiterating what their ancestors had produced, although those concepts and solutions were the outcome of an ancient era and the fruits of the conditions of a past time. Therefore, Muslims are living in a status quo environment where they ruminate on the thoughts of other men who exerted efforts to set concepts that suited their time eight centuries ago. In comparison to ancient Muslim men of religion such as Averroes, who is as important intellectually as Aristotle, current Muslim scholars read only in Arabic, are not aware of modern sciences, and find themselves in social environments that prevent them from being intellectually open to the innovations of humanity in the different fields of social and human sciences.

   A. Scholars

   We are now in dire need of a new generation of scholars, who can comprehend the sciences, cultures and knowledge of the current age as well as understand the heritage of early Muslims. Seventy years ago, the grand imam of the Azhar, Dr. Mustafá Abd Al-Raziq, was a former professor of philosophy in a university. Which university you may ask? Not the University of al-Riyadh or the University of Sana'a, but he was a professor at the Sorbonne University.[82]

   I have been engaged in meetings with a number of scholars from the Vatican. I always bemoan and wonder why the Vatican abounds with men of religion with such splendid educational, intellectual and encyclopedic cognitive backgrounds in their various areas of knowledge, while our scholars hardly know anything about the great fruits of human creativity in many of the different branches of social and human sciences!

   At a conference held a few years ago (2006) in Doha, I saw a scholar who is considered by some as the greatest Muslim jurist and preacher of his time. He was an Egyptian with Qatari nationality who fled from Egypt during the clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and Gamal Abd Al-Nasser[83] in 1954. At the conference, he used more than one interpreter, and never got involved in discussions about modern streams of thought. On the other hand, the Vatican scholars were using four or five languages in their discussions covering vast fields of knowledge. I will not hide the fact that I felt ashamed that day, at the primitive thoughts and approaches of this imminent Muslim scholar. It appeared as if he were a primeval human from the forests of “Borneo Island”.

   We need a generation of Muslim religious scholars who have studied other religions, human history, world literature, philosophy, sociology and psychology and can speak several languages; the languages of civilization. Until this happens, our Muslim scholars will remain primitive and stay at their level of naivety, shallowness and isolation from the path of civilization and humanity.

   Before I had reached 20 years of age, two monks at the Dominican Monastery in al-Abbasiyah, Cairo, had taught me about Greek drama and ancient Greek philosophy. Another monk taught me some simple things that have made many people nowadays think that I am an academic expert in Judaism. However, never in my life have I seen a Muslim man of religion who had encyclopedic knowledge in a number of different fields of interest. In conclusion, just as we are underdeveloped in all of the fields of science, we are in the same respect, underdeveloped in the sciences of our own Islamic religion. Our backwardness in Islam is the same as it is in medicine, engineering, information technology and space research. We are nothing but a 'parasite' of humanity. Even the weapons used by the militias of the groups calling themselves jihadis (related to Islamic jihad)[84] are made by others who work hard at a time when we are insipid.

   We need to see the emergence of a generation of this type of men of religion, which I have just described; those who combine the zenith of Islamic sciences and modern sciences at the same time, as without this, the gap between Muslims and the progress of humanity will increase. Campaigns of criticism will escalate against them, and I can foresee that they will be driven in a huge number out of the European communities and out of North America. In addition to that, clashes between Islam and the West, such as the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan,[85] may reoccur. Muslims (or to be more precise, large sectors of the Muslim population) will become the primary enemy of Western civilization or may become the first enemy of humanity at large.

B. Institutions

   Despite the dire need, such long-pursued development within Islamic religious institutions is very unlikely to occur.   The biggest Islamic institutions in the modern world, especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, expel anyone calling for the slightest reform or change. If so, then what should we expect when demands for comprehensive changes are voiced?

   A prominent Islamic university has dismissed Dr. Ahmad Subhi Mansur[86] for his rejection of the recognition of prophetic hadiths as a source of jurisprudential principles. The university should have discussed the differences in viewpoints using a scientific method that would be performed within the framework of a dialogue, and organized debates for the differing scholars to exchange opinions. Strangely enough, Abu Hanifah al-Nu’man, one of the great four Muslim jurists, was in the same situation as Dr. Ahmad Subhi Mansur when he decided to recognize only a few of the prophetic hadiths at a time when other jurists accepted all of them. To be more precise, if Abu Hanifah had seen a book like “Sahih al-Bukhari” (al-Bukhari’s Authentic),[87] he would have rejected more than 90% of its contents. In this situation some modern Islamic universities would have deemed Abu Hanifah a “kafir” (unbeliever) although he was the first of the great four Islamic jurists and was given the title of “The Great Imam”.[88]

   As a matter of fact, conditions in today's Islamic religious institutions do not allow those institutions to produce men of the quality of Abu Hanifah and Averroes. They are more and more isolated and occupied with religious references that have become “yellow” and brittle with age. For centuries, their role in the interpretation of Islam has been restricted to the texts of books and not their contexts. It became rare to find one scholar at these institutions who read even one book in a language other than Arabic.

    The long-sought for change among the Islamic establishment is now contingent upon a political leadership willing to lean toward a rational interpretation of history and a vision for the future. Unfortunately, these qualifications are not easily found within Islamic communities. Nevertheless, we must demand for a political leadership that would work towards achieving radical procedural change within the structure of the Islamic scholarly community, one that would be willing to bring this community in harmony with the age of science and the progress of humanity. Without this driving force, Muslims will be heading for a massive confrontation with humanity which will be as disastrous as a collision between two celestial bodies.

CHAPTER TWO

FACING EMERGENCE

   For the average European or American unfamiliar with some of the facts presented above, it is easy to believe that Islam, violence and terrorism go hand in hand.  The perception of Islam today by many non-Muslims is that it is a fanatical and violent religion. This is a superficial perception, as it ignores the fact that there are at least two models of Islam - one that is uncompromising and extremist in its views and another that is tolerant, moderate and humanistic. It is also a naïve perception which can lead to dangerous decisions like the ones made regarding the West’s policies, when it turned a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabism and established close links with radical Islamic movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.  But those who have a more thorough grasp of the issue know that this perception of Islam has taken hold only because a puritanical, fundamentalist model of Islam, which was marginal and ineffectual before the oil wealth of petrodollars put it on the map, has managed to make the world believe that its interpretation of Islam is the only version and the “real” Islam. The doctrinaire version of Islam propounded by the Wahhabis had no followers among the Muslims of the world before the expansion of Saudi influence following the oil boom. Millions of Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Indonesia, and throughout the world remained immune to the appeal of the fanatical, violent and bloody message of what was a small and obscure sect bred in the intellectually barren landscape of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. All that changed with the massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of Saudi Arabia, which used its new-found wealth to propagate the message of its home-grown Wahhabi sect with missionary zeal. Hence the emergence of militant Islam as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage, a force that now represents a dangerous threat to world peace, to humanity and equally to Islam and Muslims. As I mentioned, half a century ago, the Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey were models of tolerance who believed in a gentle and enlightened Islam that could, and did, coexist peacefully with other religions and cultures. Following the decline in living standards they have suffered since at the hands of despotic and corrupt rulers, they have become easy prey for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam (subsequently spread to include Qutbism and virulent Shi’ite schools).

   There are no permanent social phenomena; they are but the result of circumstances and factors.   Therefore the fear that non-Wahhabi Islam, which was the main trend among the majority of Muslims for several centuries, is being edged out of its central role is a legitimate one.  The moderate brand of Islam will not be reinstated in its former position unless the factors making up the equation of internal collapse, to which Islamic societies are exposed, are solved.  These factors start with autocracy, to the mentality of violence, leading to lack of competence, declining living standards, despair and the collapse of educational systems.  Unless the outside world in general and the world’s only superpower in particular realize that adopting hostile stands against Islam and Muslims indiscriminately can only provoke negative reactions, the moderate brand will not be reinstated.   This is all the more true given that they were partners with those responsible for starting the downward spiral and helped bring about the series of external factors that allowed the cycle of violence to attain its present level. Humanity’s failure to support and reinforce the gentle, non-militant brand of Islam, to which most Islamic societies until recently belonged, by helping remove the internal and external ‘landmines’ which eroded the ability of those societies to stand up to the assault of militant Islam is a crime committed by humanity against itself; it is a crime for which we shall all pay an exorbitant price. I fear that the primary cause of this is the ‘infantile culture’ of the world’s foremost superpower.  The United States, despite its great achievements in tens of fields suffers from what I call in my lectures the “cultural infantilism of American policies”. If we liken humanity to a body, the spinal cord of that body would be culture, a rare commodity among most citizens of the United States and a large portion of its intellectuals. The only explanation for this is the gap between material/ scientific/ technological advances and ‘cultural richness’, and the confusion in all intellectual and cultural centres in the United States between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’.  Perhaps a comparison between “A Study of History” by Arnold Toynbee[89] and the writings of most of the famous American writers on politics and the struggle of civilizations would clarify the point I am trying to make.

   Three decades after the creation of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, many things had changed in the world:

· Saudi Arabia had amassed a huge fortune that enabled it to further the cause of Wahhabism not only within its own borders but throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Its efforts proved successful, as many once moderate Muslims were gradually won over to or bought by the harsh version of Islam preached by the Wahhabis.

· Beginning in the sixties, Egypt suffered a reversal of fortune at all levels, including a decline in its general cultural climate, allowing Wahhabi influence to infiltrate the venerable institution of Al-Azhar.[90] The defeat of June 1967 opened the door wide to groups which espoused the Saudi understanding of Islam and who translated their radical views into political action, often at gunpoint.

· In the context of the Cold War, the West in general and the United States in particular adopted a number of misguided policies towards the region, including turning a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabi influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and even occasionally supporting radical groups inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine to achieve their own political ends, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

   Thus, the question regarding the future of the Muslim mind remains the same as the question over the future of Islamic societies: is it a future of freedom, democracy, prosperity and progress, or the opposite?  The answer to this question will determine the answer to the question about the future of the Muslim mind: will it follow the route of moderate Islam or that of Wahhabi Islam? Speeding up political, economic and educational reform is the only way to reduce the illogical popularity of Islamism in the world. Once people in Muslim societies start to reap the benefits of freedom and active participation, coupled with a marked improvement in their economic and living conditions and real educational reform, their admiration for Islamist groups will wane and they will realize that their welfare will not come at the hands of groups whose leaders are fanatical, narrow-minded and out of touch with the requirements of the age.

   Despair, deplorable living conditions, feelings of injustice, the harsh realities of life and rampant corruption constitute the ideal environment for converts to the ideology of political Islam, which offers ‘hope’ in an atmosphere of hopelessness. But offering hope is one thing, while making good on the offer quite a different matter. The Islamists are selling dreams (mirages) and promises (false) professing that they have a formula to cure all of society’s ills. In reality, however, they lack the credentials, not to mention the competence, required to undertake such a task. As someone who has spent many years at the head of a large institution, I find it hard to see what the source of their competence can be. Progress is a modern management concept that can be achieved by anyone - Christians, Jews, Muslims and Buddhists - as long as its elements are available. These elements are political, managerial, economic, educational and humanistic, regardless of religion or nationality.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PROLIFERATION

I. The Weapons of Terrorism

   A. Advocates or Followers?

   The word terrorism has been used to describe the activities of various groups over the last half century. For example, the British denounced the operations carried out by the Irish Republican Army as terrorism, while the same description was applied to the activities of such militant groups as ETA, the organization seeking autonomy for the Basque region lying between Spain and France, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, the Red Army in Japan and similar movements in Latin America. However, when the word terrorism is mentioned today, what immediately springs to the mind (in societies other than the Arab and Muslim) is that an Arab or Muslim has committed an act of violence. The linkage between terrorism and Muslims has grown over the last six years, giving rise to the irrational fear of Islam known as “Islamophobia”.  Actually, there is no doubt that Muslims or Arabs are usually implicated in acts that are today described by the world as terrorism. When it comes to addressing this phenomenon, there are two main schools of thought; one condemning Muslims in absolute terms, the other (Islamic) school justifies it as a reaction to what Muslims were and continue to be exposed to. With apologies to both schools, I would like to adopt a novel approach here by attempting to identify the sources or pillars of a phenomenon that has become one of the main areas of concern for a growing number of scholars and analysts throughout the world.

   Although I admit that the Arab/Muslim model of terrorism differs from others in terms of magnitude, in the sense that it is far more widespread than any other phenomenon described as terrorism (such as the Irish model), I believe that the difference is primarily due to the greater number of followers it can lay claim to. In other words, while the advocates of this form of terrorism are few in number and comparable to those operating in other cultural and religious contexts, the number of disciples attracted to the ideas propounded by the advocates of violence in the Islamic case is considerably larger.

   I believe those who deal politically or from a security angle with what is described as Islamic terrorism, as well as the analysts who study the phenomenon, disregard the extremely important distinction between ‘advocates' and ‘followers'. To my mind, the distinction is the key to finding solutions and dealing successfully with a phenomenon seen by many outside the Muslim communities as the greatest challenge to humankind and civilization in the twenty-first century.

   Advocates who try to win over adherents to their cause by getting their message across through books, articles, lectures, speeches or sermons, cannot attract large numbers of followers unless the mental and psychological state of their audience and the political, economic and social conditions in which their prospective followers live make them receptive to their message, be it positive or negative. In all religions, sects and ethnicities there are advocates who disseminate extremely radical and sometimes extremely aggressive, ideas. But the number of followers who adopt those ideas differs from one case to another. For example, some Jewish and Christian leaders advocate ideas that are totally at odds with common humanity, with tolerance and acceptance of the Other – indeed, they sometimes call for death to others. But the number of followers who espouse their cause is nowhere close to the number of those whom advocates of some extremist Islamic ideas succeed in winning over. Many political regimes (unfortunately supported by some members of the intelligentsia) lump the members of both groups – advocates and followers – together and deal with them through the state's security apparatus; an approach that only compounds the problem.

   Although the advocates of violence are dangerous, I believe the security risk they represent is limited. Their message cannot in and of itself push any society to the point reached by a number of Muslim societies today. I also believe that using police methods against them will not produce positive results. Indeed, it could be counterproductive.

   Take the case of Sayed Qutb, the Islamist thinker executed in 1966.[91] His ideas survived his death to become, after their merger with the Wahhabi doctrine, the primary ideological source on which most of the radical movements of political Islam draw today. The only way to curtail the influence wielded by the advocates of violence is through a concerted cultural and ideological campaign by enlightened members of the intelligentsia. For ideas can only be fought with ideas, beliefs with beliefs. And, if the campaign is to succeed it will not be thanks to the ‘official' intellectuals who lack any credibility and who are more of bureaucrats than independent thinkers.

   In the final analysis, however, it is not the advocates of violence but their followers, who constitute the cornerstone of the phenomenon known as Islamic terrorism. The solution to the problem of political violence justified in the name of Islam lies in the answer to the following question: what is it that draws people in many Muslim societies, particularly young people, into the web of advocates who teach radical ideas, justify violence and call on them to isolate themselves from the course of human civilization? I believe all the reasons behind the appeal the advocates of violence hold for the young in Muslim societies can be summed up in one word: “anger”. The sources of this anger are many, and I believe we should try to understand, not condemn, it. And, if understanding leads to compassion, there is nothing wrong with that. From a humanistic and historical perspective, to understand and sympathize is not to condone, justify or accept. Rather, it is to recognize that we are dealing with patients suffering from a debilitating and dangerous disease; patients who need treatment, not security procedures, violence, coercion and torture.

   B. The Pillars beneath Proliferation 

   Let us now identify the main – but not the only – sources of anger among young people in many Muslim societies: 

· The well-founded fear that their prospects of making a decent living are extremely limited, with young people, the educated and the uneducated alike, unable to find suitable employment that can provide them with a reasonable standard of living.

· The enormous gap between the haves and have-nots; not so much the fact that there is a gap as its sheer magnitude.

· The ambiguity surrounding how the wealthy acquire their fortunes, the powerful their power and the famous their fame. This was not always the case. For example, people knew that Mohamed Talaat Harb[92] was a rich man, but they never thought he had amassed his wealth through dubious means.

· The disappearance of fairness from most fields of employment and occasionally even from commercial activities, where cronyism counts for more than merit, and where those who enjoy the backing of political muscle (which is not available to the vast majority) are assured of success and advancement.

· The absence of personalities with leadership qualities in most areas.

· The close relationship that exists between the plutocrats, the executive branch of government and the media.

· Rumors about corruption in high places that, despite the absence of concrete evidence, people tend to believe.

   A study of these seven pillars on which the anger which spawns violence, rejection, hostility and terrorism rests is a political, cultural and strategic matter. To address it exclusively from a security perspective does a grave injustice to society and to all the parties concerned, including the security institutions themselves. For at the end of the day, police methods are no match to phenomena with numerous political, economic, social and cultural dimensions.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ILLUSION OF “RELIGIOUS” PARTIES

I. Human Distortion

   There is hence more than one logical and sound reason to refuse the establishment of political parties based solely on religious platforms.

   Firstly, there is a strong belief among many that the glorification and sanctification of Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) is a baseless act.  These critics often note that Islamic fiqh is merely a man made interpretation of holy texts. It might be useful to refer here to the most fixed and wide-spread definition of Islamic fiqh that says that, "Fiqh is the science concerned with the deduction of practical rules out of their juristic references." It is easy to see that any process of deduction is a human, not a divine, action as it inevitability requires the use of language and logic.

   As further proof of the temporal nature of fiqh, it is known that the legacy of the great Sunni jurists, Abu Hanifah, Malik, al-Shafi^ci, and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, was created in less than two hundred years.  In addition to that fact, the second and third jurists were contemporaneous and, importantly, still differed in their opinions regarding fiqh.  How could Malik publish a jurisprudential madhhab (school or legal system) different from that of Abu Hanifah unless the latter's work was nothing but a human production? One more significant evidence that we are discussing a merely human work from the beginning to the end is the fact that the third Sunni jurist, namely al-Shafi^ci produced two different legal systems, one for Iraq and another for Egypt.

   Consequently, the principles considered by some, to be the Islamic tenets for comprehensive systems of government are nothing but ijtihad[93] (i.e. human reasoning). Such interpretations have come to be called the “Sultanic” commandments. Experts know that temporal rulers, whether during the Umayyad or the Abbasid eras,[94] heavily influenced most of what was written about the Sultanic commandments.   These rulers acted this way in order to guarantee that whatever was written about the laws would concur with their desires and understanding concerning the governance of their respective communities. 

   I would like to emphasize that similar processes took place in other places. The relationship between the opinions and writings of the British political thinker Thomas Hobbes[95] and the British throne is a case in point. It has been argued that Hobbes specifically wrote opinions that echoed the desires of the British crown. Thus, the existence of political parties formed on religious basis alone is illogical because the principles of the so called Islamic doctrine in governorship affairs reflects nothing but the interpretations of humans who could be right or wrong, so the matter is entirely a human production.

   Islam does not articulate a comprehensive framework for organizing government systems that could replace the contemporary details found within the constitution. Outlining such detailed schemes was neither the task nor the aim of Islam. However, blaming Islam for not presenting a distinct political system is tantamount to blaming it for not having a comprehensive theory in psychology, sociology or management sciences. 

   In fact, Islam came with a whole host of general rules, which would be more useful if used as guidelines when formulating the more detailed regulations. Taking al-Mawardi's[96] book “The Sultanic Commandments” (al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah), which later became a genre of its own with many books about the same topic, as examples for such detailed regulations is preferable to demanding too much from vague Islamic statements.  Those works are manmade ijtihad, which reflect the authors' academic and rational abilities, as well as their cultural and motivational backgrounds, while bearing in mind the unavoidable impacts of historical and geographical factors.

   My focal point here is that there is a clear and powerful logic that can eradicate the viewpoint that is calling for the establishment of political parties based on religious platforms. We can agree that the overall rules that some call “systems of governorship in Islam” were merely the deductions of men who lived more than one thousand years ago and pondered over the rules that they thought, in their time and place and inasmuch as their understanding, knowledge and conditions, would lead to the establishment of a governing system representing the essential values of Islam.   Once we have agreed on this then we must agree that the so-called 'ruling system in Islam' is a vague and imprecise description of what Muslim jurists wrote more than one thousand years ago in a serious and respected attempt to form bodies that would govern their communities in harmony with the principles and values of Islam.

II. Temporal Dilemma

   We should accept the notion that the writings of ancient Muslim scholars with regards to laws and government are valuable attempts that have been inspired by the essence of Islam. This is the most reasonable conclusion any rational mind can reach. Once we have done so, then we will have to believe that there has been a lack of ambition within the Muslim community for a period of time exceeding one thousand years to update and expand our political traditions. We must renovate the writings of the ancient jurists regarding the Sultanic commandments, so that we can reform our contemporary political and constitutional regulations.

   Thus, any discussion that quotes heavily from writings that were published a thousand years ago, and ignores contemporary Islamic jurisprudential issues, will be just like using a book compiled in the tenth century AD on medicine and pharmacology as a founding base to establish modern medical systems and institutions. Definitely, of course, this practice will lead to the death of all the patients.

   Islam spoke about donkeys and cattle as important means of transportation. It also spoke about the principle of shura (consultation), but not directly about democracy, citizenship and human rights. Nevertheless, it is shameful for a modern man to insist on using donkeys as his only means of transportation. This kind of decision led to the conflict between Wahhabis, headed by Faysal al-Da’wiesh, and King Abdul Aziz,[97] when the Wahhabis rejected all the aspects of modern civilization like cars, telephones and radios.

   In my belief, the individual who insists on solely using the concept of shura is like the person who believes that means of transportation should be restricted to donkeys and cattle, on the grounds that Islam spoke about donkeys and did not speak about cars, trains or planes.

   Current political realities beg the question "Why can't we, as Muslims, establish political parties based on religious platforms?" Especially in light of the fact that there are numerous political parties in Europe that are described as Christian, the most well-known of them being probably the Christian Democratic Party, of which the German Chancellor Mrs. Merkel is a member.[98]

   While writing these words, I have in front of me the constitutions of all countries which have Christian parties in addition to the principles of those parties. There is not a single word, in either the constitutions or the principles of those parties, that states, or even implies, that those parties will rule according to religious fundamentals or according to any other principles, but rather according to the values contained in their respective constitutions. These parties are Christian in name only.   They are political parties representing conservative viewpoints of a secular nature.  Although their principles and values have been inspired by Christianity, they rule and are ruled by the terms of their constitutions and positive laws.  I do not think that the supporters of a movement like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will ever dare to announce that their goal in transferring the Brotherhood into a political party is to reach a similar frame of mind as that of the Christian Democratic Party.

   There remains one important argument. It is my absolute conviction that political parties who describe themselves as Islamic are acting purely as political bodies. They are simply political entities seeking power. In and of themselves, these goals are legal objectives. Yet, some of these parties play on emotional chords when they describe themselves as Islamic. They are nothing but a salafi (fundamental) movement living off the understandings and deductions of humans who lived more than ten centuries ago and handled the issues of their age through solutions that were consequences of their time and place.  There is no better evidence than the one I already alluded to, namely that of Muhammad Ibn Idris (Imam al-Shafi ^ci) who published a new legal system when he arrived in Egypt, as his previously published legal doctrine was suitable only for a distinct body politic in Iraq.

   The catastrophe is when a people characterized by intellectual indolence, as neither they nor their ancestors have worked to update their political doctrine for one thousand years, want to continue to live as parasites on the understanding of others who worked hard and made every effort ten centuries ago. In my belief, movements calling themselves political Islamic movements, amongst them the Muslim Brotherhood, unconsciously suffer from tremendous intellectual dilemmas which have very strong and negative impacts on their abilities to form new and modern doctrines of law.

   Islam touched on lofty values about justice, equality and the virtues of knowledge.  We can call these 'general values' or 'macro values.' Nevertheless, in order to be suitable for times and places other than during the dawning of Islam, it did not articulate detailed specific codes or “micro values”. As such, followers of political Islamic streams of thought are fighting tooth and nail to establish a comprehensive governing system that is not applicable in the modern era.  Islam has not prescribed such a detailed system. Therefore, political Islamic movements end up clinging to themes that have little relevance in the modern era, such as the impermissibility of bank interests in Islam and the panel code among others.  The best thing for them to do is to admit that Islam came as a sublime religion and not as a book about economics, politics, sociology, psychology, chemistry or medicine. However, if they make this admission, how will they play the game of politics? If they make it, they will abandon the strongest tool of their political propaganda. In addition, they will be required to present a realistic political, economical and social program and not their usual tricks and slogans of “applying God's commands”, “Islam is the solution” and “al-Barakah (the blessing)”. Such abstract and common slogans, if examined in the practical battlefield of life, would prove to be nothing but big empty air bubbles that contain mere politics and no religion whatsoever.

III. In Search of “Blessings”

   Regarding the issue of the “blessings”, many of the kind, simple Muslims think that having people ruling in the name of Islam at the helm of the community is enough to bring welfare and blessing. To those who think this way, I would argue that early Muslims, or to be more precise the companions of the Prophet, the al-Muhajirun (emigrants) and al-Ansar (supporters) and with them the Prophet himself, were defeated in the battle of Uhud.[99] If victory, success, progress, or welfare were achievable through blessings alone, Muslims would have been victorious in Uhud as they clearly had the blessing of the Prophet. However, the defeat of Muslims in Uhud proves that just as God created all creatures of the world, he has also created certain rules and laws to run the universe, amongst them the laws of nature. One of these laws says that whoever fights without the material and practical qualifications of victory will be defeated. Through these laws Muslims, led by Tariq Ibn Ziyyad,[100] won in their conquest of Andalusia; and because of the very same laws, Muslims were defeated several centuries later in the Battle of Tours[101] in southern France. Whoever thinks that blessings will come upon him just because he says that he is ruling in the name of Islam will receive results in all fields similar to the defeat in the Battle of Uhud. Victory, progress, and successful leadership come only through science and good administration, which are human tenets that are universal and belong to no religion, denomination or nationality. We have no single evidence that those who want to rule their communities in the name of religion acquire any of such tenets. On the contrary, we have shinning evidences acquired from their backgrounds, their ideological history and their relationship with the universality of science, knowledge and the values of progress that they do not and will never acquire these tenets.

CHAPTER FIVE

“PIETY”, UNVEILED

   Many in Egypt today are talking about two features that have come to dominate the country's social landscape. The first is that manifestations of piety have become far more widespread in recent times than they were a century ago. The second is that there is a noticeable upsurge in behavioral aberrations at the societal level, where tension, violence, aggression and lack of civility in dealings between members of society have become the norm. While neither of these observations can be denied, there is an obvious contradiction between them. If the religiosity that has come to permeate society's cultural climate, and the manifestations of piety displayed by its members, have not prevented the decline in moral standards, civility and social ethics, this can only mean that piety, or, more accurately, the understanding of piety that has come to prevail, does not serve the interests of society. This is by no means to deny that there are among those who subscribe to this understanding of piety admirable examples of moral rectitude. But I am talking here of a general phenomenon, not individual cases.                          

   I believe we can only resolve the contradiction if we admit that what has come to be called piety is in fact not piety at all. This is the unshakeable conviction I have reached following an in-depth study of this phenomenon. We are swamped by such ostentatious displays of piety as women wrapped in what has come to be called "Islamic" dress and men sporting beards, wearing silvery - as opposed to gold - wedding bands and bearing marks on their foreheads attesting to the hours they spent prostrating themselves on prayer rugs. Not to mention how the senses are constantly assailed - in writing, from the pulpit and through the audio-visual media - by voices urging the faithful to observe the ritualistic aspects of religion. If some are entitled to consider that this constitutes piety then, by the same token, others, including the writer of these lines, are entitled to assert that rites and rituals have absolutely nothing to do with real piety.  

   To be pious is to have a strong moral code, to be helpful to others, and to display such noble character traits as altruism, tolerance and a strong work ethic. As to the manifestations of piety we have mentioned, they are due to a combination of political, economic, social, educational, cultural and psychological factors that can be easily identified. According to the Positivist school of philosophy founded by Auguste Comte,[102] no one can claim that greater religiosity will set things right, because practical experience proves that excessive religiosity could further promote the decline in general standards of behavior, as well as the violence and anger in dealings among people.  

   The ubiquitous religiosity we are witnessing today in the form of a rigid adherence to the ritualistic aspects of religious observance stems from a variety of sources:

· More than half a century of no political participation or fictitious political participation is one.

· More than half a century of economic decline and the erosion of the middle class is another.

· The complete divorce between the Egyptian educational system and what is happening in the rest of the world, its isolation from modern systems of education and its reflection of all our cultural defects such as the growing tendency towards insularity and bigotry and the lack of critical thinking.

· The succession of oligarchies that have governed our political and social life for over half a century is also a source of the excessive religiosity to which society has succumbed.

   Added to all of the above is the deteriorating quality and standard of the religious establishment, which has been infected by ideas blowing from the East. Further, there is the absence from the scene of anything other than religion that can nurture a sense of belonging among Egypt's youth. Immersing themselves in the rituals of religious observance has become a psychological refuge for those who find nothing else to which they can anchor themselves in a time of uncertainty (hope, a class, an ambition, a party, a better reality or a specific cultural model.)                                       

   Every person on the face of the earth (with the exception of a small minority whose only allegiance is to their own ideas, principles and value systems) needs to feel he or she "belongs" to something or other. In advanced societies whose members enjoy a high standard of living, people's sense of belonging can take a variety of forms. There are those whose allegiance is to their own personal successes, others to a political party, to a certain social class with its own culture and value system or to a specific ideological or cultural movement. Through this feeling of belonging, a person achieves the satisfaction and fulfillment necessary for the well-being of every individual. This can help explain the sense of belonging Egyptians felt for the national movement led by Saad Zaghloul[103] some ninety years ago, as well as why most of the Egyptian people identified so closely with the Nasserite[104] project a few decades later. In both cases, there was a "front" that succeeded in gaining the allegiance of broad segments of society, irrespective of how successful either was in making good on its promises or living up to its slogans.

   With the disappearance of these fronts, which attracted the interest, energies, loyalty and allegiance of most members of society, the field was left wide open for a different kind of allegiance to take hold, one that is more appealing, comfortable and, because given to generalities and lack of precision, suitable for men and women of an average cultural formation. Where allegiance to Marxism, for example, requires an above-average degree of awareness, culture and intelligence, this does not apply when it comes to joining the front of religious slogans. I believe that religious slogans - which are in fact purely political and not religious at all - owe their appeal to the regression and erosion of the roles played by other fronts which were highly effective at earlier stages of our modern history over the last two centuries.                        

   It should also be pointed out that ritualistic piety (as endorsed in the writings of men like Ibn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya and in the applications of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab and the experiences inspired by his school) works on the outer, not the inner, person. It is like a particularly strict traffic system that lays down rigorous rules determining what people can and cannot do. It is a school of thinking that may be suitable for primitive communities with a limited store of education, culture and knowledge but not for contemporary, advanced and civilized societies. Communities governed by this strict code could appear to be disciplined on the outside but are riddled with defects and shortcomings. It treats people like circus animals trained with whips to follow the routine laid down for them. But piety in the sense it is understood in Sufism,[105] Christianity and Buddhism works on the inner person and seeks to have what is good in human nature triumph over its aggressive and base aspects.                    

   It is no coincidence that Islamic societies governed by the strictest religious rules, that is, rules designed to maintain an outer semblance of piety, are the most dissolute, the most obsessed with sex, women and all forms of sensual indulgence. The attempt to control these aberrations on the "outside" without trying to deal with the "inside" creates a kind of dichotomy, a pathological split between what is said in public and what is done in private which is perhaps without parallel in the world.

CHAPTER SIX

VISION... OR NIGHTMARE?

· Mahmoud Fahmy Al-Noqrashy, Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak were the chief executives of Egypt throughout most of the last sixty years of the twentieth century. All were targeted for assassination by Islamist groups who succeeded in gunning down two of their intended victims, Noqrashy and Sadat.

· In the misguided belief that they could contain one of the most important leaders of those groups in Egypt, the Americans granted Omar Abdul Rahman[106] an entry visa to the United States. No sooner had he settled down, however, than he orchestrated the first attack on the World Trade Centre. He is now serving life in prison.

· Islamists in Kuwait are fighting to prevent the state from granting Kuwaiti women their political rights. Such is their power that they managed to defeat a bill submitted by the Emir to the National Assembly, which would have allowed women to participate in political life.

   These are only some of the depressing examples of facts that come to mind when I hear people talk of the need to include Islamists in Egypt’s political life. My heart sinks at the prospect of giving these throwbacks to the Dark Ages a say in how we should run our lives, when I think of their attitude towards women, say, or Copts, such groups to which they accord a status only slightly higher than that of prisoners of war or slaves.

   I have often tried to imagine a scenario in which what I call the ‘Islamists’ will have achieved all their objectives. The scenario assumes that Osama bin Laden or someone like him get their way and proceed to impose their vision of what the Muslim world should be on the rest of us. The principal features of this vision can be summed up in the following:

· The departure of the West, particularly the United States, from Muslim lands.

· The removal of the kings and presidents now in power for being what bin Laden and his ilk see as agents of the Great Satan, a.k.a.[107] the United States.

· The takeover of power by Osama bin Laden or someone like him, the reinstatement of the Caliphate, the annulment of organic law, and the adoption of their version of Islamic Shari’a.[108]

   I close my eyes and try to visualize where this would lead. Such a scenario can only unfold in one of two possible ways. One is that it will lead to the complete isolation of the Muslim world from the non-Muslim world in all spheres, scientific, economic, military and cultural. When I take the image further, I see Islamic societies transformed into vast seas of humanity with little knowledge of science or of how its application in various fields can improve the quality of life on earth. Of course, this matters little to a Muslim who is more concerned with what happens to him in the afterlife than he is with his lot in this life, which to him is but an instant in the greater scheme of things, a passage to the hereafter. Under political Islam, these societies will be densely populated because their rulers will tell them that the Shari’a enjoins Muslims to multiply, as this will make the Prophet proud of them on Judgment Day. The living standard of the members of these societies, which will have boycotted sacrilegious Western science, will be dismal in all respects, economic, medical and scientific. But this too is unimportant, because the material world is of little significance to the devout Muslim, who considers life to be but a short bridge he must traverse to reach either Heaven (with its flowing streams, succulent fruits and black-eyed “houris”),[109] or Hell (with its raging fires).

   So intensely do I focus on this imaginary scenario that I sometimes manage to conjure up actual images, when my closed eyelids become a screen on which scenes of pitiful suffering and insurmountable problems are projected. I see Muslims staging raids on the world of the infidels and the infidels retaliating in kind, their advanced weapons raining widespread devastation on the Muslim world and turning it into an empty wasteland where backwardness and chaos reign supreme. For the Muslims, who do not manufacture their own weapons but are forced to buy them from their more advanced enemies, have no way of defending themselves against the sophisticated weapons used against them.

   I can practically hear the imams in the mosques assuring their congregations that God inflicted the defeat on them to test their faith, and that if they passed the test He would send them a miraculous victory. Thundering from their minbars,[110] they will paint a rosy picture of the Muslims triumphing over the unbelievers, ending their sermon by calling on God to wreak death and destruction on the pagan Christians and their Jewish lackeys. 

   As to the second way in which the scenario can unfold, it assumes that the leaders of political Islam, after achieving the objectives mentioned above, will not set out to isolate the Muslim from the non-Muslim world. Instead, they will deal with the unbelievers in accordance with an established maxim of Islamic jurisprudence which holds that “necessity overrides taboos.” In this scenario, there will be extensive transactions with the non-Muslim world in all sectors: economic, scientific, social, industrial, agricultural, and services. The acquisition of knowledge will be a high priority goal on the grounds that Muslims “must seek knowledge, even in China.” When I use my modest knowledge of politics, history and modern management to try and envisage where this way will lead, I find myself laughing aloud, because it will inevitably take Muslim communities back to where they stood a century ago when it came to dealing with non-Muslims: one party learning from the other, one party buying from the other, one party trying to catch up with the other.

   But whether the first way of the scenario prevails or the second, the big question remains the same: why the suffering, the spilt blood, the violence and destruction, the pain, anxiety and misery? I laugh bitterly to myself as I answer the question: for the sake of power! The only difference between the two ways of the scenario I mention and other possible ways is who holds power. In the two ways, power will lie with the “Islamists”.  In a scenario where things remain as they are, the answer is obvious. But there is a third scenario which assumes that Muslim societies will opt for development, progress and democracy, in which case power will lie with the people who will exercise it through their duly elected representatives. Unfortunately, this last scenario is not receiving serious consideration in political circles.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE USE OF FORCE

I. Deployment of Muscles

   Many of the storms engulfing our part of the world can be attributed to the fact that the movements practicing politics in the name of "political Islam" are still governed by a coup mentality, still acting as underground movements rather than as modern political institutions that respect and observe the law.  Actually, the word "mentality", which assumes the use of mental faculties, is a misnomer in this case, as most of these movements rely more on their muscles than their brains, more on raw power than on minds governed by a respect for laws, constitutions, rationality and sound judgment.

A. Unfortunate Events

   Take the case of Lebanon, which has an elected government and a parliament representing the people; and yet the largest opposition movement, a religio-political organization, refuses to recognize the authority of the nation's elected representatives and it listens only to strident voices calling for a return to the past. The religious firebrands seeking to drive Lebanon several centuries back in time are playing a game in which the muscles of blind power ride roughshod over the principles of democracy, constitutional legitimacy and laws. A single armed party is turning the tables on everyone, showing total contempt for the elected parliament that should be the ultimate arbiter instead of hordes of demonstrators manipulated from outside the country by a theocratic regime that is financing the destruction of Lebanon.

   Then there is the situation in the Palestinian self-rule territories, where a theocratic movement, emerging from the cobwebs of medieval times, does not consider itself bound by any of the commitments undertaken by previous governments. As far as it is concerned, events only began to unfold the day it came to power. When Abu Mazen[111] wisely, if somewhat belatedly, called for a return to the people, the source of authority, the government of theocrats whose understanding of democracy is limited to its usefulness as a means of reaching power, rejected his call. A theocratic movement that is by definition democratically immature may be capable of understanding that democracy brought it to power but not that it will, by the same token, prevent it from hanging on to power indefinitely. Governed as they are by a coup mentality totally at odds with the very notion of democracy, the members of this movement are driven by religious hysteria (not religious faith), coupled with a violent and confrontational style of political action.

   The third case in point is the shocking display put on by the young members of the Muslim Brotherhood in front of Al-Azhar University,[112] which showed that political Islam is still a very immature blend of religious hysteria; a simplistic - not to say primitive - understanding of democracy, and a propensity for violence, and for the use of muscle power untrammeled by the constraints of reason.

   Although the incident shocked and saddened all the lovers of this nation who want to see it achieve progress, stability and prosperity, it served as a wake-up call. Proving that every cloud has a silver lining, it opened everyone's eyes to the danger of allowing power to fall into the hands of people with simple minds and meager stores of knowledge, who rely on the use of muscles not brains to achieve their aim of ruling the ancient land of Egypt. 

   I believe the childish display of naked power at Al-Azhar was detrimental to many people, including members of the People's Assembly affiliated ideologically (or organizationally) to the Muslim Brotherhood. How can the Egyptian people accept a political movement when the clear message they get from the bizarre behavior of its young adherents at Al-Azhar is that it has, or could eventually have, organized militias? How can they, in an age of science and management, accept to place their fate in the hands of a callow movement driven by blind instinct, not rational ideas, and relying on muscle power, not mental faculties to achieve their ends?

   To my mind, the movements of political Islam have not yet gone through the necessary stage of threshing out their ideas - of separating the chaff from the grain, so to speak. Nor have these movements seen any internal ideological developments to speak of. Indeed, I would say that Muslim thinking was exposed to many more radical changes in the hundred years separating the death of the first of the four great Sunni jurists, Abu Hanifah Al-Nu’man (in the middle of the second century of the Hijra calendar),[113] and the death of the last, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal (just over a century later), than in the twelve centuries since Ibn Hanbal's death in the third century of the Hijra calendar. This stagnation, with its extremely detrimental effects, is a result of two phenomena. The first was when the door was slammed shut on deductive reasoning. The second was when the majority of Muslims turned their backs on the man who championed the primacy of reason, Abul Walid Ibn Rushd.[114] Had they allowed themselves to benefit from the ideas of this outstanding philosopher, the Muslims would not have reached the low rung they now occupy on the ladder of human progress and development.

B. Coincidence or a mentality? 

   It is interesting to speculate on the similarity between what Hezbollah did in Lebanon in the spring of 2008[115] and what Hamas did in Gaza in the summer of 2007.[116] Is the fact that both displayed the same pattern of behavior no more than a coincidence; or is it that the mentality shared by all Islamic fundamentalists, Sunni and Shi’ite alike, makes them behave in a similar fashion? There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the second proposition is the right one. Theocrats, whose political beliefs are a function of their religious convictions, may claim to believe in democracy, modern state systems, pluralism and diversity (that is, the acceptance of and respect for the rights of the Other), but do so purely for reasons of expediency. They know fully well that paying lip service to such noble sentiments – if only at a certain stage – can serve their interests and avert problems.

   In fact, a fundamentalist who practices politics is driven by the conviction that God is on his side and that he is the conduit through which the Almighty’s will is transmitted to the world of politics. There is thus no room in a fundamentalist’s system of beliefs for such notions as democracy, rotation of power, pluralism or diversity.

   In Iran, for example, it is the Supreme Guide who not only lays down higher state policies but also enters into such minutiae of the country’s political life as deciding whether or not a candidate is entitled to run for parliamentary elections.

   Then there is the case of Palestinian political life, where we have seen the brazen disregard for democracy displayed by the Hamas leadership. Although it was democracy that brought them to power, no sooner were they installed in the seat of authority than they set out to trample it underfoot. Transformed into an instrument of tyranny and repression, the Hamas government began to systematically eliminate its opponents, not symbolically but physically. In some cases, they were executed in particularly brutal fashion, such as being thrown off high buildings. It comes as no surprise to me that those who mix religion with politics should resort to such barbaric practices. Political religion – not religion itself – is an example of a closed system where any deviation from the official line – deemed as the only true path – is not tolerated. It is reminiscent of how men like Stalin in the former Soviet Union, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and countless others in recent history behaved after coming to power.

   What Hizbullah did in Lebanon is a new version of the diabolical game that mixes politics with religion. Not content with taking Lebanon to war without the consent of the state, a war from which it claimed to have emerged victorious thanks to divine intervention (a victory that exists only in the imagination of some deluded souls) Hizbullah, which is a state within a state, more accurately, a state outside the state, installed a private cable communication network. After the government issued a decree outlawing the network, Hizbullah militias swept through Beirut and, in an act that epitomizes the way their mind works, set fire to the building housing the Mostaqbal television channel.[117]

   The similarity between the actions of Iran’s Supreme Guide Ali Khomeini (the infallible authority on all things temporal and spiritual in the eyes of his followers) when he banned a large number of moderates from running in the parliamentary elections; the actions of Hamas in Gaza, from throwing their opponents off high buildings to instigating incursions across Egypt’s borders; and the actions of Hizbullah in occupying Beirut to impose its will on its political opponents is no coincidence. All these actions attest to the medieval mentality of their protagonists, a mentality that is inimical to freedom, democracy and modern state systems. The world will pay a heavy price if it stands passively by while this farce unfolds and drags entire societies back to the first millennium as humanity moves into the third millennium.[118]

II. “Divine Dominion”

   Many hurdles stand between the trends espousing political Islam and political maturity. Perhaps the most insurmountable is the insistence of these trends, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to cling to the theory of hakameya or "divine dominion" propounded by Abul 'Ala' Al-Mawdoody[119]  and Sayed Qutb. Derived from the Arabic root "hokm", which means rule, the theory has a certain superficial glitter that appeals to some people. In fact, however, it is based on an untenable proposition that renders it meaningless. It postulates that mortals are not ruled by mortals but by God. This is dangerous sophistry, as there is no direct recourse to the Supreme Being – in the literal sense of the word “direct”, given the existence of a religious caste ruling in His name, according to their understanding of His intentions. I believe Al-Mawdoody and Qutb came up with their theory, a fanciful notion that can obviously not be implemented in practice, each in reaction to his own personal traumatic experience. Both men experienced what we now call a culture shock, Mawdoody in the face of the strong and vibrant culture of India, Qutb, who spent less than two years in the United States nearly sixty years ago, in the face of an American culture that shocked him to the core. Unable to cope with the realities of the age, they chose to escape into a less challenging past.

   Thus the first obstacle that the movements of political Islam must overcome if they want to live in the modern age at peace with the rest of humanity is the theory of hakameya, to which all adherents of these movements subscribe. For it is a theory which cannot be applied unless we turn the clock back more than a thousand years and regard all other cultures as mortal enemies.

III. Democracy, the Salvation

   The next step is for the leaders of these movements to develop a better understanding of, and a stronger faith in democracy among their followers. They need to explain democracy as a process distinct from Shura (consultation).  Although there is no contradiction between them, Shura is but one part of a whole, namely, democracy. To those who consider this as belittling Islam, I would like to point out that while it is true that Islam spoke of Shura and not of democracy, it is also true that it spoke of pack animals and not of cars and planes. This in no way detracts from the greatness of Islam. After all, the purpose of Islam's message was not to predict the achievements of future ages, such as democracy, planes, human rights, lasers, medical breakthroughs, civil management systems, information technology, etc.

   The leaders of political Islam movements must breed a new generation of followers who believe that the nation is the source of authority, that the Constitution is the law of laws and that in this day and age societies cannot be led by men of religion (especially when the religion in question does not allow a caste of clerics to act as intermediaries between man and God), but by the latest discoveries in science, management, ideas and information technology.

   Until at least some of these leaders break away from the doctrinaire approach to religion that has plagued the Muslim mind for over a thousand years, and unless they can groom generations capable of understanding that the nation is the source of all power and that societies can only be run by science and management, we should not be surprised to find the young members of Islamist movements trying to form militias in a bid to govern us with wild emotions, strident voices and muscle power untamed by reason or common sense.

   These were the main features of the prevailing storm of intolerant Islam.  But did such a storm reach that powerful condition, outreach and influence without a strong and rich breeder and custodian?  The answer is “certainly not”.   Did it find a suitable patronage?  It certainly did.  The storm that currently threatens the cornerstones of humanity, progress, and modernity was well patronized; and this was by a patron that has been sitting on more than a quarter of the remaining oil reserves of the entire world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE BREEDER

I. The King and the Sword

   I found it emotionally and intellectually disturbing to see the King of Saudi Arabia present the Pope with a sword during his visit to the Vatican.[120] It came at a time when there has never been a greater need to distance the name of Islam and the image of Muslims from the violent connotations and symbolism of the sword. The Saudi monarch's unfortunate choice of a gift prompted me to sit down and write the address I thought he should have delivered if his advisors had been familiar with the Western culture and mind-set. 

   “Your Holiness… Your Eminences… in the name of Saudi Arabia that I am honored to represent, and in the name of Islam to which I am honored too belong, I bring you greetings of peace. In fact, the word "Islam" in Arabic is an anagram of the word "peace". On my behalf, and on behalf of the people I represent, I say let us embark on a new era based on mutual respect; an era in which neither party hurts the feelings of the other, and both refrain from aggression, moral or material, direct or indirect, against one another. I call on you and on the side I represent to pledge that the followers of any religion, while entitled to invite others into their faith, may not resort to violence, coercion or the use of swords, but to resort instead to persuasion and reasoning to convince them of the merits of the faith to which they belong. I hereby declare that from this day forth, "Jihad" means only self-defense and resistance to aggression, but never the initiation of conflict, or the attempt to convert others to our religion by means of violence or the sword. There is nothing more pathetic than a religion that cannot win the hearts and minds of people except through the use of the sword. I also urge all parties to be more concerned with the quality of the followers of each religion than with their quantity. In this connection, there is much to be done to improve the quality of the believers of our great religion.

   I call on you and on the side I represent to refrain from mocking or insulting the “Other”, and belittling their beliefs or disparaging their sacred texts. I call on you and on the side I represent to usher in a new era in which all shall enjoy freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the freedom to build houses of worship in any place at any time. As the Prophet of Islam welcomed the Christians of Najran[121] when they came, allowing them to pray in his mosque, which is now known as the Prophet's Mosque in the holy city of Medina, I declare before you that we shall begin a new chapter of dealing with non-Muslims as our brothers in humanity. I shall call on all Muslims in the world to consider such terms as Dar al-Harb (Land of War), Dar al-Salam (Land of Peace) and Ahl al-Dhimma (non-Muslim monotheists) to be products of historical conditions of a bygone age that are no longer applicable today, and that we now aspire to a world that is not divided into camps of war and camps of peace. Our mosques shall welcome all who step through their doors, and our religion is a solid religion that does not force anyone to remain a prisoner of its precepts.

   Your Holiness, I have chosen two gifts to present to you today. One is a golden palm tree that symbolizes our history and environment, the other an ancient manuscript of the Bible dating back many centuries. I turned down a proposal to present you with a sword, because first, the sword is not one of your historical symbols, and second, we do not want the message it carries to cloud our future relationship. My country will make every effort to ensure that, in future, foreigners in our land be made to feel welcome, that they enjoy warm hospitality and tolerance in every sense of the word, including the right to pray and worship God in churches or temples according to their faith. The sight of churches’ spires or temples’ domes rising against our skyline will not hurt our feelings, exactly as seeing the minarets of mosques in Europe, America, Canada and Australia does not hurt the feelings of non-Muslims in those places. I also vow before you that we shall very shortly look into not applying laws derived from our religion to the followers of other faiths. Let us begin a new era of accepting the other, of tolerance and of fostering the concept of "relativism" in the area of religious beliefs, that is, let no person on the face of the earth behave as though his/her religion is the absolute truth, while all other religions are absolutely false. Let God decide matters we are neither required nor equipped to concern ourselves with. I call on you and on all those I represent to enter a new era of tolerance, acceptance of the other and mutual respect, in which all desist from demeaning the faiths of others.

   I would like to take the opportunity of this meeting to propose the formation of a committee made up of the best religious scholars from all faiths, not only of the three great Abrahamic or book religions, but of all other faiths as well, to review educational curricula throughout the world, in order to achieve the following aims:

· Remove from the curricula any material offensive or prejudicial to the faith of others.  

· Remove from the curricula any material that sows the seeds of religious chauvinism and feelings of superiority over other faiths.  

· Remove from the curricula any material that discourages tolerance and acceptance of the other, and replace it with material that promotes admiration for diversity and variety as the most important features of life and the main sources of its richness and beauty.  

   Let me now present Your Holiness with the golden palm tree and the manuscript of the New Testament that dates back to the spread of Christianity in the region of Najran, today one of the governorates making up the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

   This, then, is the speech the king did not make, and which I believe could have helped usher in a new era of empathy and understanding between peoples of all faiths.

II. The Inoculation of Hatred

   The sociology of the Arabian Peninsula tribes is the key to understanding the Arab character and mentality, and the lack of tolerance for the “Other”. In order to trace the historical features of that character, mentality, and intolerance we must try to imagine the way of life in the inland wastes of the eastern regions of the Peninsula over the last twenty centuries. Why mainly the eastern and not the western regions? We shall explain that after presenting a panoramic survey of the historical features of the character and mental make-up of the tribes inhabiting the eastern regions of the Arabian Peninsula, specifically the tribes of the hinterland, not the coastal areas.

   Following a lecture I had given at the Department of the Middle Eastern Studies at one of the top world universities, I was told by one of the professors: "In most academic circles here in the US, we take it for granted that the Arabs' hatred of the West is the result of the intrusion of western powers into the lives of Arab peoples, beginning with the colonization of Algeria in 1830, Egypt in 1882, Morocco in 1912, and so on. But it's quite clear that you see things quite differently?" I replied, "It's not that simple. There are several sides to the issue and what you just said lumps them all together in the same basket, as it were."

   Actually, the hatred of the people of the region for colonialism is a healthy and legitimate phenomenon in itself; and does not by necessity mean hatred of all that is western or of western progress. In fact, countries with a rich heritage of civilization and history such as Egypt, Greater Syria and Iraq were able to combine a hatred of colonialism with a sincere admiration for progress, thus showing a true understanding of 'progress' as distinct from 'westernization', and exhibiting a refined and enlightened social conscience.  The alternative would have been to indiscriminately admire both colonialism and progress as one entity, which would have been a demeaning and humiliating phenomenon that could only lead to the death of many things that we hold dear.

   However, it would be a mistake to assume that all countries in the region are the same; what I said applies to societies with a history rich in culture and civilization, namely those I have mentioned, as well as others in the Arab West (Morocco, Tunisia and Libya), and to a lesser extent, the coastal regions of the Arabian Peninsula, the geo-political situation of which has rendered them more open to the outside world than those situated in nomadic fashion in the interior. The harsh geo-political conditions of the latter can only give rise to a rigid, inflexible and insular tribal mentality that refuses the "Other" (whoever this “Other” may be) in a xenophobic manner. The history of hatred of these desert communities towards anyone who differs from them in religion or thought is common knowledge; Contrary to what some may think, this animosity is not a consequence of the Hanbali form of Islam (particularly Ibn Taymiyah’s[122] interpretation) that they embrace; but rather, this rigid school that was categorically refused by the Muslim world at large could only find acceptance in this desolate region. Indeed, for more than a thousand years the ideas and edicts of Ibn Taymiyah (with all their harshness, bigotry and hatred of non-Muslims) found no adherents in Egypt, Syria and the Arab West, for how could the descendants of such highly evolved civilizations accept isolation from the rest of humankind?

   A. Locked in the Inlands

   In fact, for the past twenty centuries, the tribes living in the eastern regions of the Arabian Peninsula have been leading a pastoral life as opposed to a settled life, roaming in search of pasturage and water. As a result of this lifestyle, the attitude of the Arab tribesman living in those regions towards such notions as loyalty, objectivity and neutrality cannot be understood in isolation from the sociology of nomadic life, the culture pattern of Bedouin tribes forced by their environment to move constantly in search of sustenance. Their unconditional loyalty is reserved for the Sheikh (elder) of the tribe; objectivity is an alien concept and neutrality akin to treason.

   As the eminent Egyptian critic Galal Al-Ashry noted in his treatise on Arab creativity, the only creative area in which the Arabs excelled was poetry. That is the only form of artistic expression they produced for reasons we shall not elaborate here.  They did not produce theatre plays, novels, epics, music or other creative forms like the Greeks and, prior to them, the Egyptians and the Sumerians. The poetry composed by the poets hailing from the eastern regions of the Arabian Peninsula is a mirror reflecting the value system of the tribes of the region, their mores, concerns, behavior and thinking, and their devotion to the glorification of these tribal values. The image reflected by their poetry has remained unchanged for centuries. An ode written in classical Arabic over ten centuries ago by a poet from Najd[123] reflects the same values and world view as one written in the vernacular by a poet living in Najd today. Most of the poetry of the region, old and new, resounds with the cadence of stirring imagery, its main themes are pride and the superiority of the Bedouin who is always victorious, never defeated, who bows to no one and stands high above all others. In fact, the word for “lofty” in Arabic is “nouf”, from whence the proper names Nayef, Nouf and Nawaf are derived. This then is the message that thousands of odes by poets from Najd, Hasa, al-Qassim and al-Hofouf have tried to convey ever since the Arabic language in its present form came into being and up to the present day. This view of life as reflected by the poetry of the region encapsulates the sociology of its nomadic tribes.

   The tribal Arab mentality formed in the inland deserts of the eastern Arabian Peninsula took over leadership of intellectual life in Arab and Muslim societies after the failure of the stage of liberalism, and the blend of socialism and Arab nationalism that had at one time held sway. However, the degree to which Arab and Muslim societies have come to be influenced by the tribal mentality born in the harsh eastern wasteland of the Arabian Peninsula differs from one society to another in proportion to each society’s historical and cultural legacy, and according to its political and socio-economic conditions. Thus, while its influence was most strongly felt in the inland regions of the Arabian Peninsula, it was weaker in the coastal cities of the Peninsula, and weaker still in societies like Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Iraq and India that enjoy a richer legacy of history, civilization and culture than the Arabian Peninsula. Still, the Bedouin world view forged in the barren deserts of the eastern Arabian Peninsula and expressed in the poetry produced by poets from the region is the most important key to understanding the ways of thinking prevailing in many Arab and Muslim societies.

   The culture pattern that formed the Bedouin world view is in total contradiction with the concept of statehood. Loyalty to the Sheikh of the tribe[124] is personal by its very nature, while loyalty to the state is a more abstract notion. In the tribe, obedience to the wishes and instructions of the Sheikh is the counterpart of the modern citizen’s adherence to the constitutional and legal rules of the state. According to the sociology of the tribal mentality, the specificity of which has been described in some detail here above, the “Other” is perceived as an enemy or, at best, as a potential enemy to be neutralized. In the modern state system, on the other hand, the “Other” is regarded as a natural expression of the diversity of life, inspiring neither rejection nor enmity. In a tribal environment, there can be no discussion of such issues as diversity, acceptance of the “Other”, engaging in self-criticism and accepting criticism, the universal nature of knowledge or the recognition that it is the collective legacy of humanity as a whole, all being fruits of the modern, progressive, civilized state. Indeed the very notion of humanity is alien to the tribal society.

   If we borrow from the great philosopher Ibn Khaldoun’s[125] theory on the distinction between urban and Bedouin societies, we can say that the contemporary Islamic mentality (not Islam itself) is conditioned by a brand of Islam as understood, presented and propagated over the last half century by the Bedouin tribes living in the inland deserts of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Given that most of the Islamic centers and schools established in North America, Europe, Australia and in non-Muslim regions of Asia and Africa were set up at the initiative, and with the funding of representatives of this insular tribal mentality, it is not hard to understand why the world today sees itself locked in a major confrontation between humanity and Islam. In truth, however, the confrontation is between humanity and a model of Islam which is presented, financed and propagated by the Bedouin, or Najdi,[126] mentality.

   The reason, then, we are focusing on the eastern inland areas of the Arabian Peninsula rather than on the eastern coastal areas and the region of Hejaz, is that the inland areas were the crucible in which the brand of Islamist thinking known as Wahhabism[127] was forged. The ideas of Wahhabism are typical of a superstructure (thought) born of a specific infrastructure (the geo-political and economic features of the Najd desert); adherents to these thoughts cannot conceive that no other place on earth would have put up with such beliefs. They are the living proof of the truth of Marx's conclusion, derived from the theories of both Feuerbach and Hegel,[128] that there is a definite link between the ideas and beliefs of a community and the infrastructure (geographical and economical) in which it lives.

II. “Blood, Blood, Destruction, Destruction”

   The founder of Wahhabism, Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab,[129] had laid down the broad outlines of his call (I shall not call it a school of jurisprudence, for the man was simply a missionary, not a theologian) by 1798, a year which witnessed the first confrontation with the West in modern times, namely Napoleon's campaign into Egypt.[130] As I have previously mentioned, the first years of the fledgling Saudi state (soundly crushed by Ibrahim Pasha in 1818)[131] and of the second Saudi state (which came to an end in 1891) were marked by an obdurate rejection of modernity and of all signs of modern civilization, combined with hatred of non-Muslims and indeed of all Muslims who did not follow the same tenets. The Egyptian or Syrian Muslim who saw nothing wrong in singing, for example, was considered by the first and second Saudi states to be no better than an infidel. And when the Brotherhood (of Najd)[132] fought against King Abdul Aziz[133] for allowing the signs of modern civilization, such as the radio and the motor-car, into the Kingdom, as well as permitting foreigners into the Arabian Peninsula (bearing in mind that this was during the twentieth century), they were simply giving vent to the archaic tenets and beliefs of a system of jurisprudence that had no place in modern times, and could have survived nowhere except in a terrain of this kind, whose geographic features imposed its isolation. Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab was by no means a jurist but merely a proselytizer seeking converts to the Najdi model of Islam which, again, needs to be understood in the context of its tribal, Bedouin, insular, desert origins.

   When the alliance was forged between Mohamed Ibn-Saud^[134] and Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab, whereby the former agreed to rule according to the doctrine preached by the latter, a succinct statement was made by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab shortly after the deal was struck; it expresses the essence of his doctrine, which is known as Wahhabism: “Blood, blood, destruction, destruction.” These four simple words summarize what was and what continues to be the message of Wahhabism.  The partnership between the two men led to the first incarnation of the Saudi-Wahhabi state. Anyone who, like me, has read the nineteen books written by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab in their entirety will realize that he belongs more to the realm of proselytizing than to that of Islamic jurisprudence. The first Saudi state lasted from 1744 until 1819, when Ibrahim Pasha, Mohamed Ali’s[135] eldest son, led a military expedition which destroyed the state, razed its capital, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground, and captured its prince, Abdullah Ibn-Saud, sending him first to Cairo then, on to the capital of the Ottoman state where he was executed.

   The first Saudi state banned what it considered to be heretical practices, including the building of tombs, music, singing, dancing and any other manifestation of what they termed as un-Islamic conduct.  Members of other faiths were hated and despised as ‘unclean’. Such was the hatred to foreigners that European consultants brought in by King Abdul Aziz at the beginning of the twentieth century were spat upon by the Ikhwan, members of an ultra-orthodox offshoot of the original Wahhabi movement. The presence of non-Muslims on the sacred ground of the Arabian Peninsula was seen as a desecration, as was any hint of modernity even when it came to such trivial matters as the shape of beards and moustaches. To the theologians of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state, the only rightful interpretation of Islam lay in the Hanbalite school of law (founded by Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal and further elaborated by his two main disciples, Ibn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Qaiyim al-Jawzeya), even though it is by far the weakest of the four Sunni schools of law (the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi^ci and Hanbali).

III. The Young Scion

   Following Ibrahim Pasha’s defeat of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state, the Saudis, with their Wahhabi partners, entered into an alliance with the al-Rashid family, who ruled the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula from their capital Ha’il. The alliance between the al-Rashids[136] and what can be called the second Saudi state continued until the al-Rashids turned against the al-Saud family and sent them into exile in Kuwait in 1891.

   In 1901, the young scion of the Saudi family, Abdul Aziz son of Abdul Rahman son of Faisal al-Saud, born in 1875 and endowed with the quality of leadership, seized Riyadh[137] in a night time raid. From 1902 until 1925 he waged a campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula and, after seizing Mecca then Medina[138] in 1925, proclaimed himself the ruler of Najd and other provinces now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Actually, the name only came into use seven years after Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud became Sultan of Najd and King of Hijaz in 1925.

   In the course of a historical journey that has no parallel in history, the actions, policies, words and deeds of Abdul Aziz between 1902 and 1925 not only confirmed his exceptional leadership qualities, but also bespoke a profound understanding of the nature of power, both in absolute terms and as exercised by the Great Powers, whether the Ottoman Empire,[139] the British Empire[140] or the empire that was to emerge later, the American Empire. Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud played his role with great skill, using all his acumen to achieve the goal he had set to himself during the years of exile in Kuwait as the guest of the al-Sabah family in general, and of the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, in particular.

   Long before the Americans used the Islamists during the Cold War to help them defeat the Soviet Empire (notably after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979), Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud used Islamists to consolidate his power. In 1912, he incepted and financed a movement known as the Ikhwan, a forerunner of the Islamists/jihadists deployed by the Americans against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The symbiotic relationship between Abdul Aziz and the Ikhwan ended in 1930 with a ferocious battle between the erstwhile allies, when the Saudis, led by King Abdul Aziz, crushed the Ikhwan, led by Faisal al- Da’wiesh. The Ikhwan’s religious views were so extreme that they considered any sign of modernity or progress the work of the Devil. As their alliance with Ibn Saud coincided with a period of great scientific advances, they had plenty of abominations to contend with: the telegraph, cars, telephones then radios were all regarded as sinful, and anyone who did not resist them was a heretic. Such was the fanaticism of this lunatic fringe that one of its members advanced on the Sultan (Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud) with a pair of scissors and proceeded to shorten Ibn Saud’s robes in full view of his entourage, thereby driving home the message that the principles of Wahhabism were stronger than the authority of the Saudis. Apparently short robes are a basic tenet of Wahhabism, and failure to observe this essential requirement of orthodoxy is heresy!

   Abdul Aziz, first as prince, then sultan, then king, used the Ikhwan when he needed them to further expand his suzerainty. For like all those who welcome death as a passport to paradise, they were fearless fighters. The problem was that they were equally fearless in standing up to Abdul Aziz whenever they considered him to have deviated from the true path. During the years of their increasingly uneasy alliance (from 1912 until he succeeded in asserting his dominion over most of the Arabian peninsula in 1925), fierce clashes often broke out between them. For example, they lashed out at him when he stopped riding camels and took to riding cars, publicly berating him when “he left Riyadh in 1925 on the back of a camel and returned in a Cadillac!” This was the last straw for the sultan, who could not countenance any challenge to his authority as the undisputed leader of most of the Arabian Peninsula. He barely had time to bask in the glow of his hard-won victory over the Hashemites and the expansion of his dominion over lands previously under their control, before the Ikhwan forced his hand. The final showdown came in a battle between Abdul Aziz and the Ikhwan. They were routed, and their leader, Faisal al- Da’wiesh, was captured and imprisoned, dying in captivity a few years later.

IV. The Sequel

   But the question is whether the Saudi state, successful though it may have been when it came to defeating its enemies (from the Hashemite al-Rashids to Faisal al-Da’wiesh), has been equally successful in ridding itself of the fanatical, not to say downright psychotic, ideas propounded by the Ikhwan of Najd, who militate against the use of cars, telegrams and radios, and for the shortening of robes, the shaving of moustaches and the growing of beards. The truth is that the Saudi state, whether in its first, second or third incarnations, has never been free of the pernicious effects of the doctrine preached by the Ikhwan. To this day, Saudi jurists remain committed to the version of Islam propounded by Ibn-Hanbal, Ibn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Qaiym Al-Jawzeya, even though they rank far lower in stature than such towering Islamic jurists as Abu Hanifah Al-Nu’man, Malik Ibn Anas, Jaafar Al-Sadiq and Ibn Rushd (the second teacher after Aristotle, the first).

   Where jurists like Abu Hanifah and Ibn Rushd relied on the tools of rationality and deductive reasoning, compilation was the hallmark of the Hanbalite School, which allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic interpretation of holy texts. Thus, as I said before, while Abu Hanifah relied on “istihsan” (preference of using few traditions and extracting from the Qur’an by reasoning the rulings which fitted his ideas) and Ibn Rushd on “ta’weel” (deductive reasoning), Ibn Hanbal insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts. This led him to accept over ten thousand of the Prophet’s Hadith as apostolic precept. It also bred a climate which favored unquestioning adherence to tradition over the use of critical faculties, creating generations of followers and imitators, and leading Islamic societies to the point at which they find themselves today: sidelined from History, science and the march of human progress. The Hanbalite School has turned the Muslim mentality into a passive recipient of answers instead of one that asks questions, let alone one that engages in critical thinking, the main engine of human progress.  Although of all the Islamic jurists Ibn-Hanbal was the most zealous proponent of orthodoxy and tradition, allowing little if any room for deductive reasoning, he was a natural product of his time. It was a time the Islamic Empire was reeling from the onslaught of the Moguls and the Tatars,[141] and he cannot be blamed for ideas that were appropriate to the age in which he lived. The blame lies with those who, living in a different time and place, base their ideas on those of Ibn-Hanbal.

A. Exportation of Hatred

   Today, the Saudi state resists the education and employment of women, frowns upon television broadcasts, bans women drivers and considers music and singing sinful. The underlying logic behind these anomalies is not very different from that which informed one of the most heinous crimes in the history of Islam, the takeover of the Masjid al-Haram (the sacred mosque which is home to the Ka’bah[142]) at the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Hijra calendar.[143] All attest to the continued influence of Ikhwani ideas in the Kingdom, as do the ban on teaching music and philosophy in Saudi schools, and the refusal to appoint women to the Shura Council or in cabinet posts. There is also the spate of “fatwa’s”[144] inspired by this madness, like the fatwa in which Ibn al-Baz[145] concludes that the earth is not round but flat, and the one proscribing the sending of flowers to the sick!

   In my hands at this moment is a Saudi edict stating that purchasing flowers to send to a sick person is "haram" (sinful), because it is a custom that has originated in the "infidel countries". This is just one example, and might seem to some to be trivial, but it is not, because it discloses a mentality that blindly rejects anything that comes from outside its own narrow confines. It also reveals the laughable contradictions inherent in this type of thought: sending flowers is declared a sin because "it did not form part of the Islamic way over the centuries"! As if traveling by plane or car or using a computer - or indeed, using the sophisticated modern weapons that these people use against their so-called enemies - were part of the "Islamic way over the centuries"! Any Muslim (outside the insular world of Ibn Taymiyah) would feel nothing but revulsion against the mentality that could spew forth this type of ruling - edict No. 21409 dated 29/03/1421 (the Hijra year according to the Muslim calendar) (2000 Gregorian) - and comprising terms such as, "this is but a custom that has come to us from the Infidel Countries and has been adopted by those of weak faith who have fallen under their influence..."  A mentality that fights flowers, the symbol of beauty, goodness, friendship, innocence and love across all cultures; flowers, the names of which in many languages denote a host of beautiful, uplifting meanings!  Only the narrow-minded mentality of these nomadic tribes could wish to turn us into a culture of flower-haters! If this is the way these people view non-Muslims, it is no wonder that from time to time they should churn out warped individuals who indiscriminately open fire on the signs of modern civilization and on foreigners ("infidels") who are "desecrating" the soil of the Arabian Peninsula (using weapons made by the said infidels!).  To stop the madness, the Saudi establishment must take a firm stand preferably accompanied by a psychological campaign.

   During the second half of the twentieth century, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia spent hundreds of billions of dollars to spread this doctrine, which had by then become influenced by three external factors: the ideas of Abul Ala’ Al-Mawdoody,[146] Sayed Qutb,[147] and the Soroureya school of the Muslim Brotherhood’s[148] Syrian chapter. But these factors did not dilute the essence of the Wahhabi understanding of Islam. On the contrary, because of the simplistic thinking of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab in comparison with the schools of Al-Mawdoody, Qutb, and the Soroureya, they helped to reinforce it and swell the ranks of its adherents.

   I can only repeat that a hatred of colonialism is a natural phenomenon; any alternative would be shameful and demeaning. However, those countries in the region secure in a long history of civilization, have no aversion to modernization and progress and certainly no hatred towards foreigners; they simply do not want progress to become the equivalent of "westernization", and rightly so; it is a positive stance that indicates both dignity and wisdom. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the followers of a certain sect do indeed unequivocally hate anything outside their own narrow world. Mohamed Aly (the founder of modern Egypt) sent an army led by his son to the Arabian Peninsula to fight these fanatics, and in 1818, their leader was brought back to Egypt, tried, and executed. In the 1920s, the founder of the third Saudi dynasty took up arms against them as a result of their psychopathic obsession with fighting any signs of modern civilized life.

   One of the most alarming developments of the last five decades is that the Najdi mentality did not stop at monopolizing Islamic centres and schools throughout the world, but rather, it expanded its sphere of influence to include the mass media both within and outside Arab and Islamic societies. Its tentacles also spread to venerable Islamic institutions in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Syria, eroding their original features, and replacing them with its own. Thus while in the past we knew when listening to the Friday sermon in Egypt that the speaker was either a Shafi^cite or a Hanafite and in Morocco or Tunisia that he was a Maliki, we now hear an altogether different tune, a single Hanbalite note set to the music of Ibn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.            

   B.  Two Sides of One Coin

   Having said that, however, we must in all fairness distinguish between Wahhabism, its Ikhwan offshoot, and the Saudi family. The truth is that not one of the nineteen books written by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab calls for any of the excesses required by the Ikhwan. Also, even though the Saudi family entered into an alliance with the Wahhabis at a certain political stage and with the Ikhwan at another, it does not necessarily share their views.

   As a student of Saudi history of the last three centuries, I believe the House of Saud has reached a watershed in its relationship with both the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and the remnants of the Ikhwan. I think that when it transpired that most of the criminals of 9/11 were Saudi nationals, the Saudi family realized that it was time for a showdown with the Wahhabis and the Ikhwan (the Najdi, not the Egyptian, variety). There is, after all, a historical precedent on which to draw, namely, the stand taken by the father of their oldest prince, King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud, who took on the Ikhwan in the nineteen thirties, despite the undeniable role they played in his triumphant career, defeating their army led by Faisal al-Da’wiesh.

V. The Inevitable Choice

What is needed today is for modern, enlightened Saudis to realize that their problem lies primarily in addressing a distorted mentality that has no place in today's world - or indeed in any place or time. It is not fitting that they should have to live with the kind of edict that prohibits a woman from driving a car - and that is just one example. I am not aware that there is any Qur’anic text that impedes Saudi Arabia from forming a new entity for jurisprudence that could select as its source far more enlightened and civilized schools than those of Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Hanbal. To compare the value of the said Ibn Taymiyah with learned men of distinction such as Abu Hanifah[149] or Averroes[150] would be equivalent to comparing a camel as a means of transport with a Rolls Royce...! The House of Saud, which is not ideologically implicated in the ideas of Wahhabism and the Ikhwan, is today called upon to do the following:

1. Stand up to extremist elements in the country like their father did eight decades ago.

2. Remove Wahhabi and Ikhwan zealots from influential positions in the institution of education.

3. Remove Wahhabi and Ikhwan zealots from influential positions in the Ministry of Waqf, (religious endowments), Da’wa (the call to Islam) and Hajj.

4. Abolish the system of state-sponsored religious vigilantes like the “motawa’een” and the “al-amr bel ma’rouf wal nahy ‘an al-monkar”[151] who patrol the streets and mete out instant punishment for any perceived violation of strict Islamic practices, in total contradiction with the concept of the modern state.

5. Reduce the huge budget allocated by the Kingdom to the religious establishment (nearly three billion US dollars) and reallocate it to the fields of education and health (after all, those sporting short robes, shaven moustaches and untrimmed beards can contribute nothing of value to a modern state – the only role they are qualified to play is a destructive one).

6. Encourage moderate professors of Islamic jurisprudence to set a timetable for introducing their students to Hanafi, Maliki and a Shafi^cite sources in place of the Hanbalite sources now exclusively in use so that, in time, the people of Saudi Arabia reach a stage of religious maturity in which they recognize that the doctrine of Wahhabism is not the only, or even the major, model of Islam. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, Ibn-Hanbal, Ibn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya were minor figures in the pantheon of Islamic jurists.

7. Launch an offensive against the Ikhwani obduracy on such issues as the appointment of women ministers, the inclusion of women in the Shura Council, allowing women to drive, allowing male teachers to teach female students and female teachers to teach male students, in order to promote a climate favorable to enlightenment and progress in place of the current reactionary climate that has no equivalent on earth.

8. Given that hundreds of the Islamic centres established by Saudi Arabia throughout the world have become a breeding ground for fanaticism and extremism and crucibles for violence, blood lust and terrorism, an alternative plan must be laid down to transform them into community service centres, rather than allow them to continue disseminating obscurantist ideas that spawn a mentality of violence which has distorted the image of Islam in the eyes of the world over the last few decades.

   These opinions are motivated not by enmity for Saudi Arabia, but out of serious concern for its future. For I firmly believe that unless the descendants of the great King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud follow the example he set with his stand against the Ikhwan of Najd and their leader Faisal al-Da’wiesh eighty years ago, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is headed for a highly detrimental confrontation with advanced societies. I also believe that the collapse of the Saudi regime, whether in favour of the extremists or of the trend calling for the country’s partition and division would represent a great strategic danger to all the countries of the Gulf and the Middle East.

CHAPTER NINE

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

   The Muslim Brotherhood was launched in 1928 to restore a Caliphate,[152] a global religious government aimed at fighting the “non-believers” (specifically, Christians, Hindus and Jews) and at spreading Islam. They opposed the existence of any secular states in all Muslim societies throughout the Middle East.

   As previously mentioned the Brotherhood killed Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Noqrashy[153] in 1948 and plotted to kill President Gamal Abd Al-Nasser.[154] Their offshoot, Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s number two, assassinated the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981, and tried to kill President Hosni Mubarak in 1995.

I. Muslim Brothers’ Political Thought

   The Brotherhood remains extremely anti-Western civilization, opposes a political/peaceful settlement to the Arab Israeli conflict.  Hamas is a Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

   I have tried to summarize the political thinking of the Muslim Brothers[155] in thirteen points, in the hope that it will help shed some light on an issue many people in the world today need to understand.

· Political Freedoms:

Unlike Western democracies, which guarantee the political participation of every citizen regardless of ideology, opinion or religion, the Muslim Brothers make the political participation of individuals in society subject to the principles of Islamic Shari’a.[156]

· Freedom of Belief:

The Muslim Brothers guarantee freedom of belief only for the followers of the three revealed (Abrahamic) religions, otherwise known as “the people of the Book”.

· Personal Freedoms:

While Western democracies guarantee the absolute freedom of the individual as long as it does not impinge on the freedom of others, the Muslim Brothers set freedom of thought within the strict parameters of a moral code derived from the Shari’a. They call for the restoration of “hisbah”,[157] which allows a private citizen to prosecute any individual who commits an act he considers a breach of the Shari’a even if the plaintiff himself has not been personally injured by such an act. The right of “hisbah” was recently exercised by a private citizen in Egypt against the respected intellectual Dr. Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid,[158] whose writings he considered as running counter to the teachings of Islam. The court ruled for the plaintiff, branding Dr. Abu Zeid an apostate and ordering him to divorce his wife on the grounds that a Muslim woman cannot be married to an apostate. Dr. Abu Zeid fled with his wife to the Netherlands.

· Women’s Rights:

In Western democracies, women enjoy the same political rights as men: they can hold public office and participate in political life without any restrictions based on gender. But as far as the Muslim Brothers are concerned, women’s political participation would be limited to municipal elections; there is no question, for example, of a woman ever becoming head of state. To further marginalize women and exclude them from any meaningful role in public life, the Muslim Brothers call for educational curricula to include material that is appropriate for women, tailored to suit their nature and role, as perceived by them. In addition to special curricula for girls, they insist on a complete segregation of the sexes in the classrooms, in public transportation and in the workplace. The Islamist perception of women as lesser beings was recently illustrated in Kuwait, where Islamists successfully blocked passage of a bill granting political rights to women.

· The Economy:

The Muslim Brothers call for the establishment of an economic system based on the respect of private property. At the same time, however, they insist that it be based on the principles of Islamic Shari’a, which criminalizes bank interest. They also call for state ownership of public utilities.

· System of Government:

Contrary to the system of government applied in a democracy, which is based on the peaceful rotation of power through elections, the Muslim Brothers call for a system of government based on the principles of Shari’a and the revival of the Islamic Caliphate.[159]

· Civil Society:

The freedom of movement enjoyed by civil society organizations in a democracy would, in an Islamist system, be conditional on their adherence to the strictures of Shari’a.

· Government:

The Muslim Brothers oppose the notion of a state based on democratic institutions, calling instead for an Islamic government based on the Shura (consultative assembly) system, veneration of the leader, and the investiture of a Supreme Guide. In this they are close to the model established by Khomeini[160] in Iran, which enables diehard conservatives (a group to which the Supreme Guide certainly belongs) to nip any process of reform or renewal in the bud.

· Political Freedoms:

While the legislative branch of government monitors the actions of the State to ensure that they conform to the rules of democracy, the actions of the State are monitored by the Muslim Brothers to ensure that they conform to the rules of Islamic Shari’a.

· The Arab-Israeli Conflict:

The Muslim Brothers were the first to send volunteers to fight Israel when it was founded in 1948. Over the last fifty-seven years, they have opposed all attempts to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict, in particular the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel initiated by the late President Sadat. It would be true to say that the Muslim Brothers will never recognize the existence of Israel as legitimate.

· Religious Minorities:

Although the Muslim Brothers of Egypt do not go as far as their counterparts in Saudi Arabia, where the construction of houses of worship for non- Muslims is prohibited, their position on the question of religious minorities can be summed up in the following:

o A non-Muslim can never become president.

o Non-Muslims will be subject to the principles of Shari’a on which the entire legal system is based.

· The Legal System:

The Muslim Brothers call for the establishment of a constitutional and legal system based on the principles of Shari’a, including the application of corporal punishments in the penal code (stoning, lashing, cutting off the hands of thieves, etc.)

· Violence against Civilians:

The Muslim Brothers have never condemned the use of violence against civilians, except if it is directed against Muslim civilians and that too selectively.

   Finally, “progress” in our today's world is realized by two tools, “science and modern management”; two qualities that the Muslim Brothers have neither access to nor interest in. Instead, they have “ideology in the age of no-ideology”.

II. The Necessity to Dialogue

   Despite my strong feelings about the subject, I find the harsh and often illegal treatment to which they are subjected unacceptable and a crime against humanity. It is also self-defeating in that it hardens attitudes on both sides. In fact, the only way to resolve our problem with the Islamists is through dialogue, by opening channels of communication and engaging in a frank interchange of views. Debating the issues is the only way to transform a religious party, in the long term, into a civil political party that subscribes to the main tenets of democracy: acceptance of the Other, rotation of power, respect for other religions and for women. The transformation will be complete when political Islam abandons its distorted understanding of our religion, an understanding rooted in the Middle Ages and reflecting the mentality of Bedouins bred in a harsh and unforgiving desert environment. Civil society is entitled to protect itself from any group that remains locked in a time warp and would have us all retreat with it into a distant past.

    As reform in Egypt is a thousand times better than its takeover by any of a number of alternatives, so too is reform in Saudi Arabia a thousand times better than its takeover by alternatives that could plunge the entire region into unprecedented chaos. Maintaining the stability of Saudi Arabia and all its neighbors is imperative. But I believe guaranteeing stability is impossible without a historical operation like the one undertaken by King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud against the extremists between 1925 and 1930. The question is whether the sane elements in Saudi Arabia will follow a course similar to the one taken by their famous forbearer eighty years ago or whether they will continue to coexist with the modern-day disciples of Faisal al-Da’wiesh until the ship sinks with everyone on board.

III. The Requirements of the Dialogue

   The proposed dialogue should be based on the answers to the following questions:

1. Some of the Muslim Brothers (MB's) now expound that "Copts" (Egyptian Christians) are "Fully First Class Egyptian Citizens" - would this imply that a Copt could be, in principle, elected president of Egypt?

2. Would the MB’s follow the Saudi model of segregating "girls" from "boys" in educational institutions such as schools and universities as well as all other organizations?

3. The Non-History-Related-Tourism (i.e. the Beach Tourism) generates in excess of 75% of Egypt's tourism- revenues. What are the MB’s views on "Drinks", alcoholic beverages, gambling and casinos, and women dressing in any way they choose?

4. What is the MB’s opinion concerning the peace treaties between Egypt and   Israel, and between Jordan and Israel?

5. What do the MB’s think of the different forms of economic cooperation between Egypt and Israel (the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) for instance)?

6. How do the MB’s describe the killing of Israeli civilians in Hamas or al Jihad suicidal operations?

7. Do the MB’s believe that Sayed Qutb's[161] doctrine known as "al Hak'imyia"[162] is still the basis of their political system? (Sayed Qutb, the leading ideologist of Muslim MB Brotherhood says that Hak’imiya is the declaration of total sovereignty and rule of Allah, a full revolt against human rule in all its forms, systems and arrangements, the destruction of the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of God on earth... A revolution based on this theory does not think of improving the existing system, of understanding it or participating in it, but of destroying it first and then building a new one. It is based on the assumption that there is nothing good in the current system.)

8. What will the views of the MB’s bear on women occupying all sorts of high governmental offices and positions including ministry, prime-ministry, Supreme Court judge & and Head of State?

9. What are the MB’s views on President G. W. Bush’s vision of a “two states” solution for Israel and Palestine to live (peacefully) next to each other? Would they then accept and recognize the right of Israel to exist? Would they also accept that the Jewish section of Jerusalem is Israel's capital?

10. Egypt’s legal system (since 1883) has been based on the juridical notions of the continental legal system (Code Napoleon). What are the MB’s plans with this regard? And what do they think of physical punishments, such as the sanctions applicable in Saudi Arabia?

11. Like all modern societies, the Egyptian banking system is based on the notion of interests (for lending and savings). Will the MB’s keep it?  How do they see this particular point?

12. Is Iran a factor of stability (or Instability) in our today's world?

   Finally, one must know that the MB’s are likely to use “Taqqiya”, a principle which (according to some “ulama”/scholars, such as Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyah) allows the Muslims to lie if so doing assists them in ultimately defeating the infidels!

PART II

A Confined & Barricaded Mentality

The wicked prowl on every side,

When vileness is exalted among the sons of men.

(Psalm 12)

INTRODUCTION

 “Oppressive regimes are matched by the local citizen who lacks any connection with the outside world and who thinks that modernity is the other side of the coin of dependence.  He would not believe that democracy is a human product, and a human right and not a Western commodity for westerners.”^[163]

   At a recent round table conference which took place at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies in one of the United States’ most prestigious universities, noted for bringing forth some of the world’s most learned and respected names, a stimulating discussion took place concerning the so-called clash of civilizations.  There were ten of us attending the meeting, and we were divided into two factions; those supporting the proposition that a clash of civilizations is an inexorable fact, as supported by the now-famous assumption put forth by Mr. Samuel Huntington,[164] and those who opposed this view.  The latter formed a minority of only two persons, one of which was I.  The general trend of the discussion seemed to be turning in favor of the former group with its insistence on the existence of this conflict, until one of the opposition put forth the following question: “Japan was in a state of undeniable conflict with the free world until August, 1945.[165]  However, since then and up to the present moment, there has been no struggle or “clash of civilizations” between Japan and the West, but only a vigorous economic, industrial, commercial and scientific competition played out according to the rules of the game as established by the free world.   I then proceeded to elucidate that if indeed a clash of civilizations had existed between Japan and the free world, the complete and impressive transformation that took place in that country in such a relatively short period of time could never have occurred. 

   The salient point in this argument relates to the fact that when Japan was an autocracy, it was in constant conflict with the democratic world.  This conflict ceased to exist once Japan itself became a democracy, and it was replaced instead by competition, played out according to the rules of the game as practiced by the free world. 

   My friend and I - the minority camp - ended our argument by stating that “it is not civilizations that clash, but rather autocracies and democracies that come into conflict.”  The Second World War[166] was a war between autocratic and democratic factions; and so was the Cold War.[167]  This bears no relation to a clash of civilizations: no such thing exists. 

   Let us also have a glance at India - While every Muslim community in the world has produced jihadis (fighters) for Al-Qaeda[168] and other organizations, only one Muslim community has had no part in this phenomenon.  This Muslim community is the second largest in the world: the Muslim community in India. 

   This community of more than 150 million people is the only Muslim community which does not have a single individual who left the country to plan and take part in violent actions that are labeled by their perpetrators as “jihad”, while the rest of the world calls them “terrorism”.  The Muslim community of India is not wealthy.  It is part of the Indian society, in which a high percentage of the people live a life far removed from wealth and prosperity.  Nevertheless, this Muslim community has never produced a single individual who planned or carried out an action like the September 11, 2001 attack in New York, or like the subsequent attacks in Madrid, London, Istanbul, Taba, Sharm Al-Sheikh, and other places.  Moreover, the Muslim community in India (despite its minority status) produced a great scholar, who recently served as the president of India and just finished his term.[169]  It is important to stress that the Muslim community in India is the only Muslim community which lives in a genuine national democracy. 

What can we conclude from these facts? The obvious conclusion is that inside every individual on the face of the earth there is a political being… If this being finds overt, legitimate, and effective channels by which it can carry out the natural actions of any political being, it will not look for underground political activities. 

   India is not merely a democracy; it is the largest democracy in the world.  Not only has it managed to realize a great nation's dreams for a healthy democratic existence, but it has also enabled this nation to make significant progress in the spheres of economy, scientific research, production, marketing, and modern education.  Moreover, it handles the diversity of the Indian society in a remarkable manner; indeed, the current Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh,[170] is a member of the Sikh minority (which constitutes only 2% of the population).[171]

   The universities of India (unlike universities in third-world countries) are rated among the finest in the world (while Cairo University - the most ancient university in the Arab world - did not rank among the world's 500 best universities). 

The most important point is that India has proven that when Muslims (like any other human beings) exist in a healthy public climate that allows them full participation in political life, they do not turn to underground activities...  and they do not leave to blow up a plane, a train or a bus full of innocent civilians... 

Roadmap

The reverse of India is evident in the allegiance of the Arabs to religion and to their rulers - an allegiance which blinds them from any other reality; they even lose sight of their own identity.  This loss of identity locks them in an intellectual hostility which shuts them off tolerance of the “Other”, and off the values of criticism; hence they ignore the meaning of “compromise” or “diversity”, two essential elements of progress.  The Arabs are thus confined to indulging in big empty talk and self praise, and live in the nostalgia of a past they have created in their own minds.

   Their lack of openness to the world renders them devoid of objectivity; they become consequently submerged with destructive beliefs, such as the conspiracy theory, and the stereotypes they have created – making them inhospitable even to the minorities living on the same land.

CHAPTER ONE

The Problematic of the Arab Mentality

I. Between Verbs and Deeds: A Psychological Dilemma

“If you are out to describe the truth, leave elegance to the tailor.”

(Albert Einstein)[172]

The Arab people have neither been exposed to the Japanese model, nor to the Indian one; and if the first shackle that enchained the Arab culture in, was the outdated, rigid, and medieval interpretation of Islam – which was the yield of the reasons portrayed in Part I -, a second shackle was the natural consequence of a drastic deterioration in the educational system, media environment and cultural atmosphere, from which autocratic regimes can neither distance themselves nor claim innocence.  This enchainment has confined the Arabs to one vision of the reality of our world, while actually, apart from fanatics who believe they are the keepers of absolute Truth and who do not for a moment doubt that their viewpoint is the only right one, most of us should have “two persons” living within, each seeing matters from a different perspective.  This is a healthy phenomenon, for doubt in all matters, more precisely doubt in our understanding of things, is one of the main engines of progress.  Doubt is what drives the human race to constantly try and expand the horizons of knowledge, to learn and reassess its understanding in the light of the new knowledge it acquires, so as to attain ever greater intellectual maturity. 

   In my case, for example, I often find myself pulled in opposite directions by the “two persons” living within me.  One is a man from the world of management who trained in a multinational corporation before attaining the top executive position in an international petroleum company; the company he ran had a culture derived in equal measures from its venerable European roots and from the wide international experience it built up in every part of the world since it was founded in the nineteenth century.  The other is a man who indulged in his insatiable appetite for knowledge from an early age; a voracious reader fascinated by the social sciences and the great masterpieces of human creativity.  Often, the ideas of these two people are contradictory, sometimes even confrontational.  One issue on which they frequently clash is American and European policies towards the Middle East.  While the intellectual is filled with admiration for European sophistication, the CEO is filled with anger at the ineffectiveness of European policies.  The anger is compounded by his awareness of the economic interests and motives behind these policies, which appear to the naïve denizens of the Third World to be based on an idealistic, not to say Utopian, world view.  And while the intellectual within me despairs at the occasional lack of sophistication and ill-information of America's policies, the CEO believes that creative and decisive action can affect these policies and, ultimately, the American mentality in general. 

   The intellectual aspires to a world order in which all decisions and actions on the world stage are clothed with international legitimacy; the CEO, on the other hand, deplores the inability of international legitimacy to act rapidly and effectively in nine-tenths of the cases. 

   When I lecture at universities and research centers in the United States, I sometimes find myself thinking that it is a pity that so much progress is not matched with an equivalent degree of sophistication; but when I lecture at similar institutions in France, I ask myself why so much sophistication remains in the realm of the abstract, why it is content to stop at couching elaborate ideas in beautiful language without translating them into effective and creative action.  It seems to be incapable of acting, indeed, to not want to act in the first place, because many French, like many Arabs, have come to believe that sound can replace substance; that words speak louder than actions!

   I know that many readers in the Arabic speaking countries will be shocked when I say that if I am forced to choose between one of these two approaches, I would, without a bit of reluctance, choose the American one.  The reason is that the executive manager who lives within me would never forgive me for choosing the path of inaction rather than that of action.  In his eyes, action, even if sometimes misguided, is preferable to the paralysis that has unfortunately come to characterize many French and Arab positions of late.  At the same time, however, he is aware that decisive action can only produce positive results if undertaken by those who dream of a world governed by the rule of law, in which justice and stability prevail, and where every person on the face of the Earth is entitled to strive for development and prosperity, and to enjoy freedom of belief without discrimination and oppression. 

   The ideal approach would be a blend of the American, French/European and Arab approaches, excluding the many negative aspects displayed by and inherent in each.  Conscience dictates that I include the positive elements of the Israeli approach in the blend, even though I know this will offend many of the Arab readers.  Of course, we would first have to remove from the Israeli approach the misconceptions from which it is suffering as a result of an ascendant right-wing trend fuelled by religious fanaticism.  Actually, when it comes to fanaticism, Islamic fundamentalism has more than met its match in the extreme Jewish right wing.  But because of Judaism's close ties with Western culture, Jewish extremism has managed to project a much less negative image than its Islamic counterpart, which is seen as (and actually is) primitive, detached from the age, and inimical to Western civilization.  If I were asked to list the approaches mentioned above in order of priority based on logic and pragmatism, I would rank them as follows:

• The ideal approach would be one that blends the advantages of the European approach with those of the American one, while avoiding all or most of their misconceptions. 
• Then would be the American approach as it is, despite the many negative aspects in it. 
• Then the European approach would follow as it is despite the many negative aspects it has. 
• At the bottom of the list would be the so-called Arab approach, which in fact does not exist.  Can anyone claim that there is a coherent Arab position when it comes to relations with the outside world? To democracy, progress and modernity? To human rights or women's rights?

   I placed the Arab approach last because it is in fact not an approach at all, but a mixture of emotions, excitability and confused thinking, characterized by an overwrought imagination that is totally divorced from reality, rooted in the past, and based on sectarian or ideological considerations in an age when the role of sectarianism and ideology is receding fast.  In addition, most Arab positions epitomize the misconceptions from which the contemporary Arab mentality suffers (conformist thinking, overblown rhetoric, lack of objectivity, an unhealthy tendency to escape into the past in a nostalgic bid to recapture glories that are sometimes without any historical basis, etc.  )

   For any criticism leveled against US policies to be credible, the critic must prove that his criticism is meant to be constructive, not destructive.  This, he can do only by admitting at the outset that, despite the misconceptions in its policies, the US is scientifically, technologically, militarily and economically the leading power in the world, and that it could not have attained and preserved such a position unless it was better qualified than others to occupy it.  Moreover, American society provides the best environment in which these abilities and talents can flourish and reach the goals they aspire to and deserve.  It is also important to add here that while there is no perfect democracy anywhere, the political system in the United States comes closest to the ideal that any lover of democratic freedoms can hope for. 

   Still, the United States is far from perfect and much of what is going on in its political kitchen needs to be set right.  The same goes for Western Europe in general, and for France in particular.  The Arab citizen who admires some of France's stands is not aware that the motives behind these stands have nothing to do with justice and integrity or righteous anger for the sake of Arab rights.  As I write, I have before me several reports on the extensive business dealings France and Germany had with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, as well as reports on France's demands for a share in the spoils of the war on Iraq in the form of reconstruction contracts, all of which were turned down by the Americans.  The Arab mentality, which remains isolated from the age and is the product of a culture of grandiloquent poetry invoking imaginary glories, is incapable of grasping reality in a sober, clear-headed and unemotional manner.  The millions of Arabs lamenting the fact that the world is now governed by a single superpower and grieving over the demise of the other superpower, the former Soviet Union, conveniently forget that the first two nations to recognize Israel were the United States and the former Soviet Union.  They also forget that it was when the Soviet-Arab bond was at its strongest that they suffered the worst defeat in their history, and that they are still paying the price of what happened to them on June 5, 1967. 

   It is obvious from a dispassionate reading of history that the pre-eminence enjoyed by the Roman Empire in the distant past, by the British Empire in a more recent past, and by the United State s today did not come about by virtue of ideas or theories, but as a result of the imperatives of history, geography and economics.  It is thus as futile to object to America's supremacy in today's world as it was to object to Rome's in the ancient world.  To protest against the inevitable is self-indulgent and naïve; a grave mistake that is made by the overwhelming majority of the Arab intelligentsia. 

   What the Arab mentality needs at this stage is a leadership that can reconcile it with the past (which was never as glorious as the nostalgic tales spun by over-active imaginations would have us believe), and the present (which is no worse than it was in previous times when other great powers prevailed).  What it needs, in short, is a leadership that can act as a catalyst to induce it to set its sights on a more realistic target. 

   In asking themselves how they can change reality to fit their aspirations, the Arabs are banging their heads against a brick wall.  What they should be asking instead, is how they can find themselves a role in the context of that reality; for just as we cannot hope to change the fact that the sun inevitably rises in the East and never in the West, we cannot hope to change the reality of the world as it really is either.  The first step they should take towards being an active part of this reality is to recognize their vast misconceptions, then to work on rectifying that. 

II. The Misconceptions of the (average) Contemporary Arab

      Mentality

   I have written many books and articles over the last ten years about the misconceptions of the Arab mentality, all of which are cultural misconceptions stemming from three main sources.  The first is the repressive climate prevailing throughout Arab societies, the second is a backward educational system that lags far behind modern educational systems, and the third is a mass-media apparatus operated by those responsible for the climate of political repression to serve their interests.  The following are the most obvious misconceptions from which the contemporary Arab mentality suffers:

1. The adoption of standpoints on the basis of tribal or religious affiliations rather than on the basis of their coherence, validity or intrinsic value. 

2. The spread of the personality cult phenomenon in Arab societies, where the relationship with the ruler is not based on mutual respect and accountability, but rather on the excessive adulation, not to say deification, of the ruler. 

3. An ill-defined sense of national identity: is it Arab, Muslim, Asian, African or Mediterranean?

4. A lack of intellectual hospitality. 

5. Limited tolerance for the “Other”. 

6. Limited tolerance for criticism and the virtual absence of self-criticism. 

7. An aversion to the notion of compromise, which is deemed to be a form of capitulation and defeat. 

8. It is steeped in a culture that encourages conformity and discourages diversity. 

9. The prevalence of what I call the ‘big-talk culture’, in which overblown rhetoric is used to compensate for the appalling lack of concrete tangible achievements. 

10. A tendency to indulge in excessive self-praise and to glorify past achievements as a way of escaping our dismal reality. 

11. An unhealthy nostalgia for and escape into the past. 

12. Deep feelings of inequality with others in terms of results and achievements makes for a sense of inadequacy that is sublimated into an exaggerated and unfounded pride. 

13. A lack of objectivity and the growth of individualism. 

14. Setting great store by the conspiracy theory and believing that the Arabs are always the victims of heinous plots hatched against them by their enemies. 

15. A tendency to unquestioningly accept stereotypes at face value. 

16. Lack of respect for women and minorities. 

   Hereafter, an in-depth examination of each of these misconceptions (or defects?) will show that they are actually all interrelated, and that they even cause one another.  (The example of Egypt will be frequently taken, as what applies to Egypt, to a far extent, applies to most of the Arab societies.)

CHAPTER TWO

The Blinding Effect of Allegiance

Foreign students of contemporary Egyptian affairs believe that there has been a marked decline in the civility of public discourse in recent years, particularly when two opposing points of view contend over an issue of public concern.  I have given a great deal of thought to this phenomenon, which I tried to place in a historical perspective by comparing the language of debate in use today with that used earlier this century.  My research centered on the now-defunct Al-Kashkool Magazine,[173] specifically, on the issues which appeared in the period between 1923 and 1927.  To my surprise, I discovered that the scurrilous language which I thought was the product of the last few decades was already in use in the `twenties.  But further readings of the political and cultural writings of the period revealed that, side by side with the unfortunate tendency to resort to name-calling and slander - a tendency we suffer from to this day -, there also existed a sophisticated debating style that resembled that of the West.  When Taha Hussein[174] published his controversial book on pre-Islamic poetry, he came under attack from many critics.  Some argued their case soberly, using civilized language and confining themselves to an objective critique of the book; but others stooped to unacceptable depths of calumny and personal attacks.  Such attacks were also the style of someone like Mustapha Sadeq Al-Rafei,[175] whose book “On the Grill” (‘Ala al safoud),[176] overstepped the bounds of decency in the virulent personal attack he directed at Abbas Al-Aqqad. [177]

   In other words, public discourse in Egypt used to be conducted along two tracks simultaneously: one track observed the rules of civility and objectivity, shunning the use of insulting language and personal ad hominem attacks; the other belonged to the no-holds-barred school of writing, which had no compunctions about resorting to vilification and mudslinging to discredit the opposite party. 

   During the last fifty years, the objective school of public debate has gradually lost ground to a defamatory style, based on hurling insults at the opponent, in which polemists find it easier to demonize the proponents of the opposing point of view than to argue their own case on its merits.  Numerous examples attest to the prevalence of this phenomenon in our cultural life today, in Egypt as well as in the Arab societies, where differences of opinion over a specific issue are often expressed in the form of vituperative exchanges of accusations and personal insults rather than addressing the core of the arguments or content of the message.    

   Take the strident campaigns launched on a periodic basis by some opposition papers over one issue or another.  All too often, these campaigns degenerate from an objective discussion of the issue over which they were launched in the first place, into an all-out war against the person holding the opposing viewpoint, whose personal integrity and morality are called into question and who is accused of all kinds of private and public wrongdoing.  At first, I thought this was because a public debate offers an ideal opportunity to give vent to the pent-up feelings of anger and frustration some of us harbor because of the many problems we face in our day-to-day life.  I have since come to believe that, although this is certainly one of the factors behind the phenomenon, the real reason is a fascist trend that has marked public discourse in this country for close on half a century. 

   In the last five decades, public life in Egypt was strongly influenced by two main realities.  The first is that the regime which came to power in 1952 was extremely intolerant to any opposition, indeed, even to the mildest criticism.  I am not making a value judgment here, merely stating a fact.  From the start, the regime brooked no opposition. To crush dissidents, it used all the apparatus of the state, including the media, which launched devastating campaigns against anyone who dared raise a voice against the regime.  The other reality is that the strongest underground opposition movement in the country was the Muslim Brothers,[178] a party that was, and still is, notoriously averse to the least hint of criticism, dealing with whoever refuses to toe the party line either with an iron fist, or with floods of speeches and writings that are no less fascist.  Thus, we were caught between a ruling establishment that crushed its opponents with all the means at its disposal, and an underground opposition movement that destroyed its opponents both materially and morally. 

   As I mentioned earlier, oppressive regimes are matched by the local citizen who lacks any connection with the outside world and who thinks that modernity is the other side of the coin of dependence.  He would not believe that democracy is a human product, and a human right and not a Western commodity for westerners (as stipulated earlier).^[179] Thus, in the context of a fascist climate where any divergent opinion was ruthlessly crushed, whole generations grew with no knowledge of the rules of civilized debate; generations were raised to believe that opponents and critics were fair game for the most ferocious attacks on their probity and honor, and that personal insults and abusive language were par for the course. 

   Such a climate is not conducive to the promotion of values such as tolerance of the “Other”, accepting constructive criticism, engaging in self-criticism, expanding the objective margin in thinking and debate, or genuinely embracing pluralism.  There have been a number of notable exceptions to this general rule, but these are unfortunately far outnumbered by the examples of oral and written debates conducted along fascist lines, which represent the dominant trend in our public discourse at this time.  It is a trend that is likely to remain dominant for some years to come, until the process of economic reform now underway has been successfully completed.  Then, the fundamental changes expected to be introduced to the components of public life will make those who now feed the fascist trend mere relics of a bygone time, products of a stage which left its mark on the attitudes of some members of our society, until the new global changes divested them of their very “raison d’être”.  However, this will be still several years down the road and, in the meantime, we will continue to suffer from the fascist trend that dominates public debate in Egypt and the rest of the Arab societies today; a trend that blurs our vision and confines us to a barricaded culture.

CHAPTER THREE

The Barricade of Identity

I. The Cultural Barricade

I reiterate that with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War, only one superpower remained on the world stage.  It was a development that opened new vistas before capitalist producers, who found an opportunity to conquer markets previously inaccessible to them.  But first, new rules had to be set in place; rules that would reduce protectionism, and open the field wide for competition - the mechanisms of which the capitalist producers were better equipped to deal with.  It is from this reality that globalization was born.  Although essentially an economic phenomenon, globalization could only be envisaged in the context of wider interaction between different cultures, and it is this aspect of globalization, its cultural over-spill as it were, that many see as a greater threat than its purely economic aspect.  Voices were raised against the globalization process and the danger it represents for specific cultural identities which, according to the anti-globalization lobby, are at risk of being altogether lost, or at best, greatly diluted in the context of globalization. 

   Actually, over the past forty years, an unfounded fear of cultural invasion has taken hold of the Arabs, permeating the thoughts of many in our society.  Ever since the Eighties, with the division of the world into distinct "Eastern" and "Western" blocs coming to an end and the emergence of the concept of globalization, the issue of what is termed "cultural globalization" has been extensively discussed in the region, with the fear being voiced that this global culture will overwhelm the Arab cultural specificity and annihilate it. 

   At the conference mentioned above which was held at one of Washington D.C.’s prominent think-tanks, I also spoke of a theme related to the main theme of our discussion; namely, the sheer panic that arises in the hearts and minds of many members of the Arab communities concerning the possibility of losing their cultural identity.  I have written extensively about this issue, and have stressed repeatedly that only those with a modest store of cultural specificity are thus threatened; countries with a vast cumulative legacy of cultural specificity, whose cultural identity is interwoven with historical and geographical factors, have little to fear: I would again cite the example of Japan, from which we could learn that such fear has its roots not in a threat emanating from the outside world, but rather from the own internal world of these fearful die-hards.  Like the Japanese, our cultural specificity is too deeply entrenched to waver.  Those who describe the Japanese as having been culturally invaded by outside influences cite only inconsequential, culturally negligible phenomena such as eating fast food and wearing American-style clothing; however, human relationships, the veneration of elders, strong family ties and the dedication to work quintessential to the Japanese culture, have all remained unchanged for the past sixty years, during which Japan has been actively and overwhelmingly exposed to dealings with the West. 

   Nevertheless, while it could be understandable that some might raise concerns over our ability to maintain our cultural specificity when confronted with the wave of globalization sweeping the world, the question of progress is a completely different matter.  The principles and values underlying progress are completely in accordance with the principles upon which our cultural specificities are based: no one could possibly allege that the fundamental beliefs of Egyptians, Arabs, Muslims and Copts[180] conflict with concepts such as the value of time, dedication to work, the global nature of knowledge, team work, the culture of systems and of individuals, and a firm conviction that management is a key tool to achieve success.  In fact, I would have imagined that many of us would lay claim to the fact that these very principles were inherent in our history hundreds of years before they became the mainstay of present-day human civilization.  It might be thought that what I said applies to most of the values quintessential to progress, but irrelevant where pluralism is concerned, for it is believed by some that Muslim religious thought is based upon one model of pure, absolute truth; this, in my opinion, is a grave misconception.  There are numerous texts in the Quran which support pluralism, the most significant of which is perhaps the text which points out that if God had wished all people to follow one single religion, He would have done so.[181] The Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed) also abounds with texts that provide ample proof that pluralism is an inevitable fact of life. 

   It would indeed be strange to assume the existence of a conflict between our cultural specificities and between values such as respect for time or dedication to work; such an assumption simply propagates primitive, backward ideas.  In fact, if additional proof were needed that the values of progress do not conflict with our cultural specificity, it would be sufficient to note that such values flourished in Egypt during the last century, and only dwindled at a later date, when what some people term "the disintegration of the Egyptian society" occurred. 

   I remember when I was working for one of the most spectacularly progressive entities in south-east Asia in the Eighties, that it was generally held by most economic institutions in the area that there were two distinct work forces: the Chinese and the Malay.  The prevailing belief was that for work to be done efficiently and well, it was best to rely on the Chinese, who were known for their dedication, good team-work and strong work ethic.  The Malays (who were Muslims) were, on the other hand, known to be lazy, inept slackers, with no respect for the work ethic.  This belief prevailed until one man took over the leadership of a country where more than seventy percent of the inhabitants were of the denomination categorized as “ineffectual and unlikely to achieve”.  The country was Malaysia, where the population is predominantly Muslim.  This leader was able to achieve a miracle, taking his country to the highest levels of distinction in every field, so that in a period of less than twenty years, all the values of progress were manifest in this country which had previously been wallowing in a mire of laziness, ineffectuality and backwardness.  The world thus discovered two major truths:

· First, that backwardness is not due to unalterable biological factors, but rather to circumstances which, if changed, could reverse the situation completely. 

· Second, progress can be planted and flourish in Christian, Buddhist or Muslim environments, and is not exclusive to anyone. 

   It is worth noting that all Malaysian cultural specificities pertaining to human relationships, family ties, and religious values remained unchanged in this age of progress and did in no way diminish.  To those who venture to say that this progress was brought about by the Chinese minority in the country, I would simply reply that this – if true – simply goes to prove that progress can be contagious, which is actually not a bad thing at all.  However, to refute this theory in the case of Malaysia in particular is easy, for the simple reason that the Chinese minority had always been in Malaysia – what had been missing was the vision and the political will to allow the dynamics of the Chinese minority to be the catalyst or the locomotive of the Malaysian train.

The example of Malaysia explains why the interaction between the Arab mentality and the Western culture is an issue that has intrigued me for years.  Many public figures believe that valuing our culture implies hostility towards the Western culture.  Others believe that to be able to cope with the demands of modern life, one must be familiar with, and have knowledge of the Western culture – they often tend to ignore the Arabic Islamic culture in the process.  A third group is disrespectful of Arab culture, and has a disproportionate admiration for the alien Western culture.  I believe that these stances are based on partiality and emotional bias, rather than on any awareness of or insight into the issues at hand.  I have also come to the conclusion that most Egyptians, and Arabs in general, tend to lean towards one of the aforementioned groups. 

   However, instead of adopting a confrontational attitude, members of this group should demonstrate that it is possible to assimilate elements of Western culture without becoming blindly attracted to it.  We should not borrow concepts that could obliterate our identity as Arab Muslims. 

   Many intellectuals only have a superficial knowledge of noteworthy Arabic and Islamic literature.  Most don’t know the difference between Shari’a (Islamic law) and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).  They probably don’t even know that the Islamic doctrine is a “human” endeavor, subject to criticism and evolution.  Blending law, jurisprudence and doctrine shackles enlightened thought.  And it is basic knowledge that one does not have the right to judge something one does not know. Those in the position to defend Arab culture are unable to do so because they don’t know enough about it.  Arabs and Muslims have every right to pride themselves on the enriching treasure-trove that our cultural legacy is. 

   Quite frankly, the Arab mentality needs to undertake an honest process of self-examination and an unbiased contemplation of the following facts:

· Our cultural specificities include both positive and negative aspects. 

· Our cultural specificities are not static but dynamic; the cultural specificities of the Egyptian people in the year 2000 differ in many respects (but not in all) from those of the year 1900, which were again different from those that had distinguished the Egyptians of the year 1800; those had also changed considerably since the year 1700.  Accordingly, the widespread use of term such as “our fixed traits” is unscientific, imprecise, and largely a figment of the imagination and of wishful thinking. 

· Cultural specificities cannot be erased through widespread dealings with others, as amply proven by the Japanese. I would venture to say that the cultural specificities of isolationists and those who shun the outside world are more likely to diminish, lacking as they do, the stimulation and regeneration resulting from contact with others. 

   When the Arab mentality begins to contemplate the issue of widespread dealings with the “Other” (in particular, joining the march of human progress together with the rest of the civilized world), it raises the now-familiar cry of, “Our cultural specificities are in danger!” It fails to take into account the difference between integration with the outside world by playing the game according to the rules set by the advanced world, and between a total assimilation that erases identity and cultural specificity.  Playing the new global game in accordance with its rules (as prescribed by Western democracy), means that one participates in the game and abides by these rules without losing one’s identity or specificities.  I would liken this to the way Brazilians play football: they do indeed follow the rules of the game, but in their own, very distinctive way, and in a manner that is theirs alone! Again, the Japanese provide the best example of the validity of this argument. 

   As a matter of fact, Arabs amongst themselves do not have the same cultural identity.  Let us consider the case of Egypt: During the first four decades of the 20th century, Egypt was inextricably linked with the Eastern Mediterranean areas that surround Egypt.  The Egyptian mentality has been distinguished over the centuries by tolerance and forbearance; it is linked to the Mediterranean dimension more than any other.  The Middle Eastern identity was coined and cooked up in the “kitchen of politics” and not in the “kitchen of history”.  We have a cultural dimension that is deeply rooted in our geographical situation.  The cultural leanness that has befallen us during the last few years and the recalcitrance of some intellectual trends has probably played a significant role in sapping this dimension.  This dimension, however, is a significant bridge between us and the entire world and one of the distinctive characteristics of our civilization.  Egyptians are culturally Arabs – but certainly not in absolute terms.  They are also eastern Mediterranean – but not in absolute terms either.  And, though they are part of the Islamic civilization, this is not their unique identity.  Then too there are important Ancient Egyptian and Coptic components in their makeup.  For example, although there is a great resemblance between Egyptian cultural mores and those of the Arabian Peninsula, they are not identical.  The same can be said with regard to Egypt’s Islamic and Mediterranean dimensions.  For despite the importance of the Islamic dimension, it has not turned Egyptians into exact replicas of Indians or Indonesians. 

   In other words, the Egyptian identity is a compound one, a multi- layered tapestry woven with a rich diversity of strands that are rooted in history and geography.  Because the Egyptian identity is not the product of transient factors but has distant roots in the time and space dimensions, its specificity cannot be obliterated by the new phenomena that characterize the present times’ realities.[182]

   To understand the role of history and geography in forming the multi-layered Egyptian identity is to realize the complexity of that identity, and the depth of the overlapping layers of which it is constituted.  Once this realization sets in, the dire predictions we are now hearing about the adverse impact that globalization will have on our cultural specificity and about how the new openness onto the outside world threatens the integrity of the Egyptian identity, will appear to be totally unfounded and illogical. 

   It would be wrong to suppose, however, that because an identity is complex, it remains static.  The main components of identity are history and geography.  The first is in perpetual motion, the latter, though apparently motionless, is in a state of suspended animation.  The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this is that the traits of any specific cultural profile are in a state of constant, albeit slow change, like “time” itself, which is a dynamic process in a state of continuous flux.  Thus the cultural specifics of an Egyptian individual living at the dawn of the twenty-first century are different from those displayed by his ancestors at the turn of the nineteenth century, which were in turn different from those displayed by our forefathers at the dawn of the sixteenth century.  All of which means that cultural specifics are in a state of suspended animation or apparent immobility, yet at the same time they are undergoing a process of slow quantitative change that leads cumulatively to a slow qualitative change. 

   If it is illogical to claim that our distinctive cultural profile has remained unchanged throughout the ages, it is equally unreasonable to claim that the traits of which it is composed are all positive.  The best proof that negative strands are interwoven with the positive strands making up the tapestry of our cultural identity, can be found in our popular sayings which celebrate the positive and decry the negative traits of the Egyptian character.  Those who fear that our cultural specificity will be crushed under the weight of others coming our way from more powerful and advanced parts of the world would do well to study the case of Japan and other East Asian nations.  Although these have dealt extensively with western civilization, emulating many of its patterns of work and study, their cultural specificity has remained intact.  Indeed, some of the more positive cultural patterns they assimilated from western civilization and adapted to suit their own realities, like teamwork, have given them an edge in their dealings with the West.  A short train journey from Tokyo to any other town in Japan attests to the undiminished vigor of Japan’s cultural specificity, despite its extensive dealings with and opening onto a world having its own, distinct, and very different cultural heritage. 

   A number of questions need to be posed to those who dread the loss of our cultural identity: Is American culture really capable of uprooting our cultural specificity and replacing it with its own? And, if American culture can obliterate the Egyptian identity, why couldn’t British culture (which is deeper and richer than the American) obliterate India’s cultural specificity over four centuries of British occupation? Why does the hamburger and Coca-Cola culture strike such terror in their hearts? Finally, if it is impossible for America to assimilate us culturally; how can some people believe that Jewish culture can subsume our cultural specificity under its own? Egyptian cultural specificity is the result of a historical and cultural continuum stretching over seventy centuries, while Jewish culture has been exposed to many disruptions through the ages.  Moreover, Jewish culture is extremely limited in scope because of the limited number of Jews in the world.  If anything, it is the Jews who should - and probably do - fear that once peace is achieved in the region, their specificity will be exposed to a cultural onslaught from the surrounding cultures, especially that much of their cultural specificity stems from a ghetto mentality.  Peace will mean the end of the ghetto and, with it, of one half of Jewish cultural specificity. 

   The lessons of history prove that societies which opt for opening onto the outside world, which interact with other cultures, help keep their own cultural specificity intact while promoting its development.  There is also ample historical evidence to show that the total or partial isolation which some believe can protect their cultural specificity from erosion is likely to do just the opposite.  Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, thousands of Egyptians were open to western life and culture without giving up any of their own cultural specificity.  In fact, their interaction with another culture enriched them by adding to their own cultural specificity new elements that boosted its positive attributes and helped correct some of its negative aspects. 

II. The Intellectual Barricade

In the 1960’s, the prevailing cultural climate allowed unfettered access to world literature.  Two factors were instrumental in creating this climate: the existence of a strong school of literary criticism, and an equally strong translation movement, with its fountainhead in Lebanon.  From the former we learnt which classics of world literature we should read, while the latter made those works available to us in our mother tongue when our mastery of European languages was inadequate to capture the richness of this human legacy. 

   The leading critics of the ‘60s, such as Mohamed Mandur and Louis ‘Awad, Abdul-Qadir al-Qutt and Raja al-Naqqash, served as our navigators through the uncharted waters of European culture, guiding us in our choice of reading material not only in the field of literature but also in Western philosophy, history, political economy, psychology, sociology, and so on.  Other luminaries included the philosophers and intellectuals Abdul-Rahman Badawy, Youssef Mourad, Zaki Naguib Mahmoud and Mourad Wahba. 

   During those years I had the opportunity to indulge in my passion for reading; I read the Russian classics, masterpieces of German literature, Italy’s sublime works, as well as prose and poetry penned in English, French, Spanish, Norwegian, and other languages.  I had no inkling of the dichotomous course my life would later take, as my interests proceeded along two divergent paths: my career (in the economic sphere of petroleum, specifically as a senior executive in the oil industry) and my avocation (an insatiable appetite for literature, philosophy, music and art). 

   At that time, it never occurred to any of those of my generation who loved knowledge and culture, to question the nationality of what we read.  We devoured the works of Naguib Mahfouz,[183] Youssef Idris,[184] Badr Shaker Al Sayyab,[185] Nizar Qabbani,[186] Ahmed Abdul-Moaty Hegazy,[187] Salah Abdul Sabour,[188] Suhail Idris,[189] Mohamed Deeb[190] and Yehia Hakki[191] as fervently as we did those of the countless foreign authors, poets and playwrights.  It was never relevant to us that Youssef Idris was Egyptian, that Suhail Idris was Lebanese, Mohamed Deeb Algerian, Eugene Ionesco[192] Romanian, that Graham Greene[193] was English, Albert Camus[194] French, Alberto Moravia[195] Italian, that Henryk Ibsen[196] was Norwegian or that Eugene O’Neill[197] was American.  The issue simply did not arise because we had been raised in a cultural climate in which creativity was presented to us as the ultimate expression of human genius, its fruits being part of the common legacy of humanity taken as a whole.  Egypt was still unsullied by chauvinism, or by the fear of the jingoistic expression, “cultural invasion,” that was beginning to rear its ugly head in the late 1960s. 

   Unfortunately, the irresponsible use by some of this distasteful expression fell on willing ears, coinciding with the emergence of a regressive trend that was not affecting intellectuals in the ‘60s: the new theory of cultural invasion began to take over, as Egypt fell prey to regressive ideas which were totally incompatible with the age and which rejected the notion that human civilization is an amalgam of many different civilizations and cultures.  The numbers of those who subscribed to the cultural invasion theory continued to swell. 

   In the latter half of the 1970s, the tremendous decline in educational and cultural standards started; it further promulgated the idea that we were the targets of a cultural invasion.  In a misguided attempt to resist the “invasion” without foregoing any of the benefits of Western civilization, some of the theory’s proponents came forward with the absurd idea that Western civilization could be broken down into two distinct components: a material component, represented in the applied sciences, technology, machinery and equipment, and a moral component—culture, art and ideas.  They proposed that we adopt from the West only the material component and discard the rest.  However, they overlooked two important issues:

1. That the material component of Western civilization is the natural result of its non-material, i.e. cultural, component: “Western civilization” began with ideas, art and literature; it was only after these had created a climate in which creativity could flourish, that the applied sciences could produce their successive inventions and discoveries. 

2. That “Western civilization” is not exclusively Western, but that it is made up of two elements, one derived from the cumulative experience of other civilizations and cultures, the other from the experience built up in a purely Western context.  In other words, it has a dimension attributable to humanity in general (being the end-product of the civilization process experienced by all humankind), and a Western dimension (linked to the history of Western Europe from the late Middle-Ages and the onset of the Renaissance). 

   Every effort must now be made to ensure that the current as well as future generations understand that the fruits of human creativity and endeavor are humanity’s public domain, and that partaking of those fruits in no way represents a surrender of our specificity.  They must be encouraged to emulate the example of a whole generation of Egyptians—Lutfi Al-Sayed,[198] Taha Hussein,[199] Ahmed Amin,[200] Abbas Al Aqqad,[201] Tewfik Al-Hakim,[202] Naguib Mahfouz, who all remained ardently Egyptian despite their extensive forays into world culture and their profound appreciation of its masterpieces.  Mahfouz, widely considered the father of the modern Arabic novel and the only Arab Nobel Prize Laureate, does not hesitate to criticize aspects of Egyptian society or to adopt unpopular or defiant standings, such as his support for Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses”,[203] or his objection to the Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt, which caused an attempt on his life.  All the while, like his peers, his passion for Arabic literature and culture remained resolute. 

   Moreover, it is materially impossible for any society today to lock itself into total or even partial isolation.  The globalization of science and technology and the information and communication revolution are not only a bar to economic protectionism, but also render dreams of isolation both impracticable and unattainable. 

   Finally, the axiom that “man is afraid of what he does not know” is perfectly applicable to those who fear the disappearance of their cultural specificity if they engage in extensive dealings with the outside world.  If these proponents of isolationism had a better understanding of the multifarious strands that have converged to produce our specific cultural identity, as well as a wider knowledge of other cultures, they would not have the feeling of inferiority that makes them fear the loss of their own identity.  Ignorance breeds a sense of inferiority, which in turn leads to a paranoid fear that the other is intent on destroying our identity.  There can be no greater feeling of inferiority, compounded by a superficial and simplistic understanding of reality, than that manifested in the fear that exposure to other cultures will lead to the erosion of our own.  To believe that our cultural identity will collapse when exposed to other cultures is an insult to our culture and civilization; for the underlying assumption is that our cultural specificity is so weak, that it cannot stand up to the challenge of other cultures if we open up onto the outside world, and that it can only survive behind high walls separating our culture from others, thus breeding intellectual hostility. 

III. Repelling Diversity

   The deplorable state of the Arab intelligentsia today can only evoke a feeling of sorrow within the hearts of those who wish to see the region receive its fair share of progress and development.  These “thinkers” are occupied with denouncing the rules of the game developed by the western democracies, while propounding the theory that it is feasible to invent new rules for that game.  It is a stance that is shared by no other countries, even those who might have been expected to show animosity to Western civilization, such as Japan and the stars of Asian progress, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Indonesia.[204]     Standing on the threshold of the 21st century, then, the Arab societies need to generate a cultural reconciliation between what is “human,” in the broad sense of the word, and what is “specific”.  If the will is there, such reconciliation is not only feasible but perhaps even easily attained, and this will provide a better and more effective stage from which to deal with the requirements and challenges of the age, locally and globally. 

   So far, this will is absent.  In Egypt, for example, myriad reasons accumulate to make most of the modern citizens heavily dosed up with localism.  At the same time, the same reasons gather to make “the hue” of universality for the same citizens so minimized!

   On the one hand, citizens of ancient societies suffered a lot from being foundering in “localism”.  The “World” for them was first and foremost their homeland; hence the Egyptian saying: “Egypt is the mother of the World”.  On the other hand, throughout the sixties and the seventies of the twentieth century we had been wading in localism and evading farther communication with the outside world.  It is noteworthy that everywhere else this era was symbolically the “jumping-off” time to the external World, due to the eruption of the Communication Revolution, the downfall of separateness by the isolating barriers between nations and people – hence, the starting point of the extension of mass media beyond nations’ borders, with economy following the same array. 

   Furthermore, the educational curricula had incessantly concentrated on the interior (local history, civilization and literature) in a way contradicting, for example, education programs in France where the curricula show great interest in the history of ancient Egypt, China, and Greco-Roman Civilizations, etc…[205] an interest no less in any way than its interest in the history of France. 

   In addition, for many years, the establishment of the mass media and the local newspapers in the region as “the long arm” of the government had made the message of the media “a sheer local message”.  The discrepancy between our news bulletins and those in many other countries is enough evidence: local news was preponderant, making a clean sweep, whereas the news worldwide followed and covered events whenever they took place.

   The growth of the relatively backward ideology in our society had been a grand triumph for “localism” at the expense of the “universality” – while the future of the entire world, most properly, has been witnessing relative shrinkage of “localism”.  This takes place on the economic, cultural, educational, and media spheres. 

   Consequently, our negligence of the necessity and significance of assiduous scientific research to achieve balance formulae between (localism) and (universality) might make us unable to deal, effectively and positively, with the mechanisms of the new “globalization” universe. 

    More than once, I have mentioned in my writings that “the engine” which the institutes, firms and societies rely on is “the efficient management”.  I add - in this respect - that the “management” (in our case “bureaucracy”) foundering in localism is too crippled to play the game of the future successively and stay ahead of the game.  The basis of this game is twofold:   

1. Effective management (that is, profitable leadership). 

2. Kaleidoscopic knowledge of the substantial element of the game on the international level. 

   This applies to the economic as well as political aspects of societies’ futurity.  The Arabic speaking people must therefore detach themselves from their hostility and intolerance to all what is not “local”.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Absence of Tolerance and Critical Mind

I. The Virtues of Tolerance

   The human being has a natural propensity to be high-strung, and to reject (on many occasions even be “hostile” to) those dissimilar to him in diverse ways; different religions, races, faiths, mores, sacred precincts, in addition to civilization and cultural differences are all part and parcel of this disparity.  Throughout different eras, this discrepancy, not to mention differing self-interests, added fuel to flames of war and myriad conflicts time and again; conflicts that human history has been replete with. 

  However, it is very true to state that the history of humanity witnessed a positive shift in the progress of man’s acceptance of these differences as natural, if not hanging onto life on earth.  In other words, the human being, throughout the centuries, became less refusing, less seething with these dissimilarities; rather, showing wider acceptance in co-existing with the “Other”.  With evolution of urban life, this change erupted and grew.  Simply, it became not human, but barbarian, to blame someone for being different. 

   Islamic civilization had been relatively superior to other olden civilizations in its tolerance for others.  The discrepancy between “Muslims” and “Christians” throughout Medieval Ages shows dogmatic evidence.  On the other hand, under the umbrella of Islamic sovereignty, the life of “Christians” and “Jews” was close to normal.  Muslims, on the other hand, had been exposed to persecution and uncouth torture after the exodus of Arabs from Spain; they lived in “ghettos” like virulent diseases. 

   It’s worth mentioning that as the Jews and Christians of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt lived under the banner of Ottoman sovereignty,[206] it would have been very easy to do to them at least what the Christians had done to Muslims in Andalusia when the Muslim sovereignty declined there!

   As to the modern age, tolerance - that is acceptance of the others’ dissimilarity in aspects like religion, race, traditions, sacred precincts and conventions - was, and will always be, primarily a phenomenon of culture.  The more a society is saturated with education and culture, the more the tolerance of its members to others, and the more their acceptance of the fact that diversity among people is quite normal, and should witness tranquil co-existence!

  The Western civilization, I believe, had been marked by racial fanaticism; virtually, the boom and prosperity of the West made people more tolerant.  Suffice to cite the grand transformation in Europe’s stance on the Palestinian issue in the last fifty years.  Israel is nowadays no more aided nor backed up by Europe, as was the case in 1948; the culture build-up and awareness made most of the Europeans approve of the legitimacy of the Palestinian right, as they witnessed Israel showing double standards.  If it had not been for the culture awareness of these European countries, they would have been wading in erroneous stances as they had been for the last fifty years. 

   Back to our region; we must confess that our degree of tolerance has been spectacularly receding and shrinking during the last decades.  Roughly half a century ago, the general cultural climate was freighted with a lot of human values settled deep down in our hearts, and particularly in the hearts of those in the stratum leading the people culturally and intellectually.  Dissimilarity was a mode of life, a landmark of human existence on earth.  This culture climate was far from “the intellectual formula” that eventually grew, and made people rank between “we” and “they” - where “we” is on the right track, whereas “they” is on the wrong one.  This formula can be described at the very least as:

· “Inhumane” and “hostile”, representing complete cultural and intellectual contradiction with the modern scientific and cultural facts!

· “Non-peaceful”, meaning that proceeding vitally in conformity with this formula does not lead to our coexistence with others; it is a formula leading to “confrontation”, “contrariety” and “collision” with others!

· A formula that does not attune to the profound spirit of peace and humanity mentioned in our deeply entrenched religious doctrines, whether Muslim or Christian. 

   Fifty years ago, tolerance prevailed, due to the cultural milieu.  Nevertheless, the status quo later witnessed some manifestations of defeat, shaking this cultural atmosphere.  On the morning of the fifth of June 1967, the collapse of an entire political current was manifested, and so were landmarks of general defeat in managing our economy in the following years; those were followed by a grand rift in our social status.  When these various manifestations became embodied, some people with intellectual suggestions totally estranged from the spirit of the sage, civilization and science thought that their suggestions were the best; and the status quo permitted them to carry on propaganda for these suggestions, which had not a jot of intellectual tolerance!

   It is highly imperative to try to culturally reform this perilous defect that distorts our modern mentalities by taking a stance on a highly momentous fact, the essence of the problem, namely that we are nowadays less tolerant and more fanatic about our faiths - to the utmost! We have never dealt with this defect, substantially or scientifically; this widens the gap between us and the rest of the world (especially the world on the track of progress).  Additionally, there is a deeply entrenched relationship between this defect in our mental build-up – i.e. the recession of tolerance – and another blemish, namely the bizarre belief in the conspiracy theory (which will be further discussed below). These two misconceptions will lead us to a huge isolation from the outside world, especially from the parts economically, culturally and strategically important. 

   The presence of these two misconceptions (the ultimate belief in the conspiracy theory annexed to the recession of tolerance) rendered any mutual understanding or dialogue totally inexistent between us and the influential powers in the outside world.  Simultaneously, it gave our historical enemies a situation much superior to ours in the eyes of these powers. 

   Certainly, the recession of tolerance is a defect which not only blemishes our mental build-up, but which also affects our internal situation.  In other words, we are possessed by this stupendous defect to a great extent in our internal dialogue.  Additionally, differing opinions within each front wrangle in a spirit which can only denote a recession in tolerance!

   Undoubtedly, educational institutions, mass media and all cultural milieus are powerful pulpits that can scientifically and objectively tackle this venomous and lethal defect of the mentality of the great majority.  Unfortunately, any success in tackling such a flaw is extremely difficult; the yield of any effective reform in this domain (through the aforementioned pulpits) manifests and becomes apparent only after several years - all reforms in education, mass media and culture are long-term investments, though with results which are guaranteed, profitable and effective in the long run.  Besides, there is no alternative!!

II. Tolerance and the Dynamics of Criticism

“Tolerance” is not limited to acceptance of the “Other”; it also shapes the mentality to be flexible when this is needed.  Such need is there to break away from denial of our own misconceptions, and from our hostility to all what comes to us from somewhere else; this cannot be done if we have no tolerance to criticism. 

Working for two decades at one of the largest industrial corporations in the globe gave me a priceless opportunity to manifestly visualize the extent of disparity between many cultures (including the Western) and our culture, from the “tolerance to criticism” stand point.  During the second half of that period, being on the top executive management level made me adopt a deeply rooted belief that “criticism” is the substantial means of thinking which developed the Western societies, and that “criticism” should be directed at the higher layers of the societal pyramid, just as it is at the other layers of this pyramid. 

   This twenty year experience pictured before my eyes the magnitude of the gap between our culture and some other cultures in this respect.  Criticizing phenomena, concepts, and axioms make a milestone of the culture that set up the most advanced societies. 

   Criticism is a tool that every human being in the advanced societies acquires since the dawn of his conciseness.  The atmosphere where people live within these cultures enables them to voice opinions and speak out criticism from the very start.  The little child is taught how everything around him is subject to criticism.  At the same time, individuals practice criticism under the umbrella of general acceptance and forbearance, remote from the wrath and stress caused by criticism in other cultural milieus (such as in many Middle Eastern cultures). 

   Educational curricula consolidate this interest in criticism.  The general atmosphere (politically, socially and culturally) strengthens this same interest in criticism as an extremely constructive device, and most probably a stupendous means of promoting all systems, establishments, concepts and practices!  Nonetheless, the Arab culture proceeded on the emotional track laden with vexation at criticism, especially criticism to axioms! Arabs, in many respects, regard criticism as sabotage and a destructive act of treason or betrayal.  (In many cases, this reaction looks adequate because they seldom criticize with a calm, objective and polite attitude). 

   Intolerance to criticism is deeply entrenched in the mental build-up of the Arab society, and consolidated as a milestone of their culture.  Other negative aspects disseminate in their contemporary thought and make the issue extremely acrid. When intolerance to criticism is annexed to shrinkage of leniency and augmenting subjectivity, narrow-mindedness (reading others as either “with” or “against” them), and fanaticism (or maybe “phobia”) about their past and overweening inclination to self-praise, then the intensity of intolerance to criticism escalates and reaches its zenith.  Criticism becomes synonymous to wrath, anxiety and sneaking suspicion of intentions, added to the existence of perils lying in ambush to complete the conspiracy (plot) against them. 

   The general atmosphere in Arab societies suffers a great deal from intolerance to criticism.  During the last few decades, many stereotyped cases were repeated, symbolizing this phenomenon and asserting that it is a characteristic of myriad intellectuals and cultural figures.  Debating intellectual issues is a novel emblem of the high intensity of our intolerance to criticism and vexation at being criticized!  Let me give only two examples:

1. Those who called for celebrating the two-century relationship between Egypt and France exchanged accusations and slanders with the polemists who disapproved of this celebration!  

2. Those who believed that holding a parley/dialogue with our “Historic Enemies” is the only way out to escape from wounds- laden reality faced a strident campaign of vituperation depriving them from any honorable attribute, even patriotism. 

   It is my belief that the “critical mind” is almost non-existent today, also largely due to the meager margin of democracy allowed and to the fact that top positions, in many cases, are concentrated in the hands of a few incompetent individuals whose intellectual capacities and management skills are mediocre at best.  When we add to this the current proliferation of a reactionary religious culture, it is understandable that there should be a marked decrease in rationality, a lack of participation marked by extreme negativity, and a prevalence of constants and fixed ideas that cannot hope to hold up against the objective criticism that is crucial to true development.  This lack of democracy actively hinders social mobility, resulting in a general state of incompetence which in turn leads to a decline of standards at all levels.  Invariably, rational thinking takes a back seat. 

   Throughout the last thirty years, our mass media have been void of any article or interview including constructive criticism of any of our governments’ major choices or decisions (except of former governments!!); this is adequate evidence that we do not recognize criticism, except when drawling slogans (or launching into a harangue).  If we really believe that: “there is no problem, we agree to differ and disagree”, then there should be an article or an interview in any of our mass media outlets including criticism to one or more of our main policies.  If there is no piece of evidence, then this will be an adequate proof of intolerance to criticism to an extent that should worry us, and make us keen on treating and remedying this cultural disease, using all the means that help the growth of our acceptance of criticism - without which we cannot set up the future we have long sought and longed for. 

   Eight centuries ago, Ibn Rushd (Averroes)[207] attempted to revive rationality and to draw attention to its merits, only to be met with an onslaught of hostility and criticism from Arab societies.  As I mentioned before, it was very ironic that he was welcomed in France, where he proved instrumental in the defeat of theocracy.  A mere glance at many articles published in a number of leading Egyptian daily papers that are written by a number of well known Islamists, would make us understand the reason for the Arab people’s decline and their regrettable state of regression.  When reputed newspapers of a wide national circulation allow what amounts to a “regular demolition force” against the values of humanity, civilization and progress, there is little wonder at our taking giant steps backwards at a frightening speed.  The articles bemoaned a glorious past that actually never existed outside the writer's imagination, and which was in reality characterized by excessive bloodshed and slaughter (which tended to be the norm all over the world at that time).  The writer went into endless tirades against the “Other", who was pictured quite simply as the devil; and, in true tribal fashion, he persisted in seeing this “Other” as a vile enemy intent upon “destroying” his society, and had therefore to be fought against with words - and with the sword.  This kind of “reasoning” is typical of the desert culture, characterized as it is by tribal values, isolation, and imaginary or real dangers lurking behind every dune.  In actual fact, the “Other” is neither devil nor angel; and based upon this premise, we should engage in a constructive interchange of ideas and discussions, that can only benefit both sides and further the cause of progress and of humanity at large.  This said, we should bear in mind that the concept of “humanity” is completely alien to the nomadic tribal mentality. 

   The “Other” has played a significant and enriching role in our lives during the past two centuries, and has had a profound and positive influence on journalism, theatre, literature, translation, and intellectual thoughts and activities in general.  I can safely say that Egypt was a melting-pot blending the Egyptian with the “Other” in a harmonious and productive fusion which resulted in countless works of beauty, refinement and cultural merit.  Isolation, on the other hand, has spawned a decline in aesthetic values and an ugliness that few can deny.  I have every hope that the minorities in Arabic speaking countries will serve as a catalyst for the dissemination of progress and refinement, taking society forward towards the age we live in, rather than backwards to a past that belongs to the Dark Ages. 

 In addition to all what was stated above, “Total Quality Management” (TQM) is undeniably the “driver” of the vehicle called “Modern Management Systems”.  TQM is the main cause of the success of any economic activity.  In a few words and without getting into technical details, TQM is based on three corner stones: quality planning, quality control and quality audit.  The third corner stone means that every economic unit should critically audit its performance, the goods it produces, or the service it renders, in order to discover through this critical process what is needed to achieve further progress before the competition.  Here, we stand before an extremely clear situation, where the economic success is directly related to the benefits of criticism; a type of criticism which aims at a continuous process of improvement, to ensure the sought competitiveness before a market that will have no place or “mercy” for those who continue to have shortfalls. 

   Self-criticism

On the same note, I recall a discussion after one of my recent public lectures, where was asked by a young student to name “one single” dimension in the contemporary Egyptian thinking that requires a full scale change.  My immediate answer was: “Complacency”.  In my elaboration I highlighted the following relevant aspects: 

· Any fair and just outsider cannot negate that Egypt made, throughout the past decade, excellent moves towards a much better economic standard.  Nonetheless, the inability to admit the gigantic mistakes of the 1950’s and 1960’s continue to impede the introduction of new systems that would undeniably make the past decade achievements much greater.  We simply need to say it patently clear, that the way our economy was structured and managed since the mid 1950’s was a complete mess.  Most of the systems engineered during this era ought to be replaced by systems that proved to be successful in the advanced economies. 

· Our well-deserved pride of our history must not leave us in the currently prevailing “complacency phenomenon”.  On the contrary, we must admit that many features of our contemporary life ought to be changed. 

· The advocates of the “Medieval fundamentalism”, and equally the old guards of “the totalitarian era of the 1960’s”, are the true enemies of the great efforts to build a “modern”, “stable” and “flourishing” Egypt.  The first group advocates an “illusion” that could only throw us back into the Middle-Ages.  The second group has taken us through a long journey of failures.  Both groups would cut our ties with the world in an age of “no isolation”. 

   I remember that I ended my talk about these contradicting notions (i.e. “self-criticism” and “complacency”), by expounding the opinion that I never refrain from saying: “Self-criticism is like all advancement values… they need to be demonstrated by each leadership in its domain”. 

    “Self-criticism” undeniably generates positive, active (non-passive) citizens; i.e. members of the society who profoundly believe that they can “make a difference”.  With such a “belief”, we gain “more believers” and “fewer followers”. 

   With a decreasing “complacency” and a growing ability to practice “self-criticism”, we shall not disregard “conspiracy” as an undeniable phenomenon, but we shall certainly relate more of our major problems to “the way things are/have been managed within our borders”.  For instance, we shall thence accept that the catastrophic living conditions in many, many areas such as “Imbaba”[208] are not the result of an Imperial (or Israeli) plot!!!

   In short, there is no saying more eloquent than that of the great philosopher Emmanuel Kant, that criticism is the most constructive tool ever produced by human mind.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Flexibility of Compromise

Adding to the absence of a critical mind in our lives today, I have serious doubts as to the existence of a distinctive class of intelligentsia in all the Arabic speaking countries.  Ever since the fifties, most Arab regimes have been careful to create what I can only call "the official intellectual".  This “official intellectual” may be an excellent reader and researcher, but is almost invariably no more than a civil servant with none of the independence that is crucial to the creation of a class of free-thinking and effective intelligentsia not subservient to the ruling regime.  It is a sad fact that a large number of intellectuals in our society have been lured by the petrodollars of the Bedouins (i.e. the Nomads of the Arabian Peninsula) and the Baathists;[209] while others have been prey to the law of attraction to official positions.  Thus have most Arab countries sadly become devoid of free-thinking intellectuals, and if further proof were needed, we would only have to note that almost all our intellectuals today churn out identical views on most issues; a phenomenon that is - to put it mildly - uncivilized and uncultured. 

   The picture becomes clearer when we realize that rationality in our society has suffered two major defeats: the first was the triumph of the school of copying in the tenth to the thirteenth century AD over the school of reason as exemplified by the students of Aristotle, headed by the brilliant Ibn Rushd (Averroes).  The defeat of the champions of reason saw the end of centuries of relatively enlightened thought and paved the way for stagnation, inflexibility and inertia.  The second blow was the defeat of the Egyptian school of enlightenment, exemplified by Ahmed Loutfy Al Sayed, Salama Moussa,[210] Taha Hussein,[211] Aly Abdul Razik[212] and Al Aqqad (before he retracted his views upon his dismissal from the Wafd party).[213]  Perhaps the last of these great thinkers were Louis Awad,[214] Hussein Fawzi[215] and Zaki Naguib Mahmoud.[216]  Egypt in the nineteen twenties was undergoing an intellectual boom in its capacity as a leading Mediterranean country, enjoying the fruits of the Renaissance movement.  However, the spread of Fascism in the thirties and the defeat suffered by Egyptian liberalism put paid to the school of enlightenment in this country.  Nevertheless, I am confident that a third school of enlightenment is beginning to make its presence felt in Egypt and other Arab countries, and am also confident that it will eventually prevail, even if present-day liberals do not get to witness this outcome during their lifetimes.  It is my firm belief that the battle of progress with reactionary forces can only end in the triumph of the former and the retraction of the latter, though as I say, we may not live long enough to see the end of this battle.  Tolerance, criticism – including self-criticism -, compromise and diversity are bound to replace hostility, self-praise, and apathy.

   A few years ago, I discovered that there is no equivalent in the Arabic language - whether classical or colloquial - to the English word “compromise”.  This word is most commonly translated into Arabic by two words, literally meaning “halfway solution”.  I have gone through all the old and new dictionaries and lexicons I could lay my hands on, searching in vain for a single Arabic word corresponding to this common English word which exists, with minor variations in spelling, in all European languages - whether of the Latin, Germanic, Hellenic[217] or Slavic families.  The same is true of several other words, such as “integrity”, which has come to be widely used in the discourse of Europe and North America in the last few decades, and for which no single word exists in the Arabic language.  As language is not merely a tool of communication but also the depositary of a society’s cultural heritage, reflecting its way of thinking and the spirit in which it deals with things and with others, as well as the cultural trends which have shaped it, I realized that we stand here before a phenomenon with cultural (and consequently political, economic and social) implications. 

   As I mentioned before, for nearly twenty years, I had the opportunity to work closely with people drawn from over fifty different nationalities in a global economic establishment which remains, after a long history stretching back to the nineteenth century, one of the five largest establishments in the world.  What I noticed over the years is that people with a west-European background use the word “compromise” more frequently than those coming from an eastern cultural tradition.  As the study of cultures is one of my hobbies, particularly when it comes to comparing the Arab, Latin and Anglo-Saxon mentalities, I could not help noticing that just as those with an Arab mentality use the word “compromise” less than those with a Latin mentality, so too do the latter use it less than those with an Anglo-Saxon mentality.  There is a simple explanation for this.  If one’s way of thinking is based on a set of philosophical/religious principles, then it is normal that people raised in an Arab culture should be less inclined to use the word compromise than those whose minds were conditioned in a Latin context, where, although the philosophical dimension looms large, the religious dimension figures less prominently than it does in the Arab mentality.  It is also normal that Latin societies use the word less than societies with an Anglo-Saxon cultural formation.  The Anglo-Saxon way of thinking, which has come to dominate the world in a manner unprecedented in history, is based on an altogether different set of rules. 

   One of the people with principal influence on the reforming thought of the nineteenth century, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), believed that all systems, laws, institutions and ideas should be based on the principle of utility (“utilitarianism”).  The United States, for its part, produced two renowned philosophers, William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952), whose works reflected Bentham’s ideas, but with modifications dictated by passing of time and unfolding events; these works came under the different name “pragmatism”.  The notion of compromise spilled beyond the Anglo-Saxon world into societies belonging to different cultural traditions.  In Asia, for example, people of Chinese, Japanese and Indian stock managed, while jealously guarding their cultural specificity, to learn the meaning of the English word “compromise” before they learned its linguistic form, tending in all their dealings to find solutions based on compromise.  Even the Latin countries adopted the notion before the word became part of their political lexicon, as anyone following political discourse in the Latin countries can see.  Today it is not unusual to tune in to one of the French satellite channels and find a prominent economist speaking in English - which would have been unheard of as recently as three decades ago -, and presenting ideas based on the notion of compromise. 

   Moving to our part of the world, we find many people, even educated people, associating the word “compromise” with negative terms such as “submission”, “retreat”, “capitulation”, “weakness” and “defeat”.  These are terms that do not occur to a Westerner when he uses the word  “compromise”, because whatever his educational formation, whether it is in the field of science, humanities or liberal arts, he knows that all ideas are in their essence nothing but compromises.  Indeed, he is taught early on during his school years, that most natural phenomena are also compromises.  Moreover, the cultures of merchant nations (of which Britain is perhaps the most notable example in human history) have instilled the idea of compromise in all spheres of life, intellectual, political, economic, cultural and social, even in human dealings.  Thus, while our popular sayings reflect a negative picture of the term compromise, hundreds of popular sayings in Britain do just the opposite. 

   Although Islamic scripture is totally compatible with a culture characterized by compromise, Muslim history (especially its Arab chapter) has proceeded in a spirit that is antithetical to the notion of compromise.  Our recent history is made up largely of losses which could have been avoided had we had not persistently rejected the notion of compromise as tantamount to submission, retreat, surrender, capitulation and even, as some of our more fiery orators put it, as a form of bondage to the will of others. 

   This “all-or-nothing” mentality is self-defeating.  Suffice to look at the case of a prominent Egyptian personality, who once held a key international position at the UN, and could not retain it because of his differences with the American mentality.[218] Any dispute or conflict is, by definition, a struggle between people or nations with different views and at different levels of power.  It follows that any resolution of their differences that is not based on a compromise is impossible, because it would entail the total subjugation of the will, interests and power of one of the parties to those of the other.  Such a conflict-resolution approach is doomed to fail, because it runs counter to the laws of science, nature and life itself. 

Some prominent Egyptian intellectuals like Dr. Milad Hanna,[219] who has tirelessly expounded his theory on the need to accept the “Other”, and Dr. Murad Wahba,[220] who has written extensively on the theme that nobody can claim to hold a monopoly on absolute truth, are making a valuable and noble contribution to the process of instilling the rules and culture of compromise in our society. 

   I do not claim to be the first Egyptian writer to address this issue.  In the mid-fifties, the late Tewfik Al-Hakim[221] touched upon it in his book, “Equivalence” (Al-Ta’aduleya).  But on the one hand he was living in a time very different from the one we are living in today; this was reflected in the final product he presented.  On the other hand – notwithstanding my highest esteem for Al-Hakim’s genius - he did not address the issue in sufficient depth.  Perhaps the culture prevailing in Egypt at the time was an objective constraint preventing him from delving as deeply into the subject as he would otherwise have done, not to mention the fact that the word “equivalence” is very different in meaning and connotations from the word “compromise”. 

   I believe that the spread of a religious culture based on strict orthodoxy, or the textual reading of scripture, was one of the reasons for the failure of the concept of compromise to catch on in our culture.  If we were to talk to Ibn Rushd or Al-Jahez (a renowned Mu’tazalite literary figure)[222], we would find it easy to explain to them, and they would find it easy to grasp the notion, that all thinking, all dealings, must be characterized by a spirit of compromise, with all its implications.  That would not be the case if we spoke with proponents of the Orthodox school, strict textualists like Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal, Ibn-Taymiyah, Ibn- Qayim al-Jawzeya, and Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab,[223] or with dozens of their contemporary counterparts who preach a dogmatic adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of religion, slamming the doors shut in the face of rationality.  Attempting to explain the notion of compromise to members of this school would be as much of a lost cause as Ibn Rushd’s vigorous defense of the primacy of reason eight centuries ago.[224]  Actually, it would be even more of a lost cause because, although Ibn Rushd was vanquished by the textualists of the Arab/Islamic civilization, his ideas took root in the Christian culture.  There is no doubt that the ideas of this great Islamic philosopher prevailed over those of Thomas Aquinas[225] in the thirteenth century thanks to his many disciples in the University of Paris at the time, and the so-called Latin “Averroists”.[226] Perhaps history will one day admit that an Arab Muslim was behind the victory of reason over dogma at a time when the prevailing culture in Europe was inimical to intellectual initiative and freedom of thought.  Had the outcome of the battle for the hearts and minds of the Europeans favored the other camp, Europe would have been today at the same stage of development and enlightenment as Africa.

   A similar battle is now underway in our region, a battle of which the outcome is uncertain.  If we want reason to prevail over obscurantist thinking, we must take immediate action.  For a start, a team of intellectuals with a cultural formation made up of a synthesis of Arab, Islamic and other humanistic cultures should come together and lay down a charter to instill the rationale of compromise in the minds of the young people of the Arab countries through educational curricula, and by promoting the idea that compromise is the strongest product of nature, life and the march of civilizations and cultures, while a rigid refusal to consider the merits of anyone else’s opinion and to insist on obtaining all one’s demands runs counter to the logic of science, nature, humanity, culture and civilization; it also leads us to “apathy”, which our circumstances are well ready to engulf us in.

CHAPTER SIX

Negativity and Apathy:                        Consequences of Marginalization

   The pattern of behavior displayed by the victims of poverty differs from one culture to another.  In some cultures, it takes the form of a defiant refusal to succumb to the grip of poverty and an openly rebellious expression of that refusal; in others it engenders an attitude of resignation marked by a docile acceptance of what fate has decreed.  Many factors determine which of the two patterns will prevail.  Societies which have been subjected to tyranny and oppression for much of their history, and have a tradition of venerating their rulers will tend to exhibit the second pattern, accepting their lot philosophically and expressing their disillusionment by using the weapon of sarcasm against public officials - but only in private conversations conducted behind closed doors.  In some countries, this mechanism gives rise to political jokes which reflect what people would have wanted to say openly but which, in the absence of available channels, they are forced to express in epigrammatic form.  The ability of some of the political jokes thus spawned to encapsulate prevailing opinions and impressions in terse, witty aphorisms is sometimes nothing short of brilliant.

   Despots realize only too well that their people’s economic independence and the existence of an economically self-sufficient middle class can have disastrous consequences for them.  For it is this which allows a people to move from apathy to action, from a resigned acceptance of whatever the ruler decides at his absolute discretion to active participation in political life.  To be answerable to his subjects is the last thing an absolute ruler wants, knowing that his grip on power cannot survive open questions on the source of his legitimacy or on the legitimacy of the privileges he and his cronies enjoy. 

I.  Apathy, education and teamwork

Modern educational systems in advanced societies are not based on traditional teaching methods in which the teacher is relegated to the role of a transmitter, so to speak, and the student to that of a receiver; rather, they are based on a feedback process involving student participation, dialogue and exchanges of view.  One of the main features of this process is the division of classes into groups which are required to seek answers to given questions for themselves, by accessing available literature on the subject, whether in libraries or on the Internet, by comparing notes and/or consulting together; they finally present the conclusions reached in the light of their research.  This sort of group endeavor promotes a team spirit among its members, develops a sense of participation and the conviction that every individual is entitled to seek the truth for himself and to express the truth as he sees it openly and fearlessly.  It also promotes tolerance and a respect for the right of any member of a group to differ from the majority opinion without this necessarily rupturing the overall cohesion of the group.  At the same time, it develops the critical faculties of the students and ensures that they will not elevate anyone to the status of all-knowing oracle, neither teachers, authors nor, by extension, political leaderships. 

   Students brought up in this system, which recognizes and consecrates the value of teamwork, grow into citizens equipped to participate effectively in the life of their community.  By the same token, students brought up under the system of learning by rote, where the relationship between student and teacher is a one-way street, never develop a team spirit, and are content to remain passive recipients of information that will never be translated into active participation in public life.  Nor is the material spoon-fed by the teachers processed by the students, who merely learn it off by heart and reproduce it word for word in their exam papers, only to forget it afterwards, rather than retain the context or gist.   

An educational system which is based on the quantity of material that can be stuffed into young minds rather than on the quality of the values that should go into their formation, which consecrates the cult of personality and fosters blind obedience to diktats from above rather than the spirit of pluralism that is the driving force of progress and civilization, and which does not teach students how to accept criticism and engage in self-criticism can only produce a breed of  passive citizens incapable of rising up to the challenges life will throw at them - let alone of participating in the political life of their community.  The inflexibility of the system by which they were governed throughout their formative years is capable of killing any initiative.  Moreover, the fact that this system denied them the right to choose, which the essence of political participation is, instills in them a spirit of apathy and a sense that any attempt to change the status quo is an exercise in vain. 

II. Apathy and the rule of law

Most political systems in the Third World claim to uphold the rule of law; but this is usually an empty boast rather than an accurate reflection of reality.  The majority of these systems operate according to the absolute will of an absolute ruler who is answerable to no one for the decisions he makes.  More often than not, these decisions serve to encourage the spread of corruption and protect the vested interests of the ruling establishment, in the total absence of either democracy or the rule of law to which these political systems pay continuous lip service.  It is not surprising that in such a climate apathy should spread.  People are only motivated to participate in public life when it is governed by the rule of law.  Conversely, when the decision-making process is clearly designed to serve the interests of a select few at the expense of society as a whole, people will retreat into their shells, and resign to accepting what they cannot change.  There is thus a direct relationship between the absence of the rule of law and the apathy of the citizen. 

III. Apathy of citizens in an autocracy

The discourse of most undemocratic systems of government is rife with reverential references to “the People”.  Following a time-honored tradition which began with Hitler and Mussolini, they glorify the people as an abstract concept, but do not display anywhere near as much respect and concern for its constituent elements, viz the individual citizens.  There is a glaring discrepancy between the glorification of the entity known as “the people” in the official discourse of the state, and the abasement of the citizen on a daily basis at the hands of the system, whether in governmental offices, police stations or hospitals, where no attempt is made to translate the dignity accorded to the people collectively into common courtesy for the individual citizen.  In short, undemocratic systems of government pay lip service to an abstract non-existent entity known as “the people”, while treating citizens much as the Mamelukes[227] treated their Egyptian subjects in one of the darkest chapters of Egypt’s history.  The tyranny and oppression to which the Egyptians were subjected by a caste of slaves they themselves had bought, and to whom they then inexplicably handed the reins of power, have left traces in our general cultural climate.  The best description of the long shadow cast by nearly three centuries of Mameluke rule on our present reality can be found in a book entitled “The Slavery Heritage” (turath al-‘abeed) by an eminent Egyptian author.[228]

IV. Apathy and the herd mentality

   I tend to believe that undemocratic systems of government engender a cultural climate which can only be described as a “herd culture”.  Under these systems, the government treats people like cattle, with the result that citizens gradually come to display many of the characteristics of a herd mentality, including a retreat of individualism which, along with democracy, is one of the greatest achievements of human civilization and a prerequisite for the consecration of human rights –in the real sense of the term, not in the sense it is bandied about by some of the most despotic systems of government today.  Once a herd mentality takes hold of any society, the members of that society will develop a passive attitude incommensurate with the requirements of good citizenship.  A positive attitude that leads citizens to involve themselves in the workings of their society requires a perception of the self as an individual human being, not as an anonymous member of an abstract and dehumanized group known as “the people”.  A useful device for despots, the term “the people”, which is not necessarily the same thing as “the citizens”, allows them to benefit from the apathy and indifference of their subjects.  This indifference, one of the main symptoms of a herd culture, is most graphically illustrated in the low turnout at the polls by educated voters who simply could not be bothered to participate in the electoral process.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The “Big-Talk” Syndrome

In our tongues so glib,
Our very deaths reside;
We have paid dearly for our gift of the gab. 

                                                Nizar Qabbani[229]

No wonder the war ended in defeat, not victory,
For we waged it with all the Orient’s gift for oratory,
With quixotic hyperbole that never killed a fly,
Fighting in the logic of fiddle and drum. 

Nizar Qabbani

   In the nineteen sixties, we claimed to be the stronger military power in the Middle East, a claim that was revealed to be nothing more than an empty boast on the morning of June 5th, 1967.  To the same extent that we overrated our own abilities, we underestimated those of our historical enemy, which we dismissed as “a bunch of Jewish gangs”.  Events were to prove that the enemy was far more dangerous than we had talked ourselves into believing.  Nor were these the only instances of “big-talk” during the sixties, a decade that has become synonymous to hyperbole.  A number of notorious examples come to mind, as when we described the British Prime Minister as an “effete sissy” – a particularly offensive characterization in the Arabic language – or when we taunted the United States of America by inviting its president to “go drink from the sea, first from the Red sea and, when it dries up, from the Mediterranean”, or when we spoke of the Qaher and its sister-missile the Zafer as the ultimate weapon.[230]

   When we listen to the rousing national songs composed in the sixties, we find that, despite their high artistic standard and beauty of the national and pan-Arab dream they celebrated, their lyrics are replete with big-talk.  The tendency to indulge in bombastic and high-flown language continued, and in fact grew, throughout the seventies, eighties and nineties; it is now such an integral part of our public life, that anyone using a different language today strikes a discordant note. 

Thus when we talk of our history, we do not use scientific and objective language; we invariably sink into grandiloquent rhetoric that drowns the truth in a welter of words.  The same pattern applies to our approach to the “here and now”.  Even something as simple as a victory by the national football team provides an excuse for a veritable word fest.  Although at the international level our standard in the game ranks somewhere between “average” and “poor”, on the rare occasions our players score a victory on the football field, we are not in the least embarrassed to hail them as “conquering Pharaohs”,[231] or to use similarly overblown language to describe what is, after all, nothing more than the outcome of a match. 

   The use of superlatives is rampant in our media where, as a look at the front page of any newspaper will show, big-talk is the order of the day.  Thus any meeting is a “summit” meeting; any decision a “historic” decision. 

   It must be said in all fairness that our propensity to use big-talk is in no way contrived: we are only doing what comes naturally.  High-flown language has become part and parcel of our code of communication, both oral and written.  It is not associated in our minds with obsequiousness or fawning; we do not use it in order to curry favor or to ingratiate ourselves with the object of our flattery, but we use it as a spontaneous form of expression.  Sadly, this reflects a serious flaw in our mental build-up that has become deeply entrenched in our culture.  Even the few who are conscious of the problem are themselves not above succumbing to the big-talk syndrome on occasion, proving that the problem has pervaded our cultural climate to the point where no one is immune against its effects. 

   An example that graphically illustrates how this feature has come to dominate the cultural landscape in the area is the coverage of the marathon that took place around the pyramids shortly after the Luxor massacre in the autumn of 1997[232] by Egyptian television.  Viewers were treated to the amazing spectacle of about ten foreigners - interviewed separately and supposedly at random - who all said the same thing in virtually the same words, as though reading from a prepared script: “Egypt is a safe country in which we feel secure...Terrorism does not exist only in Egypt but in all parts of the world... Everyone wants to visit Egypt and see its wonderful antiquities”. 

   The twenty years I spent in one of the largest industrial establishments in the world gave me the opportunity to discover that this feature is unique to our culture, a mark of dubious distinction that sets us apart from other members of the community of nations, whether Western or Eastern. 

   Cultural evolution in the countries belonging to Western civilization, including North America, has proceeded along a course that equates big talk with ignorance.  Human knowledge is a complex web of interconnected strands in which there is no room for big talk, but only for moderate, sensible and unpretentious language that tries as far as possible to reflect the unembellished realities of science and culture.  As for Eastern civilizations, the reserve that has always been - and continues to be - one of their most prominent characteristics, shields them from any temptation to indulge in big-talk. 

The picture is very different in the Arab societies, where the temptation is indulged to the utmost.  Indeed, the big talk syndrome is endemic to our culture, which has a long tradition of declamatory rhetoric that places more value on the beauty of the words used, than on their accurate reflection of reality.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the rich body of Arabic poetry, which is full of poems eulogizing or vilifying this or that ruler, for reasons known only to the poet and often having nothing to do with reality.  The dichotomy between language and truth is not only acceptable in our culture, but it is actually honored in a famous saying: “the most beautiful poetry is the least truthful” (a’thab al she’r...  akthabo).  The issue is addressed by no less authoritative a source than the Qur’an itself, when it denounces poets as “drifters in all directions”, and of not practicing what they preach.[233]

   The writer of these lines believes it is incumbent on all those who are aware of this distortion in the Arab mentality to raise national awareness of the dangers inherent in using big talk that is totally divorced from reality.  To that end, they must expose the negative effects of a phenomenon which has led some to describe us a “culture of words” or, with scientific progress, “of microphones”. 

   Educational curricula must be designed to alert our youth to the highly detrimental effects of this phenomenon, which not only distorts our image in the eyes of the outside world, but also keeps us imprisoned in a fantasy world that we have created for ourselves with no basis in reality.  It also holds us hostage to a past we evoke in such glowing terms that it becomes more attractive than any present.  There is no doubt that the big talk syndrome is linked to number of other negative features, such as lack of objectivity, escaping into the past, excessive self-praise and inability to accept criticism.  Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that it is the bridge that links all these negative features together. 

It is also important to emphasize the link between the big-talk syndrome and the narrow margin of democracy.  In a cultural climate dominated by hyperbole, it is as difficult to expand the margin of democracy as it is easy for political forces to win adherents through the use of demagogy.  Those who claim that their political project represents “the solution” to all the ills of the Arab societies are merely serving up another course in an interminable and indigestible meal of big-talk.  Economic and social problems today are far too complex to be cured by simple slogans rooted in the big-talk syndrome. 

As I listen to our public discourse drowning in a sea of hyperbole, I turn to the words of Nizar Qabbani, who eloquently sums up the situation in these words:

“We have donned a thin veneer of civilization

  While our souls remain mired in the Dark Ages.”

   Sheer ignorance and unjustified conceit have led most Arabs to believe in the possibility of creating their own game, played according to new rules that differ from those developed by the democratic world.  It is the same ignorance that leads some to believe that abiding by the global rules of the game constitutes humiliation or defeat; a sick reasoning spewed forth by so-called “thinkers” who are more akin to the poets of the pre-Islamic era, where resonant words and grandiose phrases were much admired and indeed constituted the only achievement of this age.  If we look at the Japanese, for example, we will see that they did not bother about attempting to change the rules of the game, but they rather channeled their efforts into achieving progress, development and distinction within the rules of the game prescribed by the victors at whose hands they had suffered defeat in the summer of 1945. 

CHAPTER EIGHT

The “Self-Praise” Syndrome

The wise man’s mind will even in bliss cause him misery,
While the fool in abject misery will a happy man be. 
It is vain to separate from his ignorance,
He who does not repent;
Or to address him, he who lacks sagacity. 

Al-Mutanabbi[234]

   Another defect of the Arab mentality which has come to manifest itself conspicuously in the discourse of the majority of our compatriots is the tendency to indulge in excessive self-praise.  This defect has spawned aberrant social values in our everyday lives.  Nowhere is this tendency to sing our own praises more evident than in the mass media which, day in-day out, feed our self-infatuation by tirelessly extolling our virtues and glorifying our achievements.  The same pattern is repeated at the individual level, where boastfulness and self-promotion are fast becoming the norm. 

   This has not always been the case.  If we compare our mass media today with the newspapers and magazines that appeared in Egypt half a century ago, we find that this feature, so much a part of our lives at present, is a recent phenomenon.  Also, if we compare our mass media with those in other parts of the world, more particularly in the developed countries, we find that we are unique when it comes to an overweening sense of self-satisfaction expressed in a constant torrent of self-praise. 

   In an effort to trace the origins of this phenomenon, I personally went through hundreds of back issues of Egyptian newspapers and magazines that appeared in the nineteen forties, and found them to be completely devoid of the smallest hint of empty self-praise.  The phenomenon only began to appear, in a diffident sort of way, some twenty-five years ago, reaching its present brazen proportions in the last twenty years, with a noticeable leap in the last decade. 

   It is virtually impossible to read a newspaper or magazine today without coming across one or more articles and/or news items lauding our achievements, superiority and virtues.  Often these paeans of praise are attributed to a foreign source, as though this imbues them with greater value. 

   Although much of the material published in this respect inspires more incredulity than credibility, the phenomenon shows no signs of abating, and we continue to indulge an apparently insatiable need for self-aggrandizement by loudly and incessantly proclaiming how wonderful we are. 

For example, not a day goes by without one of the following or similar statements appearing in Egyptian papers:

· The international community praises Egypt’s economic reforms. 

· The World Bank praises the Egyptian model of economic development. 

· According to this or that university, the Egyptian economy is strong and stands on solid grounds. 

· According to such and such a centre for economic studies, the Egyptian economy will never be exposed to an economic crisis like the one that shook the Asian tigers. 

· UNESCO decides to implement the Egyptian experiment in this or that area at the global level. 

   What does this mean? And why do we not read similar statements in any French, German, English, Japanese or American newspaper? How can our constant harping on the same theme be explained? To my mind, the explanation lies in a desire to escape from a harsh reality into a fantasy world we have created to fulfill a psychological need for a reality more to our liking.  Escapism is by definition a negative reaction, a passive acceptance of the status quo and a tacit admission of inability to change it. 

  The only way we can change the status quo and overcome our many problems, is to adopt a more positive and constructive approach to the reality we are living.  This entails admitting that we are beset by huge economic and social problems; that we are, unfortunately (and it must be said, unnecessarily), a Third World country, and that these problems are a direct result of the way public life in Egypt was administered in the century and a half since the death of Mohamed Ali in 1849.[235]

It is only when we abandon the pattern of excessive self-praise - which we all know to be empty of any real substance -, and start admitting and facing up to our problems, that we can begin to achieve progress at all levels. 

   Of course, stemming the torrent of self-praise in which we are now drowning, and diverting it to the opposite direction of constructive self-criticism, is a far from being an easy undertaking.  Its success depends on our ability to sow the seeds of positive values in young minds through educational curricula.  But these will only yield fruit in the long term.  In the short term, we must begin from the top of the pyramid, not its base.  Once we admit to ourselves how bad the situation really is, the next logical step is to ask why we have reached such a sorry state of affairs. 

   The answer lies in the ineptitude of some of the leaderships which ran our public affairs in the middle of the previous century.  It is important here to emphasize that evaluating the performance of public officials in today’s world is not based on their adoption of specific ideologies.  Efficient administration depends, rather, on the availability of an “executive cadre” at the summit of society, with a pragmatic approach to problem solving, more concerned with implementing the results of experiments that proved to be successful, than in getting bogged down in futile and vain ideological debates that only hamper progress and perpetuate the status quo. 

   The phenomenon of excessive self-praise is organically linked to another set of negative values that have pervaded our lives in the last few decades.  There are many reasons for this, but perhaps the traumatic events of June 5, 1967, have had the greatest impact.  The most important of these negative values are:

· A discrepancy between words and deeds has gradually transformed us from a society attuned to reality to one more comfortable with empty rhetoric and emotional polemics.  This phenomenon is generalized in a very prominent way throughout the region to which we belong.  It goes back to distant dates and deeply-entrenched cultural factors.  Of all the nations of the world, we sing of our history, our past glories and our superiority to others most loudly and frequently.  If we compare our attitude with that of a society like Japan, for example, we find that although the Japanese are extremely proud of their nation and heritage, they do not constantly express their pride in grandiloquent language, oratory and slogans. 

· Judgments are formed in the logic of love or hate.  This leads to the prevalence of subjectivity rather than objectivity and ultimately to the formation of judgments from a purely personal perspective.

CHAPTER NINE

The “Staying-Put” Syndrome

Friends!
What is poetry if it does not declare mutiny?
If it does not topple tyrants?
What is poetry if it does not stir up volcanoes where we need them?
What is poetry if we cannot dislodge the crown
Worn by the powerful kings of this world?

(Nizar Qabbani)

For a person to want to remain in a privileged position is a perfectly normal human instinct.  But when the instinct turns into an obsession, it becomes a cultural phenomenon with political, economic, social and psychological implications.  I have watched this phenomenon in play over many years from my vantage point in the international corporation I worked with.  What I saw during my years with the firm was very different from what is happening in Egypt today.  Over the last twenty-five years, the desire of people in high places to cling to their positions has grown exponentially, to a degree never witnessed before in this country - or, for that matter, in any society that enjoys political and social mobility, i.e. in societies marked with a high degree of democracy.  As I mentioned, fate afforded me the opportunity to spend nearly twenty years in an international corporation which, since the nineteenth century, has been one of the five largest economic conglomerates in the world.  Its revenues from sales in 2005 were three times higher than Egypt's national income for the same period, and much of its success can be attributed to the guiding principles by which it is governed, and which it upholds strictly and unconditionally:

· A general culture based on the premise that the driving engine of success is the institution itself and not any individual, no matter whom. 

· A policy that abjures the notion that rewarding an individual for his exceptional performance is by keeping him/her on in the same position indefinitely.  For the well-being of the institution itself and in terms of sound management, the belief that no single individual is indispensable - and hence irreplaceable - makes more sense than the idea that a person who performs his/her job well and achieves good results has acquired the right to a lifelong tenure of the position. 

· Occupancy of a high-ranked position must not exceed a period of three to five years. 

· Any person who reaches the age of retirement must retire, no matter how exceptionally brilliant, competent and talented he/she may be. 

   Conversely, a culture of "staying put" has pervaded our country in the last quarter of a century.  Anyone occupying the top position in any given area – the president of a club, say, or of a professional syndicate or a political party – considers it a lifelong commission.  The word "former" when applied to a minister not reappointed in a cabinet reshuffle is tantamount to referring to him as the "late" so and so.  Departure from a high position sets the rumor mills rolling: the occupant has either fallen foul of the powers that be, or his/her performance was so poor that he/she had to be removed.  As I mentioned earlier, it is a normal human ambition to want to hold on to a high position, but when the ambition attains the proportions it has in our current cultural context, it becomes a phenomenon that needs to be studied, and perhaps treated. 

   More than a quarter of a century ago, François Mitterrand, then the president of France, called on President Anwar Sadat.[236]  As he was leaving, he told Sadat that he would be going on to visit Mohamed Hassanein Heikal.[237] The Egyptian president's immediate reaction to this bit of news was to exclaim: "But I fired him!" President Mitterrand told friends later that he could not understand what that had to do with his decision to meet with Heikal: "I didn't say I was going to call on the editor of Al-Ahram;[238] I said I was going to call on Mohamed Hassanein Heikal."  When the story was related to me by Mitterrand's daughter, whose paternity he acknowledged shortly before his death, I said that her father's inability to understand Sadat's remark was due to the different cultural backgrounds and mentalities of the two men.  For Sadat, as for many of our countrymen, a person's worth is measured in terms of the position he holds and the titles that precede his name.  Thus if Heikal's value stemmed from his position as editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram, then it follows that when Sadat fired him, he became a worthless nobody – hence Sadat's surprise that Mitterrand would want to meet him nevertheless.  Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth.  Although I differ with Mr. Heikal on most political issues, I know that he is far and away the best journalist in the Arabic-speaking world.  I also know that all those who attack him today, do so to curry favor with people in high places to whom they are greatly beholden for their good fortune.  And, talking of how a person's worth should be appraised, I wonder if the international publishers who published Mr. Heikal's best-selling books would even deign to look at a manuscript presented by any of his attackers. 

   I would like here to recount an anecdote that is self-explanatory.  Despite my political differences with Mr. Heikal, I was lunching with him at a restaurant in London a few years ago when he called the Spanish royal palace to request an appointment with King Juan Carlos two days later.  After only fifteen minutes, the palace called him back to confirm that the King would be happy to see him the day after next.  This is a man whose books have been translated into many languages and read by millions of people throughout the world.  As to his critics, it is a fact that they vilify him for no other reason than to ingratiate themselves with their benefactors.  It is also a fact that not a single one of them is capable of putting together a manuscript that would be acceptable to any international publisher. 

"Does Egypt open its doors
                 to every slave who kills his master?"[239]

   It is almost certainly what led the university professor and former dean of the Faculty of Law to enter into a pitched battle with his opponents in the party, using live ammunition, in a bid to stay on as party president against the will of its members.  Perhaps he would not have been so determined to cling to his position at the head of the party if he had remembered that its founder, who held no official position, was more popular than both Egypt's King and its Prime Minister.  Similarly, violent battles were fought over the presidency of a famous sports club. 

   These and hundreds of other examples show how far people will go to cling to their privileged positions.  Nobody today accepts the idea that occupancy of these positions is temporary, and not a permanent state of affairs. 

   Recently, Dar Al Hilal[240] published a book about the monarchs who ruled Egypt more than five thousand years ago, i.e. starting with the founder of the First Dynasty in 3400 B.C., the Pharaoh Menes who unified Upper and Lower Egypt.  A simple statistical survey shows that these rulers can be divided into three numerically equal groups:

1. Those who were forcibly removed from the throne. 

2. Those who died in office. 

3. Those who were killed in office. 

   My search for a single ruler who had voluntarily abdicated proved fruitless.  In this connection, I would like to mention the sole exception to this pattern.  On Wednesday, October 8th, 1917, the ruler of Egypt, Sultan Hussein Kamel, died.  In accordance with the rules of succession, the throne was offered to his son, Prince Kamal Al-Din Hussein, who turned down the offer.  The throne went instead to the "blackguard" prince, the Sultan's younger brother, Ahmed Fouad.  In a lecture I gave to a class of history students, I asked if any of them knew the name of the man who, less than a hundred years ago, had declined the throne of Egypt when it was offered to him.  Not a single one of the history students knew what I was talking about: it was as though the event had never happened.  The only explanation for this collective amnesia is that, in our culture, anyone who actually turns down the chance to wield absolute power must be demented, and hence not worth remembering; and so, a man of high principle, an idealist who exercised his free will in the face of the ultimate temptation, has been relegated to oblivion.  In using the word "blackguard" to describe Prince Ahmed Fouad, I am quoting Bairam Al-Tunsi[241] who lamented the accession of a prince best known for his love of cabarets to the throne of the great Pharaohs; his famous poem goes:

                   "When in Egypt we ran out of kings,
                    The British brought you and threw you in the ring,
                    They sat you on the throne to masquerade as a king true,
                    Where did they find a traitor and blackguard like you."

   A friend of mine with a philosophical bent of mind is fond of quoting the dictum that “answers are blind, questions are clear-sighted”.  I would like to ask our esteemed historians if they have a scientific explanation for the monstrous growth and spread of the "staying put" culture in our society.

CHAPTER TEN

Destructive Beliefs

   Thus, we have seen that those who accede to the “throne” cling to their positions and remain there eternally, and the vicious circle continues:  abuse of big-talk and self-praise, denial of misconceptions and what it entails of false beliefs shadowing over our weaknesses and inadequacies. 

I. Complacency

The Other Face of the Denial Culture

   Until recently, I believed that the first step on the road to progress was the “acceptance of criticism”, and the diffusion of a general cultural/intellectual climate which does not adopt a defensive posture towards criticism, but welcomes it as a tool of positive feedback; a climate in which self-criticism is practiced without any reservations, constraints or taboos.  I believed, and still believe as I mentioned above, in Immanuel Kant’s[242] brilliant characterization of criticism as being the most important building tool devised by the human mind.  But regional developments over the past few years have caused me to revise my priorities, and I now believe that another step should precede the acceptance and practice of criticism, namely, the dismantling of the wall of denial behind which we have sequestered ourselves for the last few decades; for it is clear that we cannot embark on a process of constructive criticism of our mistakes and shortcomings, before we overcome our insistence on denying their existence in the first place.  Our denial is sometimes expressed in positive terms, like when we openly deny the existence of this or that problem or the commission of this or that mistake; other times, it is expressed in negative terms, like when we tacitly deny the existence of a specific shortcoming by simply not talking about it. 

Thus, our course on the road to progress should proceed in three stages.  The first is to break out of the denial mentality in which we are locked.  The second is to embark on a process of constructive criticism, while avoiding personalizing the process by using it as an opportunity to vilify certain individuals.  The fact is that no one in the region is entirely blameless for the predicament in which we now find ourselves, and finger-pointing will get us nowhere.  The third stage is to come up with concrete proposals on how we can best solve the problems plaguing us.  There can be no shortcuts here, no way we can jump directly to the third stage before first, breaking out of our denial mentality, and second, embarking on a process of constructive criticism of all our misconceptions and shortcomings after we stop deluding ourselves that they do not exist. 

It might be useful here to borrow a methodological approach that is central to modern management techniques.  One of the cornerstones of management science is quality management, a results-oriented operation that extends over three stages.  First the status of a product or service is evaluated at the planning stage from the perspective of quality, a process known as quality audit, which corresponds to what I call eliminating denial.  Then its status is evaluated from the same perspective at the stage of execution, a process known as quality assurance.  Finally, there is the stage of quality planning, which is the formulation of a future vision on the basis of the conclusions drawn from the preceding stages, namely audit and assurance.  This corresponds to the process of laying down new systems and policies in the light of the results obtained from the two processes of eliminating denial and accepting criticism. 

I refer once again to my twenty years as a member of the first echelon of a well-known multinational conglomerate in Western Europe, East Asia and North America; I was taught that the presence of too many ideology-driven individuals in any society will invariably impede on its going through the necessary three stages of the road to progress.  Indeed, advanced societies tend to look upon ideologists as suffering from a condition that warrants serious study and treatment, and there is not a single advanced society on the face of the earth today, whose leading and ruling elite is ideology driven.  Finding solutions to the complex problems of contemporary life entails using a scientific approach based on empirical verification, and adopting practical solutions that were tested and successfully applied by others, and not on doctrinal formulas dreamt up by ideologists to fit their rigid worldview. 

   In fact, there is a “prescription” for progress, a mix of values, systems and policies drawn from successful experiments, not from theoretical ideas.  The ingredients making up the prescription are the end product of the collective human experience, the cumulative legacy of all the different civilizations that propelled humanity forward over the ages.  They belong to the whole of humanity, to the march of human civilization in general, rather than to any specific model of civilization, whether European or Western, Jewish or Christian.  This is borne out by the Human Development Report for the year 2003 issued by the United Nations Development Program, which shows that the leading twenty-five countries in the world belong to different cultural and civilization backgrounds.  Some are American, some West European, some Chinese Asian, some Japanese Asian, some Muslim Asian (like Malaysia), and some Jewish, like Israel.  In other words, as I have always maintained, the engine of progress is driven by a set of positive values and systems that were developed and refined throughout history by various civilizations (while not denying that they received a qualitative boost thanks to the European Renaissance.)[243]

An ingredient the prescription for progress does not include is ideology.  Indeed, once an ideological mentality takes hold of the opinion-makers of any society, that society’s prospects of making any headway on the road to progress are severely diminished.  By definition, ideologists are driven by moral certainty in a system of belief, a certainty they can only be sustained by suspending their critical faculties and building up a defense mechanism against any challenge to their core beliefs.  They tend to take refuge in a bunker mentality which leaves little room for self-criticism and even less for breaking down the wall of denial isolating them from reality.  Such criticism as they engage in is reserved to being directed at others; yet when it comes to evaluating their own performance, there is nothing but self-praise. 

Skeptics could argue that moving from a culture of denial to one in which people are conditioned to accept criticism and to engage in self-criticism requires a lengthy educational process extending over centuries.  This argument is easily refuted by living proof to the contrary.  In the last forty years only, eight developed Asian countries succeeded in overcoming the culture of denial, and adopting a culture that accepts criticism.  Indeed, in the cases of South Korea and Malaysia, the process took only twenty years. 

   I have written extensively about the merits of adopting a culture that accepts objective and constructive criticism in numerous articles, as well as in my book “On the Egyptian Mind”.[244] Accordingly, I will limit myself here to citing a number of examples to illustrate how far we have sunk into a culture of denial, whether by maintaining a resounding silence in the face of problems screaming for attention or by openly denying that they exist. 

Countless books, studies and research papers published all over the world, not only in countries the Arabs once described as enemies (like Britain and the United States) but also in many they call their friends (like Russia, India, China, Japan and France) have praised Anwar Sadat’s foresight, wisdom and political acumen in adopting the line he did towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in the last four years of his life.  By the same token, they find that the Arab countries, leaderships and intellectuals who fiercely opposed his line at the time, committed a grave strategic mistake.  Not content with their virulent campaign of defamation against the late Egyptian president, Arab leaders met in Baghdad in 1978 (the historical irony will not be lost on the reader!) to announce their boycott of Sadat and Egypt.  One of the victims of their relentless war of words against Sadat was the Egyptian minister Youssef Al Seba’i,[245] who was murdered for no other reason than accompanying the Egyptian president on his visit to Jerusalem in 1977. 

The situation is very different today.  Many of those who participated in the anti-Sadat campaign at the time are now trying to follow in his footsteps, albeit far less effectively.  Most of his former detractors admit today that they were mistaken not to support him, with no less virulent a critic of his line at the time than the Saudi monarch’s brother, the Prince of Riyadh (who said in 1977 that he wished it was in his power to shoot down the plane carrying Sadat to Jerusalem); the very same Prince recently issued a statement admitting that Sadat was right, and that those who opposed him were wrong.  Despite all this, most of us are still unable -or unwilling- to venture beyond the wall of denial behind which we have cloistered ourselves for so long, and, consequently, to recognize a simple truth that is staring us in the face: Sadat was right, his detractors were wrong. 

This rigid denial of reality can be motivated only ideologically (whether by pan-Arabism, Nasserism, socialism or by the ideology of the Muslim Brothers).[246] The denial mechanism is brought into play just as strongly with respect to two defining moments in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict; although everyone would be more than happy today to accept the partition plan offered by the United Nations in 1947,[247] the solid wall of denial we have built to shield ourselves from painful truths prevents us from openly admitting that we committed a strategic mistake in rejecting the plan.  Similarly, if we succeed today in restoring the Golan Heights[248] in their entirety to Syria, in ending Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and in restoring East Jerusalem, it would only be restitution of losses incurred in May and June of 1967.  Of the territory lost in the 1967 war, only Egypt has managed to recover Sinai.  Even those who claim that Egypt was tricked into entering a dark tunnel started in May and ended on June 7, 1967, must admit that one of the primary responsibilities of any leadership is not to allow anyone to lead it into a trap.  But our culture of denial prevents us from looking these facts in the face.  All the books and articles that have been written, all the lectures delivered and all the television and radio programs broadcasted since then avoid touching on these uncomfortable truths.  Thus while foreign analysts are unanimous in qualifying our performance on all these occasions (1948, 1949, 1956 and 1967)[249] as lamentable, we continue to turn a deaf ear, or, as the Egyptian saying goes, have “an ear of mud and an ear of clay”, to the truth. 

Although Egypt lowly ranks number 120 in the UNDP Human Development Report for 2003, our media have highlighted the few points in our favor while totally ignoring the overall picture, which was described by Dr. Hazem Al-Beblawy as being “nothing to be proud of”.[250]  But our media, true to form, have been tireless in their attempts to paint a rosy picture of what is actually an indictment of our economic performance, with all the major newspapers carrying banner headlines highlighting the one positive point made by the report, and ignoring the many negative points.  This is yet another manifestation of the pervasive culture of denial marking every aspect of our lives. 

Denial also serves us well when it comes to the issue of corruption. Of course, corruption has become so rampant in our society that we can no longer actually deny its existence. Instead, we deny its significance, playing down the urgency of the problem by convincing ourselves that corruption is a universal phenomenon, and that it exists in all societies. While this is certainly true, it is also true that the extent, degree and spread of corruption differ from one society to the other. A society in which corruption has become a way of life cannot be compared to those in which isolated cases of corruption are dealt with as aberrations. The same is true of crime; while human nature is the same everywhere, some societies have low rates of crime, others have moderate rates and still others have high rates.  Our complacent attitude towards the issue of corruption is yet another example of how adept we have become at using the denial mechanism to shield ourselves from unpleasant truths.

   Also, we all complain about the absence of modern management systems and techniques, whether in private and public economic institutions or in government departments and service sectors, and we admit that we have a serious management problem on our hands.  But, like a doctor who proclaims a patient ill without identifying the cause of his disease, we stop short of laying the blame where it belongs, i.e. on the role of the state in general and of the executive authority in particular.  It is a role that has changed little from the days when Egypt was a socialist country following a command economy, and it leaves little room for the development of effective management systems.  But on this all-important issue too, like on so many others, we continue to be driven by the culture of denial.

It is common knowledge that our educational system produces graduates who are totally unfit to compete on the international job market.  They are unfamiliar with the concept of teamwork, their English-language skills are practically non-existent, and they are formed by an educational philosophy based on rote learning which, as I mentioned before, actively discourages personal initiative and creativity.  Moreover, they are raised to believe that there exists only one model of pure, absolute Truth, with the result that there is very little room in their intellectual baggage for pluralism, dialogue, acceptance of the “Other” or tolerance.  Another feature shared by the vast majority of graduates churned out by the system is an inability to express their ideas in writing or to conduct methodical research in a scientific manner.  But here too we follow the pattern of denial, patting ourselves on the back for our “achievements” in the field of education while turning a blind eye to serious structural misconceptions in the educational system which lead most international organizations in advanced countries to systematically turn down job applicants who received their education in Arab countries.

   The list of examples is endless. What is required at this point is to organize a conference or symposium that will bring together some of our top intellectuals, government leaders and prominent civil society personalities for the express purpose of finding a cure to the malignant social disease of denial.  Our inability to come to grips with the many serious problems plaguing us is a direct result of the pervasive culture of denial which is keeping us in a closed loop and preventing us from moving forward on the road to progress.  We must break out of this culture before we can move to the stage of objectively criticizing our role in allowing the problems, misconceptions and shortcomings of our reality to reach their present gigantic proportions, and from there to the stage of devising solutions and laying down policies to overcome them. Finally, there is one more stage we need to cover, namely that of implementing these solutions and policies.  Allowances must be made for human error, that is, for the possibility that some of the proposed solutions and policies need to be modified before execution.  It was precisely this which led to the introduction of the stage known as quality audit in modern management science. 

Being thorough believers that they are absolutely correct, the Arabs perceive those who do not comply with their beliefs to be (naturally!) enemies who conspire to destroy them. 

II. Belief in Conspiracy

   For anyone concerned with the world of ideas, particularly as they pertain to the social sciences and the dynamics governing different societies, some issues acquire greater resonance than others.  One issue that has long been at the forefront of my concerns is the prevalence in Arab societies in general - including Egypt - of the “conspiracy theory”.  There are many in our part of the world who subscribe wholeheartedly to that theory, firmly convinced that sinister forces are busy hatching plots against them.  United in their belief, they differ only as to the motives and origins of the conspirators.  Some see them as motivated by an atavistic hatred for Muslims in general and Arabs in particular, others by a fear that an Arab awakening represents a danger that must be averted at any cost.  Then are those who attribute the conspiracy to Jewish machinations.  Finally, there are those who believe it is part of a grand design for the economic exploitation of the region. Actually, in the minds of many millions of Egyptians and Arabs, the following propositions have become virtual articles of faith:

· The blueprint for our recent history and present reality was drawn up by the great powers, and what we are now living through is the product of their machinations. 

· The powers responsible for this grand design were Britain and France in the past and the United States, aided and abetted by its protégé, Israel, in the recent past and present. 

· The plans were prepared in great detail by those powers, leaving little room for maneuver to those at the receiving end, including us, who had no choice but to follow the course charted for them. 

· Accordingly, we bear little responsibility for what happened in the past, what is happening in the present, and indeed, according to some, what will happen in the future. Reality is the predetermined result of a grand design, and it is beyond our power to change it. 

   When Israel, as an actor, is factored into this theoretical scenario, the picture becomes even more inflammatory and provocative.  Moving from generalities to specifics, it is normal from this perspective to see even the landmark events of our modern history as resultants of the plots hatched by the great powers.  These include the 1956 war,[251] Syria’s secession from Egypt in 1961,[252] the Yemen war of 1962,[253] the June 1967 disaster[254] and the failure to crown the glorious crossing of the Suez Canal in October 1973[255] with the military liberation of the whole of Sinai, as well as President Sadat’s[256] visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David accords[257]  signed between Egypt and Israel, the demise of the Soviet Union and the structural collapse of socialism everywhere.[258] By the same token, the emergence of the United States as the sole global superpower, the New World Order, the GATT[259] and a host of other global developments.. 

       A paradox worth studying is that this view is shared to varying degrees by the following disparate groups:

· All those who can be classified as “Islamic” believe profoundly in the truth of the propositions which collectively form the “conspiracy theory”.  The groups in question include the Muslim Brothers,[260] the Gama’at Islamiya,[261] the Jihad[262] and all fundamentalist movements, indeed, even the most moderate of the Islamic trends.  It pains me to have to use the epithet “Islamic” to designate groups that are basically nothing more than political organizations, because this implies that whoever does not belong to those groups should be classified as “non-Islamic” or “anti-Islamic”.  Although I am fully ready to challenge the validity of this obviously ludicrous implication, I am forced to use what has become the widely accepted terminology to describe these groups.  If we had to identify the most devoted adherents of the conspiracy theory, there is little doubt that this dubious distinction belongs to the “Islamists”. 

· All those who can be classified in one way or another under the banner of socialism, from Marxists to socialists, passing through tens of subdivisions of leftist or socialist orientation, including the Nasserites,[263] [264] also subscribe to the conspiracy theory, albeit less rigidly than the Islamists.  For while they believe in the theory as a whole and accordingly, in the propositions on which it is based, their belief is neither shrouded in what can be called the spirit of jihad[265] or militancy, nor grounded in anti-Christian feelings as is the case with the “Islamists”. 

   Of course, the difference in the degree of rigidity of the belief and the fervor of the conviction is due to the theocratic ethos of the Islamic groups and the more scientific, progressive and modern spirit of socialist ideas, even if the failure of those ideas to achieve their aims or live up to their slogans proves that they are inherently flawed. 

· The third and final group is made up of ordinary citizens in the Arab societies and Egypt, who belong neither to the Islamic school politically nor to the socialist school ideologically; most of these people are inclined to believe in the conspiracy theory, and to accept the validity of the propositions on which it rests without questioning it. 

However, it is essential to remember that the reasons behind the adherence of each of the three groups to the conspiracy theory derive from different sources. 

· The Islamists, in all their subdivisions, consider that the history of the region is the history of a conflict between Islam on the one side and the Judeo-Christian world on the other.  As far as they are concerned, the Crusades[266] have never stopped, except that now they are not being waged openly on the battlefield but elsewhere.  This group attaches great importance to the Jewish dimension, which it blames for many of the ills besetting the Arab/Islamic world and the disasters which have befallen it. 

· The socialist group, in the broad sense of the word, views matters from the perspective of the struggle between what it calls the forces of imperialism, and the oppressed and exploited peoples of the world. 

· As to the third group, the multitude of ordinary citizens who subscribe to the conspiracy theory, they reflect the climate of opinion created by the information media, many of the key constituents of which are controlled in this part of the world either by the socialist trend or by the Islamic trend, and which repeatedly spout the propositions on which the conspiracy theory rests as though they were gospel truth.  In societies not characterized by a high level of education and culture, the information media (including the “minbar”, or pulpit of the mosque) can be used to brainwash and indoctrinate public opinion.  It is enough to recall that the Ministry of Information[267] in some countries was once called the “Ministry of Guidance”, a clear admission of the function it sets to itself: to guide and direct. 

Actually, the sources from which the three groups draw their belief in the conspiracy theory are wholly illusory, having no basis in fact, history or logic.  The history of the peoples of our region would have been the same, including their subjugation by Western colonialism, even if the region had been part of the Christian world.  The West did not colonize us because we were Muslims, but for quite different reasons.  On the one hand, we were backward and hence susceptible to foreign domination; easy pickings, as it were.  On the other, the whole colonial enterprise was motivated in the first instance by economic considerations, and, to a lesser degree, by cultural or “civilizational” considerations, which constitute a broader framework than religious factors.  Although much can be said to refute the naïve view that the region’s history with Western colonialism can be reduced to a question of religion, it is sufficient here to cite but a few of the many examples attesting the contrary to realize how widely off the mark this view is. 

   Those who maintain that we would not have been colonized had we not had our Muslim heritage conveniently forget the dark chapter of our history under the dominion of the Ottoman empire,[268] when the colonized Arab peoples were subjected to the worst kinds of abuse by their colonial masters, despite the fact that both colonizer and colonized belonged to the same Muslim faith.  Throughout the eighteenth century, our ancestors were in a deplorable state of backwardness, even though they were Muslims occupied by Muslims, as the Christian West was then still absent from the scene.  The same situation prevailed when the Zionist movement[269] was launched by its Hungarian-born founder, Theodor Herzl,[270] towards the end of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, we had remained locked in a state of medieval backwardness for more than six centuries preceding the emergence of the Jews as a political force capable of affecting the course of events in any way. 

Though in many ways wrong, the socialist reading of our history with colonialism is right in that it approaches the issue from an economic perspective.  Certainly the economic factor was the driving force behind the West’s imperialist ambitions in the region over the last two centuries.  But this was within a framework quite different from that of the conspiracy theory, as we shall explain below. 

As to the group of ordinary citizens enamored of the conspiracy theory, it is in a way understandable that their logic is impaired and cannot stand up to any sort of serious discussion or analysis; for even the most outlandish statement, if repeated often enough, can come to be accepted as true, especially in a society where one half the population is illiterate, and the other half displays only a very modest standard of education and culture.  Here, the lack of sophistication provides a fertile breeding ground for the most untenable, demagogical and unfounded assertions to take root and flourish. 

   To my mind, the real issue is that most of those who subscribe to the conspiracy theory know very little about the nature and mechanisms of the capitalist economy, or what is called a market, or free economy.  The essence of capitalism is competition, a notion which means many things, some positive and wholesome, others negative and unhealthy.  But given that all the ideological alternatives to the market economy have failed lamentably, wreaking such havoc in the societies which adopted them that they have been relegated to the museum of obsolete ideas, we must under no circumstances let our nostalgia for the past or our emotional reaction to certain aspects of capitalism drive us back into the world of socialist ideas.  Those ideas have caused so much more loss, damage and human suffering that they have forfeited the right to be given a second chance.  Indeed, experience has proven that socialism (both as an ideology and in terms of practical application) is not a viable system of beliefs. 

As mentioned before, however, competition, which is the backbone of the capitalist economy, is a notion that carries within it not only positive aspects, but also highly negative ones.  On the positive side, it works to the benefit of individuals and the enhancement of their quality of life because, by definition, it leads to a process of constant upgrading of the type and quality of products and services; this in turn often leads to reducing their cost or price. 

   On the negative side, it sometimes deteriorates into vicious struggles between the producers of products and services, struggles that can take such diverse forms as driving a rival out of the market, marginalizing the role of others and grabbing the largest share of the market or markets.  This feature of the Western capitalist system engenders, in countries without a long tradition of industrialization and advanced capitalist services, the belief that they are the victims of a well-planned conspiracy. 

   It is this aspect of competition that I want to cast some light on, because unless we understand it well and accept that it is an inevitable - if unfortunate - feature of the market economy and unless we devise a strategy to deal with it as a fact of life in our contemporary world, we will not attain any of our goals.  The competition to which I am referring here, which is one of the main cornerstones of economic life based on the dynamics of a market economy, was responsible for the wars that tore Europe apart in the last three centuries, indeed, for the two world wars the twentieth century has witnessed. 

   But after centuries of fighting amongst themselves, the Europeans came to realize in the last three decades that the advantages of putting an end to the strife that had convulsed their continent throughout much of its history, greatly outweighed the advantages of allowing a spirit of contentious competition to continue ruling their lives.  And so, competition in its extreme form was displaced from Europe to other arenas.  The rationale now governing competition in Europe, which continues to thrive in many different shapes and forms, is mutual coexistence, and consensus on a framework of checks and balances in which competition is to operate. 

   To better illustrate the point I am trying to make, I would like to draw the attention to a very simple fact, which is that, in an economic system based on competition, the strategic interest of the producer, or seller, is to remain a seller while ensuring that the buyer of his products or services remains a buyer as long as possible, preferably forever.  There can be no switching of roles here.  This simple principle is the essence of that aspect of competition which many in our part of the world tend to regard as indicative of a conspiracy.  Although in a way it does resemble a conspiracy, it is very different in terms of motivation and the rules which determine its inner workings.  This law, one of the laws governing competition in a free-market economy, operates within advanced industrial societies.  Its application outside those societies is thus inevitable, expected and unavoidable.

In other words, the economic system in force in the advanced industrial countries (now also advanced technologically and in the services sector) is based on unavoidable conflicts fuelled by competition, which manifest themselves in endless attempts to capture the largest possible share of the market.  This means that the big fish are constantly trying to swallow the little fish.  This process and its negative, not to say ferocious, aspects, operate both inside a given society, and beyond (where it is liable to be even more ferocious).  The terminology and practices of modern management sciences contain many terms and notions that, in the final analysis, serve competition in its various aspects (both positive and negative).  While I do not want to bother the reader with a detailed account of this terminology, the analysis given here would be incomplete if I did not mention at least some of the principal notions which have become part of the lexicon of modern management sciences in the contemporary world, such as quality management, global marketing, data confidentiality, the plethora of occupational health systems, and environmental considerations.  These and tens of other recently-coined terms are tailored essentially to serve the interests of the big fish who, by applying them, can successfully swallow the small fish. 

   We can now add to the “big-fish-eat-small-fish” law, another rule running parallel to it, which is that the swift and efficient fish will gobble up the fish that are less swift and efficient.  The huge conglomerates that have emerged on the global stage in the last twenty years in the fields of industry, services, technology and commerce attest to the growing ascendancy of this new law.  It is very important here to distinguish between what we want to see, and what we cannot avoid seeing if we do not want to delude ourselves.  These laws/rules exist and are fully operational, and there is no hope, after the demise of socialism, to replace them with laws/rules that can ensure success, abundance and the avoidance of these aberrations (for those who regard them as such).

   It must be said that even the most widely-read and highly cultured intellectual would be unable to fully grasp those new realities and laws if his cultural formation is based exclusively on a familiarity - no matter how deep and extensive - with human and social sciences, but without any knowledge of the modern sciences in the fields of management, marketing and human resources, and the tens of new specialized fields which have branched out of them.  No matter how deeply a person may have drunk from the tree of knowledge, how familiar he is with the works of thinkers from Socrates[271] to Bertrand Russell,[272] passing though the thousands of names and areas of human knowledge, if his cultural baggage does not include a working knowledge of contemporary sciences in the fields of management, marketing and human resources, he will be unable to grasp the essence of these laws.  In a way, he would be like a physicist who devotes fifty years of his life studying physics since the dawn of history with the exception of the last half century.  Although in such a case he would be well acquainted with the history of the subject, what he knows belongs in a museum of the past and is in no way suitable for the modern world. 

   Unfortunately a considerable number of Third World intellectuals are like our fictitious physicist; they know a great deal, but their knowledge does not extend to new areas.  Not only that, but these intellectuals also continue to engage in lengthy debates in which they use obsolete terms of reference which confirm that they are living in the past, and, consequently, unable to comprehend what is happening around them.  Indeed, these obsolete frames of reference stand as obstacles in the way of society’s ability to take the only means of transportation that can carry it to the desired destination, or, stated otherwise, its ability to play the game according to its new rules, not according to utopian rules that exist only in the minds of those who remain locked in the past. 

   Having come this far in our analysis, we cannot proceed any further without addressing an issue that is inextricably linked to all discussions touching upon the subject of conspiracies and the conspiracy theory, namely, once again, the Japanese phenomenon.  In a lecture delivered in Tokyo in December 1996, the author of this book credited Japan with playing a vitally important role in his intellectual formation, explaining that its experience had convinced him that the conspiracy theory, whether imaginary or real, was far less potent than it is made out to be.  If one believes in conspiracies, then surely there could be no conspiracy more heinous than the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.  For, by definition, a conspiracy seeks to inflict injury on the party against whom it is aimed, and there can be no greater injury than the atomic devastation which rained down on Japan over half a century ago. 

Japan’s refusal to remain locked in the spiral of defeat proves that, even assuming that a conspiracy does exist and that, moreover, it attains its full scope (i.e. the infliction of maximum damage on the party against whom it is directed), the conspirators cannot achieve their ultimate aim unless the targeted victim accepts to be crushed.  Japan has risen like a phoenix from the ashes of the atomic blasts to become the main rival of the very powers that seemed, in 1945, to have succeeded in bringing it to its knees. 

   The most important thing left to say about the unshakable belief in the conspiracy theory that seems to have taken hold of the Arab mentality, is that it denotes a complete denial of a number of fundamental principles we must never lose sight of:

· It proceeds from the assumption that while the conspirators enjoy absolute freedom of action when it comes to exercising their will, the parties conspired against are totally devoid of that prerogative.  This endows the former with the attributes of motivation, determination, will, and the ability to make things happen, while stripping the parties conspired against of all these attributes, reducing them to objects rather than subjects, inanimate pawns moved on the chessboard of history according to the whims of others.  

· It denies the parties conspired against the quality of nationalism, while attributing it exclusively to the conspirators. 

· It makes the conspirators legendary figures in the minds of those who consider themselves victims of conspiracies. 

· It assumes that there is no way the parties conspired against can foil the stratagems of the conspirators, making for a defeatist and passive attitude that runs counter to pride and self-dignity, and to the notion that nations, like men, can shape their own destiny. 

   All that I have written about the conspiracy theory would be incomplete - as well as contrary to my beliefs - if the reader was left with the impression that, first, I believe that conspiracy and conflict are one and the same thing and that, accordingly, I do not believe that conflict has been a constant feature of human history; or, second, that I am denying that conspiracies too have always been a part of that history. 

   In fact, I am profoundly convinced that human history is made up of a series of conflicts, and moreover, that the world stage today is the setting for numerous bitter and major conflicts.  But I believe that conflict and conspiracy are two different notions. 

Conflict means persistent efforts by given parties to maintain whatever edge they enjoy over others, or even to expand that edge, and the privileges and advantages that go with it.  But conflict also means that contradictions are played out in a game that proceeds according to certain rules which differ from one era to the next, so that whoever wants to achieve a position of any prominence must wage the conflict with the tools, and according to the rules that will guarantee the optimal results.  Here the Japanese model emerges one more time, as the most salient proof of the truth of this characterization.  It goes without saying that conflict is a relatively more open game than conspiracy; the degree of ambiguity in which the game of conflict is shrouded (even its features that are so ambiguous as to appear closer to magic than anything else) is relatively less than that necessarily surrounding the conspiracy game.  Placing matters in the context of a conflict game rather than within the parameters of a tight conspiracy that determines the course of history, encourages people to draw on their inner resources of pride, dignity and determination, to enter the game as active participants bent on affecting its outcome to their advantage. 

   This is very different from the state of mind created by a widespread belief in the conspiracy theory as the driving force of history.  This state of mind encourages people to adopt a passive attitude; they believe that they have no choice but to bow to the inevitable - albeit with much wringing of hands and loud complaints at the often disastrous results coming their way - rather than rise to the challenge by becoming active players determined to achieve honorable results in the game, even if the cards are stacked against them.  The experience of the Japanese, who have waged one of the most ferocious conflicts in human history throughout the last half century, stands as a testimony to the triumph of the human spirit in the face of great adversity.  Again, that is not in any way to imply that history is devoid of conspiracies; indeed, the annals of human history are rife with examples of plots and counterplots.  What I am trying to say, rather, is that history is not a general conspiracy, but the stage for a fierce and relentless struggle on which those who quietly accept whatever comes their way are relegated to the sidelines. 

   Finally, it is necessary here to highlight another disastrous aspect of the rampant belief in the general conspiracy theory, which is the aspect related to undemocratic rulers, like some of those now in power in the Third World.  The undemocratic ruler contributes with his ideas, statements, and information media apparatus in consecrating the belief in the conspiracy theory.  It is a useful fig-leaf behind which he can hide his own shortcomings and failures, since it allows him to put the blame of the problems and hardships faced by his people, as well as his inability to respond to their aspirations, on external elements, i.e. a general conspiracy, rather than on the real reason, which is the absence of democracy, and the existence of rulers like him - who are usually far from being the most efficient, capable, honest or cultured members of the society they represent. 

   The real challenge as I see it is not a global conspiracy but a global conflict, one that is ferocious, violent and dangerous, which nations can only wage successfully if they are properly equipped for.  And they can only be equipped if their leaders are men of vision operating in a climate of democracy through cadres characterized by a high degree of efficiency, ability, honesty and culture.  It is impossible to overrate the importance of this last attribute, for without culture there can be no vision. 

In conclusion, it must be said that though the logic of the proponents of the conspiracy theory is based on a patriotic love of country, and though I have absolutely no doubt that they are in fact nationalists who want only the best for their country and people, the sad fact is that, in the final analysis, their absolute belief in the conspiracy theory renders them defeatists and advocates of the line of least resistance, which is to bemoan their lot as parties conspired against, without making any serious attempt to do anything about it. 

   Dealing with Conspiracy

Nevertheless, let us try to go beyond the question which is at the heart of what has become a sterile and demobilizing debate: “is there a conspiracy against us?”, and ask a further question: “assuming we are in fact pawns in a grand design orchestrated by others, is there anything we can do other than lament the fact, which so many seem to think is the only course open to us?”. In fact, our reaction to the conspiracy – assuming it exists – can be any of several scenarios.

The first scenario is embodied in the reaction of the majority of our conspiracy theorists; it is to rant against the conspirators and speechify about how much they hate and envy us.  This becomes an occasion to enumerate the qualities that make us an object of envy.  I call this the “declamatory scenario”.  Then, there is the “confrontation scenario,” in which the self-perceived “victims” of a conspiracy adopt a confrontational stance towards the “conspirators”.  Finally, there is what I have chosen to call the “Asian scenario”.  I decided on this appellation following a discussion I had with a prominent Japanese personality, who asked me why our part of the world was so obsessed with conspiracies and conspirators, in contrast with East and Southeast Asia where, he said – and as I mentioned above -, “despite the atomic bombs dropped by the West on our cities, we did not waste our time talking about conspiracies.  Instead of indulging in this futile exercise, we directed our attention at building ourselves up internally in all spheres, economic, political, social, educational and cultural.  We opted for action rather than words, because we realized that the declamatory scenario would get us nowhere: it would neither benefit us nor hurt others.  As to the confrontational scenario, setting ourselves on a collision course with the West would have exacted a heavy price, and we would have ended up squandering our time, assets, resources and energy striving for the impossible.”

The Asian scenario, which eschews words in favor of action, was adopted by China in another, very different, matter.  Instead of getting bogged down in an endless debate over the respective merits of a socialist command economy based on centralized planning versus a market economy, China quietly pressed ahead with its own version of the Asian scenario, keeping most of its provinces under the old system while allowing a few to follow a market economy.  After what had started out as a limited experiment which proved to be successful, China gradually expanded its scope, moving smoothly from the old economic system to the new one.  Thus, it did not tear society apart by involving it in a polarizing and endless national debate which would have sent the pro- and anti-change camps at each other’s throats and sapped the national will hampering it from moving forward.  Too much talk and no action can only erode society’s resolve and, as the old adage goes, “it is a nation’s resolve that can revive it. 

   My interlocutor went on: “Look at China, which is – theoretically - more dangerous for the West (approximately a thousand times more dangerous) than you are.  And yet, it avoided getting bogged down in useless talk about conspiracies, and it focused on the process of building itself up from within.  I believe that Russia and India, like China, also represent a greater threat to the West than the Arabs do, and yet neither of them got caught up in a war of words against conspiracies and conspirators.  This tends to prove that you, Arabs, are using this talk about conspiracy for other reasons; maybe an inability to deal with what is essentially a conflict situation as active participants bent on affecting the outcome to their advantage, which entails building a strong, healthy, stable and thriving internal environment.  ”

   I believe that talk about conspiracy can be as demobilizing for a society as talk of the clash of civilizations.  Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that we are the targets of a conspiracy, we should ask ourselves what positive action we can take to foil the designs of the conspirators.  Loudly bewailing our fate while waiting passively for whatever they decide to throw at us, hardly qualifies as positive action.  At best, the declamatory scenario is the line of least resistance, a static scenario that locks us into a world of fiery language, and prevents us from taking control of our destiny.  If we opt for the confrontational scenario, we must be ready to pay a heavy price in terms of our financial, natural, economic, and human resources.  In the final analysis, then, it is only by adopting the Asian scenario based on building a strong internal front in all fields, political, economic, social, educational and cultural, that we can hope to achieve our aim, namely serving this nation and ensuring a better future for coming generations.  The point I am trying to make can best be summed up as follows: the source of any country’s pride is in its ability to realize its goals.  It is a statement that could be made to counter the declamatory and confrontational scenarios.  The former, in which words take the place of deeds, is incapable of achieving pride, while the latter, in the absence of a strong internal front, can only result in great loss. 

   I believe it would be easy to convince most people in our part of the world of how ineffectual the declamatory scenario is when it comes to coping with external threats.  It is a scenario we have long been familiar with, and we have seen at first hand how it has consistently failed to live up to its extravagant promises.  We have also seen how it has all too often led us into situations for which we were ill-prepared, with disastrous consequences.  But while most people who realize that big talk has cost us dearly would be receptive to the idea that the declamatory scenario is no longer an option, they would be less ready to concede that the confrontational scenario too should be abandoned.  In fact, there are those who would challenge my contention that the confrontational scenario can only be a losing proposition of defeatism.  This challenge would easily be rebutted; even the most fervent believers in a conspiracy theory cannot deny that our internal front is weak and friable, and that all our resources must be deployed to address this problem.  Neither can they deny that overcoming the problem entails a concerted effort that combines scientific knowledge, modern management techniques, a serious program for reform and development, an educational revolution aimed at bringing the region’s educational system into line with modern educational systems (which are based on creativity not memory tests), expanding the scope of general freedoms, and allowing for wider popular participation in public affairs.  If we can easily reach an agreement on this point, we should just as easily be able to agree that embarking on a confrontational scenario for which we are not prepared will cost us dearly. 

   Thus, building a strong internal front is the first task we must set ourselves, because it is the only way we can effectively deal with the outside world, whether as partners in a state of peaceful coexistence, or as protagonists in a confrontational situation.  Neither coexistence nor confrontation is possible unless we focus on improving our internal structural build-up.  In this connection, a useful lesson can be drawn from the experience of Mohamed Ali.[273] As long as he confined himself to building Egypt’s internal institutions, he was neither subjected to any external pressure nor dragged into confrontations aimed at clipping his wings.  But when he shifted his attention from the internal front, and began harboring ambitions to transform Egypt into a great power with an important role to play and interests to promote beyond its borders, he found himself facing the same fate as that of countless dedicated rulers who succumbed to the temptation of expanding their sphere of influence beyond the borders of their own countries.  Like boxers entering the ring before they are ready, that is, without going through a lengthy regimen of training and preparation, they were easily defeated by their stronger and better prepared opponents, who managed to inflict heavy damage, not only externally but also internally. 

    I have tried here to drive home the point that even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is a conspiracy against us, we must be aware of the dangers of opting for the declamatory or confrontational scenarios.  The former serves only to paralyze society and keep it in a state of suspended animation; the latter, while feeding the psychological cravings of some, satisfying the emotional needs of others, and responding to the basic instincts of many, can only deplete our resources and cause us to incur heavy losses we can ill afford.  As Shakespeare so perceptively put it, pride can only come from success.  It is also useful here to recall another wise saying, that there is nothing worse than allowing what is attainable to slip from our grasp while we strive for the unattainable!

III. Belief in Stereotypes

Another essential step towards success is to get rid of the tendency of blindly accepting and following “stereotypes”.  Actually, the English word “stereotypes” has no equivalent in Arabic, but is usually translated into two words (al-afkar al-namateya), literally meaning “standardized ideas”.  In my search for one Arabic word that could best denote the meaning I intended, I dismissed the word “cliché” which, though commonly used in colloquial Arabic, is originally French.  By stereotypes, I mean the hackneyed expressions people use in a more or less automatic fashion without stopping to think what they really mean, that is, without exercising their critical faculties to determine whether these expressions are right or wrong and, accordingly, whether they should accept or reject them.  It is, of course, easier to unquestioningly accept generally held ideas than to exert the mind searching for the deeper meaning behind them.  A common feature of human behavior that exists to varying degrees in all societies, stereotyping is an extremely negative phenomenon that does nothing to foster greater understanding between peoples.  Many of the West’s perceptions of other societies, civilizations and cultures are based on stereotypes; and we too are guilty of perceiving the “Other” through the prism of stereotypes which acquire an aura of truth through endless repetition.  The universal tendency to accept stereotypes at face value rather than subject them to critical examination is a triumph of rhetoric over reasoning.  While this tendency is part of human nature and, as such, can never be completely eradicated, I believe steps can be taken to limit its spread.

   To that end, it might be useful to try and identify the main reasons for the profusion of stereotypes that have come to dominate people’s perceptions in today’s world.  I believe there are four main sources for the phenomenon.  The first is the lack of a rich store of knowledge that can serve as a shield against the blind acceptance of stereotypes.  The second is the absence of what I believe to be the main enemy of stereotypes, namely, a free and uninterrupted dialogue.  The third is the lack of a human dimension in the process of globalization currently sweeping the world, which proceeds from an economic/political premise with little regard for humanistic/cultural considerations.  The fourth is a psychology dominated by a defensive mentality.  I will try to cast some light on each of these four sources before moving on to the intellectual tools by which I believe the phenomenon of stereotypes can be cut down to size. 

   The first source from which the phenomenon springs can be found in societies where the store of knowledge forming the intellectual sensibility of the population in general and of the educated and cultured elite in particular, can be characterized as either limited, flimsy or insular, and hence inhospitable to opinions deviating from the norm.  Even though some members of the educated and cultured elite could have a reasonably rich store of knowledge on which to draw, their frames of reference are often rooted in the past, whether a distant past stretching back for centuries or a more recent past going back only a few decades.  As a result, their approach to questions of the day does not take into account modern developments in various fields of knowledge, especially in the field of social science.  Many are the intellectuals, especially in the Third World, whose store of knowledge belongs more to the fifties and sixties than to the present day.  Many are those who are imprisoned in a mentality that is incapable of breaking free of the shackles of parochialism to explore wider horizons.  In some cases, these intellectuals may display a store of knowledge that is rich in some aspects and poor in others, notably in the area of modern social sciences.  It is thus clear that the existence of a store of knowledge (for the ordinary citizens as well as for the educated elite) that can be characterized as strong, non-parochial and capable of expanding into new areas, is society’s only shield from the spread of stereotypes and biases.  It is in such a context that critical faculties can develop and allow people to choose between several alternatives rather than blindly accept stereotypes as the line of least resistance. 

   The second source for the phenomenon of stereotypes can be found in societies whose educational and cultural constructs are not built on a solid foundation of dialogue.  When educational techniques rely on rote learning and memory tests, when relationships in the world of education and in society at large are based on monologues (transmitters and receivers) and not on dialogue, this creates an ideal climate for the propagation of stereotypes.  The opposite is true: dialogue is an effective tool by which their propagation can be limited. 

   The third source is the failure by the advocates of globalization to give a humanistic/cultural face to a project that has so far succeeded in portraying itself exclusively in economic/political terms.  There is a pressing need to introduce a human dimension to globalization in order to allay the fears of many in the less developed parts of the world who regard it as a device to promote the interests of others at their expense, worse, as a weapon designed to destroy the structural underpinnings of their societies, whether political, economic or cultural.  As one who has no problem recognizing that the West, where the notion of globalization was born, is firmly ensconced in the driving seat of progress in every sense of the word, I am convinced that the introduction of these two equally important dimensions, humanistic and cultural, to the globalization process is up to the West.  I also believe that one of the main reasons for this serious deficiency is that global leadership is now in the hands of the United States.  In fact, it is not only the notion of globalization that suffers from this deficiency: the same is true of such other vital notions in today’s world as “human rights”, “general freedoms” and “democracy”.  The West, which has developed these notions in its own societies, needs to add a humanistic dimension to their application by dealing with them as universal (rather than regional) values whose sovereignty extends to the whole of humanity.  Otherwise, the West will continue to be accused of applying double standards.  Worse, it will render these values meaningless for those in the underdeveloped world who hear that they exist in the West, but have seen nothing in the last fifty years to indicate that the West is overly concerned with extending their benefits to the rest of the world.  I believe that the failure to develop the globalization process in such a way as to place humanistic/cultural needs on the same footing as economic/political considerations is one of the main sources for the propagation of stereotypes. 

   The fourth and final source is a general psychological climate characterized by a perceived need to adopt a posture of self-defense.  A sense of achievement and progress renders the members of any society less susceptible to two things: the need to be on the defensive, and the feeling that they are victims of a conspiracy.  These two factors create an ideal climate for stereotypes, which are usually used by people to cover their feelings of inadequacy, and shift the blame for their society’s lack of progress from where it rightfully belongs on to the shoulders of others. 

   These then are what I consider to be the main sources of stereotypes.  While it may be impossible to eradicate the phenomenon altogether, given that it exists in all societies to one degree or another, there are mechanisms by which its insidious spread can be reduced to manageable proportions.  The most effective mechanism is education - curricula, philosophy, teachers and the general learning environment. 

   Only education can plant such values as pluralism in society; only education can form critical minds that require proof before accepting the truth of any proposition; only education can imbue people with a sense of the primacy of reason, so that they test any idea through a reasoning process rather than through ensuring its conformity with set formulas.  These are the tools which can limit the spread of a culture of stereotypes.  However, as I already said, in the short and the medium term, information media can be more effective in exposing the incoherence and intellectual shallowness of stereotypes.  They can also show the link between a culture of stereotypes and other misconceptions like the big talk syndrome, the tendency to indulge in self-praise and the irrational belief in conspiracy theories; for there can be no denying the existence of a dialectical relationship between all these negative phenomena.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Victims [274]

   Although my writings have covered a wide range of subjects since my first book was published in 1978, the central theme that links them all together is the issue of progress.  The seemingly unrelated topics to which I have devoted numerous articles in various publications and entire chapters in my books, ranging from educational development, to the need to adopt modern management techniques in all fields, to misconceptions in our thought processes, are all tributaries of a single river flowing in the same direction, namely towards defining the elements of progress and removing the obstacles impeding its achievement. Values of progress, modernity, democracy, freedoms, belonging to humanity, belief in pluralism, cultural tolerance, otherness, culture of peace, refusal of all forms of fanaticism or discrimination; these are the cornerstones of my writings and lectures.  There is no doubt that one of the worst misconceptions of the Arab culture hampering progress is reflected in the way minorities are perceived in the Arab societies.  The conditions of these minorities are far from enviable.   First, there is the status of women in the majority of the Arabic speaking countries; then, there is the status of other ethnic or religious minorities, such as the Shiites in Saudi Arabia and the Copts in Egypt.

I. Women, the gender minority

I write to save women from the cells of tyrants/ from the cities of the dead/ from the state of polygamy/from the monotony of days/ the ice, the repetitiveness.

 (Nizar Qabbani)

Our purposes to achieve the values of progress cannot be served unless we all feel most ashamed of the manner “women” were/are treated in many societies, where they were/are (to a shameful degree) denied most of their human rights.  The patriarchal “dominant male” culture is a disgrace to mankind; if men apologized to women for a thousand years, it would still be “insufficient”.  It might sound as given to some Westerners, but in the Middle East (and elsewhere) we need thousands of voices and wills to cause the required crack in the prevailing medieval masculine culture.

Women’s status in most of our societies is in dire need of serious review.  Not only do women constitute half of the population, but their societal role, in terms of the influence they wield as mothers, is far greater than their numerical weight.  Unfortunately, the status they are accorded in no way reflects this reality.  To redress the situation, we must first stop hiding our heads in the sand, and acknowledge the existence of a real problem. Once we break out of the denial mentality, we can set out to make a critical appraisal of the situation, using a methodological and systematic approach, preliminary to laying down concrete policies designed to enhance the status of Arab women in line with what they deserve and with the requirements of the age.  Here, the wall of denial which was discussed earlier is at its highest; we are constantly congratulating ourselves on how well women are treated in our culture, and how they are given rights not enjoyed by their sisters in the West.  The example most often cited to prove this point is their independent patrimony. We also hold up exceptional (and symbolic) cases in which women achieved prominence as proof of the equality enjoyed by women as a whole, a myth we are able to perpetuate thanks to our amazing ability to hide behind an impenetrable wall of denial.

   One of the most important indicators of a society's progress is the status it accords to women and how they are perceived in the prevailing cultural climate. Indeed, that is perhaps one of the most accurate ways to measure the extent of a society's progress or backwardness.  For long, I have championed the cause of equal rights for women, not only because I firmly believe that they are - at least - equal to men in all aspects of life, but also because a society that subordinates women to men cannot hope to make any headway on the path to progress.  The institutionalized concept of male superiority, the so-called machismo ethos, works not only against the interests of women as a group, but of society as a whole. In other words, the worst thing about male chauvinism is not that it is reactionary and completely out of step with the spirit of the age, or even that it is at odds with basic human rights, but that it is an insurmountable obstacle in the way of progress.

   I have no doubt whatsoever that male chauvinism grows from the seeds of male insecurity.  A confident man who believes in himself, his intellect, and his abilities, having a strong “sense of self” does not need to assert his superiority over women.  The experience of dealing with thousands of young men has taught me that the more modest their capabilities, the more insistent they are on clinging to the chauvinistic culture that relegates women to a lower status than men.  It is understandable, as those who fail at the public level have nothing left but to assert themselves artificially in their little private domain.

Strangely enough, the generations that grew up in the fifties and sixties, like me, are more progressive on this issue than subsequent generations. Several factors have contributed to this phenomenon.  One is the spread of reactionary interpretations of religious teachings; another is the higher-profile role that was getting assumed by women.  With more and more women receiving an education and participating in the workforce, the myth of male superiority was effectively shattered.  To compensate for this blow to their self-esteem, many young men sought refuge in a kind of mythical victory, invoking their innate superiority on no other grounds than their gender (how easy it is to find texts promoting the notion of male superiority, a notion that flies in the face of science, reason, culture, humanity, and civilization.)

As previously mentioned, many years spent closely observing the attitude towards women among the men I worked with, confirmed the existence of an inverse relationship between a man's lack of self-confidence and his willingness to accept that women are equal to him in all respects, and that, indeed, in some respects they rank higher; for if women are men's equals as human beings, their value surpasses that of men in certain areas, notably as mothers, the first teachers of humankind.

   Some of the proponents of the male-superiority theory use specious arguments to back their claim that women are somehow inferior to men, often citing religious texts to justify their position.  But there are always other texts that assert the full humanity of women and the equality of both sexes.  At the end of the day, any text, even if it is divine, requires a human agency to interpret it, and the real test is how the mind elects to deal with it.  Thus the source for the notion of male superiority is not, as some people claim, religion, but the stages of human history in general, and of tribal/Bedouin history in particular, when civilization and humanistic values were at low ebb.  There is no greater proof that the issue has nothing to do with religion than the fact that none of the proponents of this chauvinistic approach care to underscore any of the aspects of the first marriage which the Prophet of Islam entered into.  Not only was it exemplary in terms of the equal humanity of both partners, but also in many other aspects, like the wife having the right to divorce, and the husband not taking a second wife.  But the reactionary chauvinists choose not to see these examples or not to bring them to light, as if they never were.

   The first person in history to receive the Nobel Prize[275] more than once was Madam Curie.[276] That alone is enough to silence those who claim that men are superior to women, and it is far from being the only instance of public recognition of a woman's excellent achievements.  But diehard male chauvinists dismiss the argument that brilliant women like Madame Curie, who are light years ahead of them in intelligence, knowledge and success, testify to the fallacy of the male superiority theory, and they claim that such women are exceptions that confirm the rule.  In fact, the only reason for which women were not allowed to realize their full potential earlier is that, for centuries, they were subjugated to men, who then claimed they were unfit to take part in, let alone win, the race. My experience as the CEO of a giant multinational corporation employing thousands of men and women proved to me not only that male staff members were in no way superior to their female colleagues, either in education, performance, management or leadership qualities, but also that, if anything, the opposite was true.  Possibly because they were driven by a sense of challenge and the desire to prove themselves, women often proved to be superior in many ways.

Women's organizations have worked and continue to work tirelessly to promote the status of women in society.  Yet they are required to do even more, to set in place a comprehensive plan designed to put an end to the reactionary male chauvinist culture dominating our society - in the family, in education, in religious institutions and in the media.  A campaign should be launched to drive home the point that the only source of a man's blind belief in his innate superiority over the opposite sex is a tremendous lack of self-confidence.  Free people like to deal with free people, and the opposite is true.  The only men I hear propounding outlandish theories about their superiority over women and the inability of women to hold leadership positions are frustrated men who are themselves devoid of any qualities of leadership or elements of superiority.

Any society that views women as unequal to men contrives to find references and “evidence” to support its perception, although the attitude has no religious or legal basis, but is a purely cultural phenomenon.  It follows that the more developed a society's educational/cultural environment, the less inclined its members are to subscribe to the primitive belief that a person's worth is determined by gender. In a developed society, people no longer need to ask the question that is reactionary by its very nature, namely, “are women equal to men?”  There are clear examples that prove that the issue in its entirety is a cultural one. Despite the existence of Qur'anic texts enjoining men to release a wife who no longer wishes to continue the marital relationship, and prohibiting them from keeping her against her will just to hurt her, the legal system has for many years provided men with a legal device that allows them to do the exact opposite: the infamous beit al ta'a,[277] whose only purpose is to enable a man to hold his wife against her will, and to hurt her, both psychologically and financially.  This is a flagrant example that epitomizes the backward attitudes prevailing today, in total disregard of several sources that could have been interpreted progressively in the context of a more enlightened cultural environment.

Therefore, there can be no doubt that the khul’ law[278] enacted on the 1^st of March, 2000 by the Egyptian government, which allows a woman to unilaterally repudiate a marriage, represents an important step forward.  But while we applaud its enactment, we must be aware that it will remain vulnerable, unless legal and constitutional guarantees are put in place, in order to foil attempts by reactionary forces to have it repealed. For although the system of beit al ta'a was a disgraceful legal, social, and cultural travesty, when the government enacted the khul' law, merely empowering women to exercise a human right that no fair-minded person can oppose, it stuck in the throats of thousands of our men.  How could the law deprive them from a tool of brutal injustice that was in their hands?  If they had a reasonable amount of self-confidence, this long overdue legal development, which represents a very important step forward, would not have bothered them at all.  One can only wonder how a man who wants the law to help him keep his wife locked in a marriage against her will can reconcile his attitude with such values as manliness, chivalry and honor.  The long and glorious history of Arab male chivalry, decency and pride is rendered meaningless when a man keeps his wife in a marital relationship which she does not want.  The issue is also indicative of a state of cultural rot when thousands of young men and women are completely opposed to the idea of granting women the right to divorce, even though it was a right held by the first wife of the Prophet himself.

Nevertheless, our forward drive should not stop at the promulgation of the Khul’ law.  To sustain the momentum, more steps need to be taken.  For example, a provision should be included in the marriage contract to invest the wife with the right to obtain a divorce for prejudice, whether material or moral.  More generally, it is essential to promote a cultural climate conducive to the adoption of a standard marriage contract drafted along the lines of the one which was referred to above, which the Prophet Mohamed and his first wife, Khadija bint Khuweilad, entered into, and which stipulated that she could terminate the contract at any time, and that he would not take a second wife.

   Another equally important step forward has been the recent appointment of the first female judge to Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court.  But again our appreciation for what is undoubtedly a commendable - if long overdue - development should not blind us to the fact that it is only a small dent in the armor of a strong patriarchal culture; this step needs to be followed up.  The Ministry of Justice needs to sustain this forward momentum by appointing at least 25% of deputy public prosecutors from among women. It is only in this way, and not by means of a decision from on high, that it can ensure a strong presence for women throughout the judicial system. The appointment of women to all levels of the judicial system is the only way to end what is an affront to the norms of civilized behavior.  If we start the process now, in twenty years' time we can have a judicial system comprised of 50% women.  This is a natural state of affairs that should prevail in all aspects of life.  A society that restricts important positions to men uses up only half of its potential of intelligence, performance, productivity and education; it is a society running on half steam.  Not surprisingly, a society that does not make full use of all its assets remains in a state of underdevelopment, for how can a person run on one foot?

   It is not only the judicial system that needs to open its doors to women. The executive branch is required to put a program in place, aimed at appointing a large number of women as governors, deputy governors, university presidents, faculty deans, and city council heads; in short, to all the public positions from which they are still excluded.  In the absence of a concerted effort in that direction, proponents of the male superiority theory and other reactionary forces will have the opportunity to wipe out the progressive steps recently taken to enhance the status of women. Placing these forces before a fait accompli is the only way to prevent the cultural setback our society would suffer if the Khul’ law was repealed and if the appointment of women to prominent positions was challenged.

A most shocking aspect of the male supremacist mentality that has taken hold in some societies is that this mentality is not, as might have been supposed, confined to the male segment of the population.  Although men are its source and beneficiaries, the myth is embraced wholeheartedly by many girls and women, who raise their children to accept without question propositions that run counter to all contemporary values of progress, science and civilization.

It is impossible to liberate women from the yoke of the male supremacist culture, which is a form of slavery, unless women themselves are at the vanguards of a movement to change societal attitudes, for these to be in line with the requirements of the age; and to replace the reactionary view that women are inferior beings, by a view that accepts them as equal to men in all respects.  Moreover, they should promote the notion that although they constitute half of the population, their actual value, as mothers, is far greater than their numerical weight.  It is tragic that in this day and age, when the advanced world is concerned with knowledge, development, civil liberties and human rights, we should still be asking the shameful question: “Are women equal to men?”

   Those who are today expounding reactionary ideas in the name of religion are worthy successors of those who supported King Fouad[279] in the nineteen twenties in his bid for the Islamic Caliphate[280] and who, in 1937, wanted his son Farouk to be crowned in Al-Azhar[281] not in Parliament.  They also uphold the legacy of those who attributed socialism to Islam in the nineteen sixties only to say the exact opposite a few years later.  They are reminiscent too of those who, after years of telling us that war with Israel was a religious duty for Muslims, suddenly decided in the seventies that Islam enjoined us to make peace with this country, invoking a religious text to support their new pacifism: “If they lean towards peace, so too should you.”[282] They are the same people who invoked religion to justify the infamous practice of breaking the will of recalcitrant wives by locking them up in the so-called “house of obedience” (beit al ta’a), and then reversed their position.

   To these people we say that we know as much about Islamic jurisprudence as they do and that one of the first things we learned is that Islamic jurisprudence is defined as the extrapolation of judicial rulings from available legal proof; in other words, through a process of deductive reasoning that involves a human agency.  This was best expressed by the great Islamic jurist Abu Hanifah[283] in his description of Islamic jurisprudence as “a science of opinions, so that if someone comes forward with a better opinion we accept it.”[284] Abu Hanifah accepted just over a hundred of the Prophet’s Hadiths[285] as apostolic precepts, while Ahmed ibn-Hanbal[286] accepted hundreds of thousands of these.  Moreover, Abu Hanifah, known as the Supreme Imam, refused to base judicial rulings on Hadiths ascribed to just one source.  The conclusion to be drawn from a thorough reading of the thousands of reference works on Islamic jurisprudence is that it is a human science that was initially established by great thinkers.  These were followed by the strict traditionalists who spurned deductive reasoning altogether, and insisted on a dogmatic adherence to Scripture. With their limited knowledge and lack of intellectual abilities, these so-called “expositors” invested the purely human field of Islamic jurisprudence with a divine character.

   The time has come to break the institutionalized concept of male superiority that colors the general attitude towards women in our society.  To that end, measures must be taken to safeguard the steps already taken in that direction and to prevent anyone from engineering a cultural setback in the future.  For, at the end of the day, the notion that men are innately superior to women is deeply entrenched in the cultural tissue of society.  It is only by recognizing the existence of an organic link between people’s cultural formation and the beliefs they hold, that we can understand and properly address the mentality that seeks to keep women at the same lowly status to which they have been relegated throughout much of our history.  The use of religion to justify this view is a political cover for fossilized societal attitudes deriving from the following sources: Bedouin customs, medieval values and a patriarchal culture that is deeply rooted in tribal society.  What can we expect of men who have drunk deeply from these sources and who, moreover, have never drunk from the well of universal human culture?  Men whose inability to master the linguistic tools of the Renaissance keeps them isolated from the great masterpieces of human creativity?

   This cultural insularity makes the absence of objectivity on the issue of women’s rights absolute. We are here before revisionism coupled with primitiveness colored by a tribal mentality and covered with a layer of cultural isolation from the masterpieces of universal human culture.  The situation is rendered even more intractable by the fact that men are clinging to the myth of their superiority over women out of a tremendous lack of self-confidence, a sense that they must at all costs defend themselves against what they see as a challenge to their supremacy.

It might be thought that I tackle the issue of women’s rights from the perspective of progress only, rather than from that of human rights as well.  Actually, my position on the issue of gender equality is informed by a conviction that both aspects are equally important.  I have always advocated the need to grant women full equality with men from both perspectives: as a prerequisite for society’s progress, and as a basic human right.  The two aspects are not mutually exclusive, they complement one another.

II. Religious Minorities

Another flagrant human rights violation and obstacle to progress in the Arab societies is manifested in the treatment of religious minorities.  The Shiites of the Arabian Peninsula and the Copts of Egypt are sheer examples, and are certainly not exclusive.  Yet, the similarity in the treatment of both minorities is striking, even tough one is Muslim and the other Christian and both live in different countries.

A. The Shiites

The Shiites in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for instance, are oppressed to the extent of being denied any official or ministerial positions.  Also, in spite of living in areas rich with oil, public services are not extended to them, and they live in poor conditions.  Moreover, they are denied the right of building mosques and hussayniyas[287] even at their own expense and the religious rituals of their cult are totally neglected in the entire Kingdom.  On top of all this, they are defamed by the Wahhabis who not only incite hatred against the Shiites, but also proclaim them enemies of the nation, and allow all sorts of evils against them.

   B. The Copts

The (tragic) parallel in Egypt is seen in the Copts being denied access to certain high positions, deprived from the freedom to build new churches, and suffering from increasing suffocating fanaticism from all directions.

My special interest in the Coptic question, which is known to many people, led me to conduct an in-depth study of the history of Christianity in Egypt, in an attempt to acquaint myself with the source of the Coptic culture in all its dimensions and aspects.  This entailed establishing close relations with hundreds, not to say thousands, of Copts, including many prominent figures of the Egyptian church.  A number of Coptic friends believe that the Coptic question has reached a critical stage, and others dismiss this as an imaginary problem with no basis in reality.

   Before going into the subject, I would like to state that the basic premise from which my thought proceeds is that the Copts are (or should be) genuine Egyptian citizens, that is, first-class citizens.  Egypt is their country; they are not living here by the grace of others, but are fully entitled to enjoy the status and rights of nationhood, as full partners, not as charity cases.

   If this premise is disputed, there can be no dialogue. This chapter is neither addressed to those who regard our fellow countrymen of the Coptic faith as second-class citizens allowed living amongst us thanks to our tolerance and magnanimity, nor, a fortiori, to those who call for the imposition of the jizya (the poll-tax payment required of non-Muslims) on members of the Coptic community.  To engage in a debate with anyone who rejects the basic premise of this chapter is to embark on an exercise in vain. No purpose would be served in trying to initiate what would essentially be a dialogue of the deaf.  On the other hand, if the reader accepts the basic premise of this chapter as an incontrovertible truth, then there is room for dialogue, provided, however, that no one presumes to speak in the name of the Copts, whether in expressing their grievances or in denying that these grievances exist.  Actually, not a single individual or entity in Egypt today, official or unofficial, can claim that the Copts have no problems or complaints.  In writing these lines, therefore, I do not presume to speak for the Copts but only to convey to the reader what I have heard over and over again from ordinary Egyptian Coptic citizens, who cannot possibly be classified as rebels or extremists. I am familiar with the allegations of the extremists, which I will not go into here.  I will only write what I have heard over the years – and believe to be true – from those who can only be described as moderate Copts. The basic issue is: “Do the Copts in Egypt suffer from serious problems in their own country?”  The only possible answer is: “Yes”.

   Yes, Copts fear for themselves, their families, their property and their safety much more than Muslims do, though the latter, too, are not completely safe.

   Yes, Copts suffer from a public atmosphere of fanaticism characterized by severe animosity towards them.

   A major grievance over which there is complete consensus within the Coptic community is that the right to construct new churches or restore old ones has until recently been severely curtailed by legislative and bureaucratic constraints.  Although these constraints have been somewhat eased, most Copts believe the situation is still far from satisfactory.  I believe that the only way out of what is clearly an untenable situation is to unify the laws governing the construction and restoration of all houses of worship, whether they are called mosques or churches.  These laws should lay down a set of rational rules applicable to all Egyptians, regardless of creed.  For it is totally illogical that one segment of society should be subjected to arbitrary constraints, while another is allowed to enjoy unbridled freedom when it comes to constructing places of worship, or congregating to offer prayer when and where its members choose. Indeed, and it is often the case, even when, this leads to chaotic situations involving obvious violations of law, people are too intimidated to challenge the offenders, leaving them free to flout the law with impunity.

   But while this is a major grievance, it is far from being the only, or even the main reason for the widespread feeling among Egypt’s Christians that they are living a tense moment, not to say a crisis situation.  They have a lot more to worry about than the need to obtain a license before they can build a new church, although this is a flagrant case of institutionalized discrimination that is totally unjustified. After all, what possible threat can the construction of a new church represent?  Churches are used either as houses of worship or as community centers where people congregate for weddings and funerals; banning or constraining their construction is an abridgement of a basic human right.  Still, the Coptic community has other more serious complaints that can be summed up as follows:

· The existence of a general climate that allows for the resurgence of a spirit of religious intolerance at different times and in certain areas of the country.  Copts are finely attuned to this phenomenon, as sometimes the mere mention of their name is enough to trigger a hostile reaction.

· There is a widespread feeling among Copts that their participation in public life has gradually dwindled over the last fifty years.  Their sense of marginalization is borne out by the facts like in 1995, when not a single Copt was elected to parliament.

· There is, moreover, the specter of communal violence, which can flare up at any time as it has done in the past, most notably in the Koshh incident.[288]

   A few analytical remarks on the feelings of unease that these issues engender among the Copts may be useful here.

First, with regard to the general climate which breeds a spirit of hateful fanaticism, this did not come about by a governmental decree or a political decision, but was a natural result of the defeat of the Egyptian revival project, especially after the June 1967 debacle.  The vacuum was quickly filled up by a fundamentalist ideology and culture, which put itself forward as an alternative to the movement for a new Egyptian awakening.  With the spread of the cultural values of this trend (whose members committed many crimes, most notably the assassination of Anwar Sadat),[289] the general climate fell prey to the forces of conservatism and regression which inevitably bred a situation of hostility towards the Copts.  As a noted Egyptian intellectual once put it, whenever the revival project is defeated in Egypt, this has negative repercussions on two groups of Egyptians: women and Copts.  The opposite is equally true; in a vital and dynamic cultural climate, the attitude towards these two groups is enlightened and in keeping with the values of civilization and progress.  It may be unfair to blame the current regime for creating an environment which breeds fanaticism and allows the resurgence of religious intolerance, with the attendant risk of communal violence. However, it is a fact that the government could have done, and can still do much to limit the dangerous polarization that has come to characterize the cultural climate in Egypt today.  To that end, it must adopt a policy aimed at the positive reinforcement of a culture of religious tolerance to replace the spirit of fanaticism threatening us all.  While educational curricula and information media are the right place to start, we must not forget the importance of religious pulpits in shaping public perceptions. For there can be no hope of progress if Islamic religious institutions oppose a cultural project aimed at eradicating the spirit of religious intolerance which has taken hold in our society.  This is why Al-Azhar must follow the vision of the regime, not the other way round.  To leave matters to the men of religion is to accept the spread of a theocratic culture; logic and experience prove that theocracy cannot possibly support a culture of tolerance and acceptance of the right of others to differ; neither can it accept the notion of unity through diversity.

   I am well aware that what I propose is easier said than done, and that the Egyptian government faces a daunting challenge.  But I also know that the role of any “leadership” (in the broad sense of the word; that is, the executive leaders), is to formulate a vision, and work towards achieving it.  In order to succeed, they must lead, and not allow themselves to be led.  It would be wrong to claim that the regime is by its nature unwilling to face up to the challenge, or that it is responsible for creating the ugly spirit of fanaticism that has come to pervade our society. However, it has turned a blind eye to this aberration for a long time, only slowly coming to realize that the ideology behind the culture of fanaticism is the main enemy of the regime. It is this ideology which spawned the assassins of Anwar Sadat, the would-be assassins of the Addis Ababa incident, and the perpetrators of many other crimes.[290]

   Second, with regard to the widespread feeling among Copts that their representation in public life has shrunk considerably over the last few decades, this is borne out by official statistics.  However, this should not be seen as a deliberate attempt by the regime to keep Copts out of public office.  It should rather be seen as a negative phenomenon that grew insidiously over the years, unnoticed by successive governments and driven by its own dynamics, until it has reached its present unacceptable proportions.  But whatever the reason, the fact remains that the Copts are marginalized in Egyptian public life, and this is a situation that merits serious study.  I, for one, believe that the explanation of this phenomenon lies in the mentality our public officials have developed in recent years, which is characterized by a refusal to admit to the existence of problems, and an insistence on claiming that all is best in the best of all possible worlds.  This mentality is rooted in another cultural specificity, namely a refusal to accept criticism and an inability to engage in self-criticism, both of which have been discussed in a previous chapter of this book.  To claim, as some do, that the situation is of the Copts’ own making, that they have become marginalized because they are too passive and too taken up in financial activities, is to put the cart before the horse.  It is true that the Copts are passive and that they are involved in financial and economic activities, but that is a result not a cause - the result of having too many doors closed to them despite their undeniable abilities.

Although I am deeply convinced of the truth of the above analysis, I am also aware that it is incomplete. The same doors that are slammed in the face of highly qualified members of the Coptic community remain closed to many highly qualified members of the Egyptian society in general.  The political game in Egypt today is open only to those willing to play by certain rules established over the last few decades; these rules are by their nature repellent to skilled professionals with any sense of pride, they are based on personal loyalty, nepotism and other mechanisms having nothing to do with professional abilities.

Third, with regard to the violent communal clashes which flare up from time to time, most recently in Koshh and, before that, in Khanka[291]  - to mention just two of the many violent confrontations to which our recent history bears witness -, these are the result of a number of factors, the most important of which are:

· An official line that seems determined to play down the gravity of the situation, in the mistaken belief that admitting to the existence of such problem would be detrimental to Egypt’s reputation.  In fact, Egypt’s reputation would be better served by confronting the problem head on, rather than pretending it doesn’t exist.

· The spread of a culture pattern characterized by ignoring problems, extolling achievements and singing our own praises.

· A failure to make use of the many worthwhile efforts made to study and analyze the root causes of such incidents, such as the famous report put out by Dr. Gamal Oteify[292] on the spate of communal clashes which broke out in the nineteen seventies.  His findings and recommendations could have been put to good use, had it not been for a cultural propensity to dismiss the clashes as a minor problem instigated by external forces for the purpose of destabilizing Egypt.

The purpose of this chapter is not to accuse or blame anyone, but to present an objective and neutral study which aims, like the late Dr. Oteify’s report, at casting light on some elements of the problem.  To accuse the government of persecuting the Copts would be both illogical and unwise.  But it would equally be illogical and unwise to pretend that they have no legitimate grievances and that their situation is ideal.

Therefore, to accuse anyone who speaks of these matters of being an agent of parties hostile to Egypt, or of being involved in a plot against Egypt is simply a bad joke, an insult to the truth and an affront to reason; the style of riffraff, and a reflection of the style of the security services' investigations department, which tends to abandon the heart of the matter and pursue marginal issues related to personalities, suspicions and conspiratorial thinking.

   This security-service mentality is one of the factors that contributed to the collapse of objectivity and rationality in our thinking, and that made this kind of thinking so far removed from objective and civilized modes of analysis, which are one of the achievements of human civilization; its time has passed.

Nonetheless, I was visited a few years ago by a person whose high-level position and job had direct bearing on the Coptic issue; he asked me why I was so enthusiastically involved in what I call in my writings “the Coptic issue”. I told him at the time that as an Egyptian, it was my obligation to do so, and this was also what made me support women's issues in Egypt - because Egypt, which is sick today, will never get on the road to recovery so long as Copts and women do not take part in treating Egypt's problems from a position of full and unimpaired citizenship.  An oppressed person whose rights are denied cannot participate in pushing forward the broken wagon.  I was sure that this visitor did not understand what I told him, because he had been trained to treat the Copts as a threat to Egypt, despite the fact that they are the original Egyptians.

   At the time, I also told him: “If the Coptic issue is not discussed here, in Egypt, it will eventually be discussed abroad, and if we don't recognize all the aspects of the problem, then the Copts abroad will take their cause from the stage of merely crying out that they are being oppressed, to the stage of calling it a human rights issue; then, many will pay attention to them on an international level, including important decision-makers.”

   When I was young, I heard the Arab adage: “Most fires start from tiny sparks that people overlooked.” Today, we realize that most troubles result from their having been ignored when they were small.  We demand from the world that they believe our claim of being above reproach in our treatment of non-Muslims and women, and we relish repeating this, while the world looks at our deeds and finds them to be totally contrary to what we say.

   To return to the issue of the Copts in Egypt, I contend that the fact that most senior officials continue to ignore the Coptic issue will bring Egypt to crises which I can almost make out on the horizon.  They are similar to the crises of others in the region - others who were prey to the temptation of ignoring some problems, and especially of ignoring the realities of today's world, that is, the post-Cold War world.

   This is a world in which the idea of sovereignty in its old sense, which had been stable for the many decades preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall, is no longer of any use to anyone.  There are those who understand this new world, and there are those who are unable to understand and take in all the dimensions of this change…

   I can think of no better way to conclude this chapter than with the following story: In the course of a debate on the Coptic question, someone asked me what the needs and demands of the Copts were. I began with their second demand, and then moved on to the third, fourth and fifth.  But what, he asked, is their first demand?  I replied that what they needed above all was a “social embrace”, in the sense of being made to feel that there is a genuine desire to listen to them and hear their complaints and problems, in a spirit of brotherly love and sympathy based on the belief that they are equal partners in this land, not second-class citizens belonging to a minority that has to accept and bow to the will of the majority.

For a real and comprehensive solution to the Coptic question, we only need to look back at the time of Sa’d Zaghloul,[293] who established an exemplary model of communal relations that can serve as a glorious point of departure for a contemporary project to lay this nagging problem to rest once and for all.

   There are good reasons making Sa’d Zaghloul the beloved of the Copts, and we would do well to emulate the example he set so many years ago.[294]

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Reality That Arabs Refuse

   When World War II broke out in September 1939, the United States adopted a neutral stance despite the efforts made by Britain’s wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to drag it in on the side of the Allies.  The United States only entered the war in December 1941, following the Japanese attack on its naval base in Pearl Harbor.[295]  US industrial and military power provided the Allies with the main strength necessary to stem the tide of initial Axis successes in Europe and the Far East and, finally, to bring the war to a victorious conclusion in the summer of 1945. Although its intervention was the decisive factor in the Allied victory, the United States did not capitalize on this fact in the immediate aftermath of the war, but delayed calling in its debt for just less than half a century.  In the logic of power politics, the US should have reaped the fruits of the victory it was instrumental in achieving right after the war ended, but fate intervened in the form of the Cold War, which began in 1945 and lasted until 1991. During that period, the United States was locked in a battle for global supremacy with the Soviet Union, which stood as a formidable obstacle between the United States and its dream of unchallenged domination of the post-war world order.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the moment for which the United States had been waiting since 1945 finally arrived.  It was now free to stake its claim to global leadership on the strength not only of its victory in both World War II and the Cold War, but also of its uncontested political, economic, scientific and military superiority.

   However, its emergence as the unique superpower on the world stage, which had already been delayed by the Cold War, was even further delayed by Bill Clinton’s accession to power in January 1993.  Under his administration, America held back from asserting its new international status (which reflected the post-Cold War balance of power) too blatantly. I believe that if the first president Bush had won a second term in the November 1992 presidential elections, the world would have seen then what it has been seeing since the Republicans regained power in January 2001; the group of right-wing conservatives at the helm of the Republican Party are more direct than anyone else in America when it comes to dealing with the realities of power.

   During the Cold War, the contrast between the value system prevailing inside American society and certain aspects of its foreign policy was disconcerting to outside observers.  On the domestic front, America upheld values that had helped make it one of the most advanced societies in the world in all fields.  It could rightfully claim an impressive level of democracy, a rate of economic productivity higher than one quarter of the entire global productivity, a vibrant culture, pre-eminence in the fields of science, technology and research and the strongest military force in the world.  But America did not uphold the same values when it came to its dealings with the outside world.  Justifying its actions as dictated by the conditions of the Cold War, American foreign policy had no qualms about maintaining friendly relations with corrupt and despotic military juntas in Central and South America, as well as with equally unsavory regimes in Africa and Asia.  It also supported and used radical forces with extremist views, including groups, organizations and countries it now regards as enemies.

   One of the most important results of the Cold War culture is that US foreign policy lost sight of the fact that democracy is not only a human right for all the peoples of the world (including those of the Middle East), but that it is also the only safety valve that can protect humanity from the scourges of despotism, totalitarianism and extremism.  During the Cold War, the United States was occasionally concerned with upholding democracy and human rights, and with combating despotism and corruption outside its own borders - but only when it served its interests to do so.  However, it turned a blind eye to blatant human rights violations and abuses, as well as glaring manifestations of corruption perpetrated by friendly regimes or those with which it had common interests.  A deep crisis facing many countries today is that the United States has suddenly taken it upon itself to introduce democracy, by force if necessary, into societies it was content for many years to leave at the mercy of corrupt and tyrannical rulers, whose subjects were brainwashed into believing that national pride entailed standing up to the challenge of Western civilization.

   America’s newly assertive stance as the unchallenged custodian of world order has not been met with universal favor.  Not everyone is willing to accept that the new situation is an inevitable result of the seismic shift in the global balance of power.  There are those who dispute the right of the United States to lay down the political and economic rules governing our world today, and others who question whether expressions like ‘sovereignty’ and ‘international legitimacy’ still have any meaning. While these questions and reservations deserve serious tackling, another set of questions the Arab ought to endeavor to answer far from its historic love to “big words” that are mostly entirely isolated from reality:

• Is the policy of resistance, defiance and confrontation a means to an end or an end in itself? If the latter, what are its material repercussions? And if it is a means, what are its chances of achieving the end to which it aspires?
• Does a society’s rejection of reform, development and modernization imposed on it by others reflect its understandable resistance to foreign interference, or does it reflect a rejection of those processes in absolute terms? Can any society avoid the imposition of reform, development and modernization by external forces without that same society initiating such processes itself in response to the aspirations and needs of its own people, rather than in compliance with the demands of foreign powers?
• In the early nineties, a country in the region raised the slogan of “development without change.”  Although developing without changing is a contradiction in terms, none of our intellectuals bothered to question what the slogan meant, or to look into the reasons behind our culture’s opposition to change in any sphere, be it political, economic, management, social, cultural, educational or mass media.

   The previous chapters were meant to shed a light on those reasons; starting with the blind allegiance of the Arabs to religion and to their rulers, which made the peoples lose the sense of their own identity, and of the depth and strength of their culture.  It has made them live in the fear of being invaded by the culture of the rising powers, a fact which raised a barricade isolating them from reality.  They have locked themselves in a prison of intolerance, blinded in its darkness to their misconceptions and to what the “Other” can bring.  And so, barren of the dynamics of criticism and compromise, saturated with apathy, confined to void talk and praise of a glorious past which never was, they let their souls be invaded by the destructive evil of false beliefs – belief that we are devoid of problems and that it is the “enemy” that conspires to put an end to us.   Hence hostility, even towards there own fellow citizens, who have the misfortune of not belonging to the majority.

   No wonder, then, that the Arabs’ mentality remains confined and their soul barricaded in their own enchained culture: the vicious circle keeps going round.

What does that luminous disc

Do to my homeland?

The land of the prophets,

The land of the simple,

The chewers of tobacco, the dealers in drugs?

What does the moon do to us,

That we squander our valor

And live only to beg from Heaven?
What has the heaven

For the lazy and the weak?

When the moon comes to life they are changed to corpses,

And shake the tombs of the saints,

Hoping to be granted some rice, some children...

(Nizar Qabbani)

Epilogue

There might be many political, social or cultural phenomena, which can hamper Arab culture (and hence most Arabic-speaking societies), and prevent it from catching up with human development or progress, and from actively participating in these processes.

   The two keywords in solving this problem are "religion" and "education", which must be understood here in the most negative, backward, and hampering context of systems unable to either face or meet the challenges of this modern era and actively contribute to them by practicing human creativity.  These two factors are the main causes of the isolation of contemporary Arab culture from evolution and human modernization.

   I would like to emphasize the intertwined and closely knit relationship between these two destructive factors.  While the culture of a backward and enchaining understanding of religion creates and produces a general climate which impairs educational levels and aids in its further deterioration, the educational systems originating from this era suspend human creativity which, in turn, result in more segments of the society adopting the diffident and medieval, dismal and austere interpretation of religion.

   After finishing the book, the reader may wonder about the role of political tyranny, oppression, corruption and other manifestations of different oligarchies in this ghastly concoction, a cultural climate full of negative fixations and rich in deterioration and disintegration, hampering human minds from creativity, originality and ingenuity.

   My answer is that all these negative phenomena are not the problem, but rather its symptoms.  I do not dispute the existence of an apparent dialectic relationship between the cause and its symptoms.  Tyrannical and despotic rulers definitely benefit from silencing the disapproving voices and shutting down the critical minds of their societies and communities.  However, that does not account for the proliferation of taqleed (blind following), senseless obedience and mindless imitation (which in turn is espoused by a backward interpretation of religion that aids this political tyranny).

   The remaining – and vital question – is, "Where do we start?"  Even though my answer would require another entire book, it can be summed up in one single phrase, namely – "quality leadership."

   Humankind has seen two main courses of development.  The European course, which can be described as "simmering on a low flame" and which took many centuries to crystallize, and the Asian course, which can be described as " fast cooking on a high flame". In the first course, the maturity and evolution of democracy played a big role in hastening development, innovation and prosperity.  The Asian model, on the other hand, started with quality leadership and then democracy found its roots hand-in-hand with growth and development.

   It is important to elaborate on what I mean by democracy here.  I do not mean ballot boxes or elections.  Limiting and reducing democracy in backward and retarded societies to electoral processes and ballots results in destructive choices (for example Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections).  I do mean democracy in its comprehensive overall definition, including the democratic culture, numerous parties, modern dialogue, democratic institutions, effective urban societies, constitutional and modern laws, an independent judiciary, low illiteracy rates, and finally elections.

That way it will be understood that the tragedy of the isolation of modern Arab societies from human development and evolution rests on two major factors in Arab societies, namely religion (in its prevailing interpretation) and education (in its existing backwardness) which both negate and hamper any progress towards creativity, innovation and originality of the human mind.

---

[1] The Ottoman Empire was founded by Turkish-origin tribes in Anatolia at the end

     of the thirteenth century. At its peak it comprised most of southwestern Asia, the

     Balkans, Egypt and large portions of the North African coast. The capital of the

     empire during most of its existence was Istanbul (Constantinople). The Ottoman

     Empire was a multinational Islamic state dominated by elements of Turkish

     descent or affiliation. It ceased to exist in 1919. Egypt was ruled by the Empire

     between 1517 and 1798 or 1517 and 1882 (differences originated in historic

     exegesis). During the nineteenth century the Ottomans granted much of their

     power to their governor Mohamed Ali (see note 62) and his dynasty, which

     became the Egyptian royal family, who ruled the country until overthrown by the

     Free Officers Revolution in 1952 (see note 70).

[2] Ruled in Egypt from 996 AD to 1021 AD, as the sixth Caliph of the Fatimid

    Shi'a dynasty.

[3] (Born in London, England in 1916 AD). British-American historian, expert on

     the Middle-East.

[4] Radical Sunni Islamists, disciples of Wahhabism.

[5] (699-767 AD).Sunni Muslim jurist, founder of the Hanafi School of

     jurisprudence.

[6] Founders of the Maliki and Shafi^ci (respectively) Sunni schools of Islamic Law.

[7] (780-855 AD).Muslim scholar, founder of the Hanbali "textualist" school,

     followed by Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.

[8] (C. 1263-1328 AD).Sunni Islamic scholar, follower of Ibn Hanbal, wanted to

     return Islam to its sources.

[9] (1292-1350 AD). Student of Ibn Taymiyah.

[10] (Najd/Saudi Arabia, 1703-1792 AD).Influential  follower of Ibn Taymiyah,

     founder of Wahhabism.

[11] One of the largest denominations of Shi’a Islam (The Twelvers).

[12] (702-765 AD). Sixth Shi'a Imam and polymath.

[13] A third group of Muslims who originally supported Ali the fourth Caliph, and then

    rejected him for his accepting arbitration with his Seffein battle enemies.

[14] First Muslim ruling dynasty, established in Damascus from 660 to 750 AD

[15] Muslim ruling dynasty established in Baghdad from 750 to 1258 AD

[16] (1126-1198 AD). Arab philosopher from Andalusia, also theologian and polymath.

[17] (1135-1204 AD). Rabbi, physician and philosopher in Andalusia, Morocco, and

     thereafter in Egypt as an advisor to Salah Al-Din; his works on Jewish thought are

     still influential.

[18] Founded by Mohamed Ibn Abdul-Wahhab. See note 10.

[19] Pertaining to Sayed Qutb, Egyptian radical Islamist author, leading intellectual of

    the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see note 42) in the 1950's and 1960's, (1906-

    1966 AD).

[20] (1937-2006 AD). President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003 AD; sentenced to death

     and hanged by an Iraqi government set by U.S. forces, for the execution of 148

     Shi'ites suspected of planning his assassination.

[21] The largest denomination of Islam.

[22] The Largest minority in Islam.

[23] See note 13.

[24] (838-923 AD). Persian historian.

[25] (94-175 Hijra year - see note 37). Imam Laith Ibn-Sa'd, Sunni Muslim Jurist and

     sheikh (clergyman) of Imam Malik; lived in Egypt

[26] Islamic dialectic school of science, originated in the ninth century AD

[27] Islamic theological school of thought relying on reason, originated in the eighth

    century AD

[28] Islamic theological school of thought, precludes reason, originated in the tenth

    century AD

[29] Meaning “the secret movements”.

[30] Egyptian Professor of Muslim sects.

[31] Extremist Muslim sect established in eastern Arabia towards the end of the ninth 

    century AD

[32] Famous saying by the fourth Caliph Ali Ibn-Abi Talib who was murdered near the

    city of Najaf (Iraq) in 661 AD

[33] See note 5.

[34] Followers of the Hanafi School, see note 5.

[35] Followers of the Maliki school founded by Anas Ibn Malek, one of the four schools

    of Sunni Islamic law.

[36] See note 13.

[37] The Hijra calendar started the year of the emigration of Mohamed and his

    followers to the city of Medina in 622 AD

[38] A comprehensive history of these groups has been compiled by Professor  

    Mahmoud Ismail Abdul Razzak, in an authoritative reference work entitled "The

    Secret Sects of Islam." The author devotes special attention to the Qarmatians (see

    note 31), who carried away the Black Stone of the Ka'bah  ⁽see note 40⁾ and kept it  

    in a remote area in the east of the Arabian Peninsula for over a century.

[39] Founder of an extremist Muslim sect established in eastern Arabia towards the end

    of the ninth century AD

[40] The holiest place in Islam, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

[41] (Born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1957 AD). Founder of the terrorist organisation

     “Al Qaeda”.

[42] The Muslim Brotherhood is a political religious movement founded by Hassan Al-

     Banna in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928. The group calls for the reinstitution of Islam

     and Islamic law as the main pillars upon which the Egyptian – indeed, all Arab and

     Muslim societies – should be based. The group rejects secular and Western notions

     of the running of Islamic societies. As part of the Islamic notions the group set up a

     well-organized network of social independent institutions, such as schools and

     medical clinics, and gained much influence in Egyptian society. During the 1940’s,       

     its secret wing was involved in subversive and violent acts against leading political  

     figures and others who were perceived as its enemies. In 1954, Gamal Abd Al-

     Nasser (see note 70) banned the group and suppressed it, executing its leader

     Sayed Qutb. The movement resumed its activities in the 1970’s under Sadat’s (see

     note 249) political liberalization, and even published its own journal, though its

     publication ceased after renewed political suppression in September 1981.

     Although the movement stresses its peaceful nature and distances itself from more

     extreme and violent groups, the official ban on it continues. In spite of this, the

     movement continues to operate and even takes part in Egyptian elections by

     presenting its candidates as independents or by forging coalitions with legitimate

     parties.

[43] See note 21.

[44] See note 5.

[45] See notes 25 & 24 respectively.

[46] See note 22.

[47] (600-661 AD). Fourth Caliph and Prophet Mohamed's cousin.

[48] See note 7.

[49] See note 8.

[50] See note 9.

[51] (1058-1111 AD). Persian Orthodox Ash'arite theologian.

[52] See note 16.

[53] See note 26.

[54] (C. 980-1037 AD). Persian Muslim polymath.

[55] (C. 872-950/1 AD). Persian Muslim polymath.

[56] (C. 1225-1274 AD).Italian Catholic priest, proponent of natural theology; he

     believed that truth can be known through "reason" and "faith".

[57] See note 38.

[58] Region in Saudi Arabia, in the centre of the Arabian Peninsula.

[59] (1918-1981 AD) Egyptian President from 1970 to 1981 AD Graduated from the

     Military Academy in 1938. Expelled from the army and imprisoned in 1940’s for

     subversive political activities and suspicion of participation in plots to assassinate

     senior political figures. When he was released, he rejoined the armed forces in

     1950. He took part in the 1952 Free Officers Revolution and was a close ally of

     Gamal Abd-Al Nasser, who appointed Sadat in 1969 as his vice-president. When

     Nasser died, in September 1970, Sadat succeeded him as president. During the first

     years of  his presidency Sadat quelled leftist opposition, surprised Israel in what

     was considered the victory of the 1973 war (see note 255), reoriented Egyptian

     foreign policy towards the West (especially towards the USA), reversing its long

     pro-Soviet inclination. He introduced a series of economic and political reforms,

     promoting liberalization. In 1977, in a dramatic act and as a gesture demonstrating

     his will for peace, Sadat flew to Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset

     (parliament). The culmination of the process initiated by his visit was the signing

     of an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement at Camp David (see note 257). In his last

     years in power, Sadat’s rule suffered from growing disillusionment and opposition

     (mainly from Islamic elements), manifested in the popular riots that broke out in

     1977 and his assassination, during a victory parade, on 6 October 1981 by Islamic

     militants belonging to the Jihad group.

[60] Islamic government, the head of the state is the Caliph.

[61] It became the Saudi capital from 1744 to 1818 AD

[62] (C. 1769- 1849 AD).Governor of Egypt; founder of modern Egypt and of the  

     dynasty which ruled Egypt until the expulsion of King Farouk on July 26, 1952

     (followed by the abolishment of the monarchy on June 18, 1953)

[63] Islamic mystic way and tradition.

[64] See note 40.

[65] Legendary poet of Ancient Greece.

[66] (1905-1980 AD). French existentialist philosopher.

[67] Egyptian Islamic institution of higher learning.

[68] Author of the article "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in Foreign Affairs

      magazine in 1993 AD.

[69] Author of many books, amongst others "The End of History and the Last Man”,

      published in 1992.

[70] Jamal Abd Al-Nasser (1918-1970 AD). Second Egyptian President 1954-1970.

     Graduated from the Military Academy in 1938. Participated as battalion

     commander in the 1948 War between the Arabs and the fledging State of Israel.

     After the war, he organized the Free Officers group, which consisted mainly of

     low-ranking officers, mainly from humble backgrounds, whose objective was to

     revamp what was believed to be a corrupt system (implying the ousting of the

     then-called royal dynasty). On 23 July 1952 they successfully executed a coup.

     Initially the officers installed coup leader General Mohamed Naguib as president.

     After growing dissent and rivalry, Nasser ousted Naguib and became the official

     president in 1954. Under his leadership Egypt underwent a series of economic,

     social and political reforms. He banned all parties except his own Arab Socialist

     Union. In the economic sphere he pursued a socialist policy, nationalizing in 1961

     all major industries and utilities and adopting an ambitious development plan, with

     the project of the Great Dam of Aswan being one of his main achievements. His

     regime also carried out agrarian reform, redistributing agrarian lands in Egypt. In

     the international and inter-Arab sphere he adopted a nationalistic revolutionary

     Arab policy and was one of the co-founders of the non-alignment bloc in 1955.

     During his time in office Egypt’s foreign policy tilted towards the Soviet Union

     and the Eastern bloc. Some of his most salient actions in the international arena

     were the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the union with Syria, the

     Egyptian involvement in Yemen and the 1967 War after which he resigned for 24

     hours only to be reinstated following popular clamor. After his death, Nasser was    

     succeeded by Anwar Al-Sadat (see note 59).

[71] (1818-1883 AD).Prussian revolutionary philosopher and political economist,

      author of the "Communist Manifesto" in 1848 AD.

[72] Related to the teachings of Confucius, the famous Chinese thinker and social

      philosopher (551-479 BC).

[73] (1866-1946 AD). English writer,

[74] (Born in Philadelphia, 1928 AD).American philosopher; he calls himself a

     "libertarian anarchist".

[75] British Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945 AD and from 1951 to 1955 AD

[76] Middle Eastern region, historically covering from the east of the Mediterranean

      Sea to the Levant.

[77] From Najd, see note 58.

[78] Political party founded in Egypt by Saad Zaghloul in 1919 AD

[79] See note 37.

[80] See note 7.

[81] See note 16.

[82] One of the oldest and most important universities in France and in the entire

      world.  (Université de Paris II).

[83] See note 70.

[84] Struggle “in the way of God”.

[85] Fundamentalist Sunni movement.

[86] Former university professor, liberal Sunni Muslim.

[87] The most trusted collection of “hadiths”.

[88] An “Imam” is an Islamic leader.

[89] (1889-1975 AD).British historian; his work is a twelve-volume study of the

      history of civilisations.     

[90] See note 67.

[91] (1906-1966 AD).Egyptian radical Islamist author, leading intellectual of the

      Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950's and 1960's.

[92] (1867-1941 AD). Egyptian economist, co-founder of Banque Misr in 1920.

[93] Independent interpretation of the legal sources in Islam.

[94] See notes 14 & 15.

[95] His most important books are Human Nature (1650) and Leviathan (1651)

[96] (972-1058 AD). Muslim jurist from the Abbasid era (see note 15).

[97] (1880-1953 AD). First king of Saudi Arabia.

[98] (Born in Hamburg, Germany in 1954).Angela Merkel, elected Chancellor of

      Germany in 2005.

[99] Mohamed’s forces were defeated by those of Mecca led by Abu Sufyan; 625 AD

[100] (Eighth century AD).Berber Umayyad Muslim leader, one of the most important

        military commanders in Iberia.

[101] Also known as the Battle of Poitiers, 732 AD

[102] (1798-1857 AD). French Thinker.

[103] (1859-1927 AD).Egyptian political figure; served as prime minister of Egypt from

26 January 1924 to 24 November 1924.

[104] The Nasserites are the followers and adherents of the political ideology known as

     Nasserism. This was the term applied to the political philosophy of former

     Egyptian President Nasser (see note 70). It included international neutralism,

     Arab nationalism and socialism. Following Sadat’s reforms (see note 59)

     Nasserism came to represent the views of those opposed to his policy, i.e. political

     but mainly economic capitalist liberalization. On 19 April 1992 the Nasserite Arab

     Democratic Party was formally approved and given permission to participate in

     Egyptian elections.

[105] Inner, mystical Islam.

[106] (Born 1938 AD).Leader of the Egyptian terrorist "Islamic Group (Al Gama'a al

      Islamiya)".

[107] (Also known as).

[108] Islamic religious law.

[109] Voluptuous, alluring, beautiful virgins.

[110] Pulpit in the mosque.

[111] (Born in Safed, Palestine in 1935 AD). Mahmoud Abbas, President of Palestine

      since 2005 AD.

[112] Egyptian Islamic institution of higher learning.

[113] See note 37.

[114] (1126-1198 AD).Arab scientist from Andalusia, philosopher, theologian,

      polymath.

[115] On the 7^th of May, 2008, the Hizbullah militia took over the Lebanese capital,

      Beirut, in order to force the Lebanese government to abolish a number of decrees

      that were endorsed by the legitimate government of Lebanon a few hours before;

      this instant resulted in the death of approximately 100 Lebanese.

[116] In June 2007, Hamas militarily took over the Gaza strip by violence in an

      operation that included the murder of an excess of 100 non-Hamas Palestinians –

      some of them were thrown from the top of high buildings.  Since this Hamas coup 

      d’état, and till the moment of writing this note, (July 2008), the Gaza strip has

      been isolated from the West Bank, and therefore not managed by the Palestinian

      Authority.

[117] Al Mostaqbal (The Future) TV station is a well known Lebanese media podium; it

      belongs to the 14^th of March Alliance which is led by Saad al-Hariri, son of Rafik

      al-Hariri who was assassinated on the 14^th of February, 2005 in an operation that

      many Lebanese came to believe was performed by the Syrian regime; this will

      ultimately be confirmed or denied by an ad hoc international court already

      established by the UN for this particular purpose.

[118] In this connection, I recall a discussion I had with Dr. Saadudin Ibrahim, who

      expressed the belief that the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza and

      Hizbullah in Lebanon are committed to the principles of democracy!  Perhaps he 

      (and his peers) will now reconsider this utopian position and issue a statement

      more in keeping with reality – a statement admitting that he was the victim of

      wishful thinking.

[119] (1903-1979 AD).Influential radical Islamist Pakistani journalist, theologian and

      political philosopher, founder of "Jamaat-e- Islami" religious political party in

      Pakistan.  

[120] King Abdullah visited Pope Benedict XVI in November, 2007.

[121] Province in the south west of the Arabian Peninsula.

[122] (1263-1328 AD). Sunni Islamic scholar, follower of Ibn Hanbal, wanted to return   

      Islam to its sources.

[123] Region in Saudi Arabia, in the centre of the Arabian Peninsula.

[124] Eldest or chief of the tribe.

[125] (1332-1406 AD). Arab Muslim polymath.

[126] From Najd, see note 58.

[127] Thoughts established by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab, see note 10.

[128] German philosophers (1804-1872 AD) and (1770-1831 AD), respectively.

[129] (Najd/Saudi Arabia, 1703-1792 AD).Influential  follower of Ibn Taymiyah,

     founder of Wahhabism,

[130] The French campaign in Egypt lasted three years, from 1798 to1801 AD.

[131] (C.1769-1849 AD).Son of Mohamed Ali, the Governor of Egypt and founder of

      modern Egypt and of the dynasty which ruled Egypt until 1952.

[132] Region in Saudi Arabia, in the centre of the Arabian Peninsula.

[133] (1880-1953 AD). First king of Saudi Arabia.

[134] Ruler of Al Dar’iyah and son-in-law of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.

[135] (C.1769-1849 AD). Governor of Egypt, founder of modern Egypt and of the

     dynasty which ruled Egypt until 1952.

[136] Historical fierce enemies of the House of Saud.

[137] Present capital of Saudi Arabia.

[138] Major cities of the Arabian Peninsula (today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).

[139] See note 1.

[140] The largest empire in history; it started in the 15^th century and lasted till the 20^th

      century.

[141] People who came from Asia and built an Empire beyond the continent.

[142] The holiest place in Islam, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

[143] See note 37.

[144] A legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader.

[145] Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993 to 1999 AD

[146] (1903-1979AD).Influential radical Islamist Pakistani journalist, theologian and

     political philosopher, founder of "Jamaat-e-Islami" religious political party in  

     Pakistan.  

[147] See note 19.

[148] See note 42.

[149] (699-767 AD).  Sunni Muslim jurist, founder of the Hanafi School of

      jurisprudence.

[150] (1126-1198 AD).Arab philosopher from Andalusia, also theologian and polymath.

[151] Translates to “enjoining what is right and prohibiting what is wrong”; Saudi

      Arabia's instruments for the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”.

[152] See note 60.

[153] Prime Minister of Egypt, 1945 to 1946 and 1946 to 1948.

[154] See note 70.

[155] See note 42.

[156] Islamic religious law.

[157] Based on a Qur'anic principle of enjoining what is right (good) and prohibiting what is

      wrong (evil).

[158] Egyptian liberal theologian, who views the Qur’an as a religious mythical literary

      work, he was convicted for apostasy and heresy in the 1990’s.

[159] See note 60.

[160] (1902-1989 AD). Shi’í Supreme religious and political leader of Iran, overthrew

     the Shah in 1979 AD.

[161] See note 19.

[162] A system of government based exclusively on Allah’s law which rejects all 

      democracy and human law as apostasy.

[163] From Tarek Heggy's lecture on “The Future of the Muslim Mind” at Merton

     College (Oxford University) on Thursday 16th October, 2003.

[164] Author of the article "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in Foreign Affairs

     Magazine in 1993 AD

[165] Date of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the

     surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers, at the end of World War II.

[166] A war which involved most of the world, mainly opposing England, France and

     the former Soviet Republics (later joined by the USA) to Germany, Italy and

     Japan (1939–1945).

[167] A period of non-military conflict between the former USSR and the USA and

      their respective allies which lasted around half a century (1940’s-1990’s).

[168] International Sunni organization of Islamists, founded in 1988; presently led by

Osama Bin Laden.

[169] Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam (Born 1931 AD), was the eleventh

     president of India, serving from 2002 to 2007. He initially worked in Defence

     Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), and made significant

     contribution to the development of India’s first indigenous Satellite Launch

     Vehicle (SLV-III), and conceived the Integrated Guided Missile Development

     Programme (IGMDP). Prior to Presidency, he was also Scientific Advisor to the

     Indian Government. Dr. Kalam generated the “Technology Vision 2020”

     documents, a road map for transforming India from “Developing India” to

     “Developed India”.   In 1997, he was awarded India’s highest civilian honor

     “Bharat Ratna” He is known as “the People’s President” due to his unconventional

     working style, and as “the Missile Man of India” for his work; he is looked at as a

     progressive mentor, innovator and visionary of India.

[170] Manmohan Singh; 17^th and current Prime Minister of India since 2004.  He is the first ever

      Sikh (religious minority in India) to be Prime Minister.  He was previously Minister of

      Economy and initiated important economic reforms in 1991. (Born 1932 AD).

[171] Based on the 2001 census, the population groups are as follows: Hindu 80.5%, Muslim13.4%, Christian 2.3%, Sikh 1.9%, other 1.8%, unspecified 0.1%.

[172] (1879–1955 AD).German physicist, renowned for the “Relativity Theory”; winner

      of the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1921.

[173] An Egyptian political weekly magazine that used, in the 1920’s, to side with the

      King of Egypt (Fouad I) against the national movement that was led by Sa’d

      Zaghloul (1857-1927).

[174]  (1889–1973 AD).The greatest Arab writer and intellectual in the 20^th century. 

      Although he was blind, he enlightened the heart of the sons and daughters of the

      Arabic speaking societies till they opted for an atavistic and backward path.

[175] (Died 1937 AD).One of the pioneers of Arabic literature in the first half of the

     twentieth century. 

[176] ‘Ala al-safoud was a collection of articles that comprised the author’s very harsh

      criticism to the views and writings of Abbas al Aqqad (1889-1964 AD - see note

      177) that were in a few words the old Islamic camp fighting the new generation

      that was fascinated by European philosophy and literature (i.e. the old stoning

      the new).

[177] (1889-1964 AD).Largely self-educated Egyptian writer, historian, poet,

     philosopher, translator, and journalist.

[178] The Muslim Brotherhood is a political religious movement founded by Hassan Al-

     Banna in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928. The group calls for the reinstitution of Islam

     and Islamic law as the main pillars upon which the Egyptian – indeed, all Arab and

     Muslim societies – should be based. The group rejects secular and Western notions

     of the running of Islamic societies. As part of the Islamic notions the group set up a

     well-organized network of social independent institutions, such as schools and

     medical clinics, and gained much influence in Egyptian society. During the 1940’s,       

     its secret wing was involved in subversive and violent acts against leading political  

     figures and others who were perceived as its enemies. In 1954, Gamal Abd Al-

     Nasser (see note 264) banned the group and suppressed it, executing its leader

     Sayed Qutb. The movement resumed its activities in the 1970’s under Sadat’s (see

     note 240) political liberalization, and even published its own journal, though its

     publication ceased after renewed political suppression in September 1981.

     Although the movement stresses its peaceful nature and distances itself from more

     extreme and violent groups, the official ban on it continues. In spite of this, the

     movement continues to operate and even takes part in Egyptian elections by

     presenting its candidates as independents or by forging coalitions with legitimate

     parties.

[179] From Tarek Heggy's lecture (The Future of the Muslim Mind) at Merton College  

      (Oxford University) on Thursday 16th October, 2003.

[180] The majority of the Christians of Egypt, of pure Egyptian ascendance.

[181] For instance verse # 99 of Surat Younes ([10.99] And if your Lord had pleased, surely all

     those who are in the earth would have believed, all of them; will you then force men till

     they become believers?),  verse # 35 of Surat Al- An’am ([6.35] And if their turning away

     is hard on you, then if you can seek an opening (to go down) into the earth or a ladder (to

     ascend up) to heaven so that you should bring them a sign and if Allah had pleased He

     would certainly have gathered them all on guidance, therefore be not of the ignorant.), and

     verse # 48 of Surat Al-Ma’eda (the table) ([5.48] And We have revealed to you the Book

     with the truth, verifying what is before it of the Book and a guardian over it, therefore

     judge between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their low desires (to

     turn away) from the truth that has come to you; for every one of you did We appoint a law

     and a way, and if Allah had pleased He would have made you (all) a single people, but that

     He might try you in what He gave you, therefore strive with one another to hasten to

     virtuous deeds; to Allah is your return, of all (of you), so He will let you know that in

     which you differed;), verse # 93 of Surat Al-Nahl, The Bee ([16.93] And if Allah please

     He would certainly make you a single nation, but He causes to err whom He pleases and

     guides whom He pleases; and most certainly you will be questioned as to what you did.)

[182] See Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen's book "Identity and Violence: The

     Illusion of Destiny (Issues of Our Time)" on issues of multiple simultaneous identities.

[183] (1911-2006 AD).Egyptian novelist, modernizer of Arabic literature, and winner of

      the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988.

[184] (1927-1991 AD).Egyptian playwright, author of short stories, and novels; Nobel

     Prize for literature nominee.

[185] (1926-1964 AD). Popular Iraqi poet.

[186] (1923-1998 AD). Famous Syrian poet who abandoned his diplomatic career to

     focus on writing poetry. His literary works consisted of two dozen volumes of

     poetry and regular articles in the Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat.  He was

     revered by generations of Arabs for his sensual and romantic verse where it  

     seemed that women were his main theme and inspiration.

[187] Contemporary Egyptian poet and writer.

[188] Egyptian pioneer of the modern Arabic poetry.

[189] (1925-2008 A.D,). Lebanese modern poet novelist, dictionary author, translator

      and publisher renowned for defending pan-Arabism; founder of “Al Adab”

      magazine and “Dar Al Adab publishing house  in Beirut (partnering with the

     famous poet Nizar Qabbani; see note 186).

[190] (1920-2003 AD).Probably the most reputed Algerian writer, author of more than

     thirty novels, as well as short stories and novels; also wrote literature for children

     in French.

[191] (1905-1992 AD). Egyptian writer of novels, short stories, essays, criticism...; one

      of the pioneers of the modern literary movement.

[192] (1909-1994 AD). Famous Romanian/French playwright.

[193] (1904-1991 AD). English novelist, short story writer, playwright, screenwriter,

travel writer and critic whose works explore the ambivalent moral and political 

      issues of the modern world.

[194] (1913-1960 AD). French author, philosopher and journalist born in Algeria. 

      Winner of the Nobel Prize in 1957.

[195] (1907-1990 AD). One of the leading novelists in 20^th century Italy. 

[196] (1828-1906 AD). Important Norwegian playwright of realistic drama; referred to

      as “father of the modern drama”.

[197] (1888-1953 AD). Major American playwright, winner of the Nobel Prize in

      Literature in 1936.

[198] (1872-1963 AD). Egyptian intellectual known for his anti-colonial activism; also

      reform rector of Cairo University.

[199] See note 174.

[200] (1886-1954 AD). Egyptian author and historian.

[201] See note 177.

[202] (1898-1989 AD). Prominent Egyptian writer and playwright.

[203] A novel first published in 1988, whose British-Indian author (Sir) Salman Rushdie

      (born 1947 AD) was threatened to death because of the contents of the book

      considered offensive to the Prophet.  The then Supreme Leader of Iran (Ayatollah

      Khomeiny) issued a religious edict (fatwa) calling for Rushdie’s death.  The latter

      lived in hiding for close to a decade.

[204] It is my belief that Malaysia will soon catch up with the Japanese example after ridding

     itself of a leader who, while enjoying a high degree of administrative skill, is nevertheless

     a dictator who thinks nothing of imprisoning his opponents (after fabricating false

     accusations), and who recently joined the ranks of the defenders of Saddam Hussein. 

[205] The oldest civilizations in the history of the world.

[206] Most of them were annexed to the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16^th

      century and remained under the wings of this historic superpower till its defeat in  

      World War I in 1918.

[207] (1126-1198 AD). Arab philosopher from Andalusia, also theologian and polymath.

[208] A popular and populous suburb of Cairo, Egypt, where hundreds of thousands of

     working class Egyptians live.

[209] The Baathists are the followers of the Baath Party (mainly in Syria and Iraq) who

      are the prime advocates of pan Arabism or Arab nationalism

[210] (1887-1958 AD). Egyptian journalist, interested in reform, science, and culture;

     firm believer in the human intellect as the tool for progress. Influenced Nobel Prize

     winner Naguib Mahfouz (see note 183).

[211] See note 174.

[212] Muslin Sheikh who was stripped of his Al-Azhar degree (see note 281 below) in

     1924 because of his book “Islam and the Basis of Government” which opposed the

      rulers.

[213] Egyptian political party founded after the end of World War I in 1918 AD

[214](1915-1990 AD). Egyptian intellectual and writer.

[215] (1900-1988 AD). Egyptian intellectual who studied medicine at the Egyptian

     University; after his graduation (1925), he traveled to France to study

     ophthalmology. However, he abandoned his medical studies for two different

     things: classical music and marine  lives. After six years in Paris, he returned to

     Egypt to two different paths, a scientific research path as professor in the Faculty

     of Science, and a path of a scholar who profoundly advocated Western culture; in

     parallel, he wrote extensively about symphonic music. When Sadat signed the

     Camp David Treaty with Israel (see note 257), Hussein Fawzi was one of the

     strongest supporters to Sadat’s initiative in general, and to naturalization between

     Egypt and Israel in particular. He continued to write in favor of Western

     civilization till he died in 1988. Many refer to him as “Sindbad” due to the fact that

     he spent 3 years in the Indian Ocean (in the 1930’s) pursuing marine researches.

[216] (1905-1993 AD). Egyptian pioneer of philosophical and literary enlightenment. 

     He was described by Al Aqqad (see note 177) as "the philosopher of authors and

     author of philosophers”.

[217] I.e. Greek.

[218] See Tarek Heggy, “The Arab Mind Before the Anglo-Saxons”, ESSAYS ON THE

      ARAB MIND, available at “www.tarek-heggy.com”.

[219] Well known Egyptian cultural figure, writer and engineer. (Born 1924 AD).

[220] (Born 1925 AD). A prominent Egyptian professor of Philosophy who migrated,

     intellectually, from the far left (as a Marxist) to a genuine liberal thinker who

     advocates the values of reason, humanity, and modernity. He founded and runs his

     Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Association, which is a kind of civil social podium to

     advocate the values of modernity.

[221] (1898-1989 AD). Prominent Egyptian novelist.

[222] (159-255 Hijra; see note 37). Iraqi pioneer of Arab literature from the Abbasid era.

     (See notes 15 & 27).

[223] (1703-1792 AD).Influential  follower of Ibn Taymiyah, founder of Wahhabism,

     (Najd/Saudi Arabia. 

[224] See Part I, chapter I.

[225] (C. 1225-1274 AD).Italian Catholic priest, proponent of natural theology; he

     believed that truth can be known through "reason" and "faith".

[226] Followers of Averroes/Ibn Rushd (see note 207).

[227] Members of a former military caste, originally composed of slaves from Turkey,

      that held the Egyptian throne from about 1250 until 1517 and remained powerful

      until 1811.

[228] The author of the book, (A.A.), wrote an introduction which made him not dare to

      put his name on the cover of the book; it would have (according to him) caused  

      his murder in a society that has a very thin layer of tolerance to criticism.

     However, A.A. was a professor of sociology at one of the Egyptian universities,

     and  advocated the theory that most of the Egyptians are similar (from the

     sociological viewpoint) to the African Americans in the USA, i.e. the latter

     suffered long from the harsh treatment as secondary citizens to the white people in

     the USA and the former from the non-Egyptian rulers of Egypt for some 20

     centuries - since the end of the last Ancient Egyptian dynasty in the fourth century

     BC

[229] See note 186.

[230] Huge missiles that the regime of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser in Egypt (see note 264)

     used to parade, and repeatedly announced that these were the long and medium

     range missiles that would remove Israel from the face of Earth. Linguistically,

Qaher means “conqueror” and Zafer means “victorious”. The father of this book’s

     author used to mock these huge missiles (when they were paraded) by saying “an

     excellent carpenter has done a very good job”, i.e. that they were not real missiles,

     but huge maquettes (wood models). His statement reflected the views of the pre-

     1952 (Egyptian revolution) generation on the socialist era of Nasser (1954-1970

     A..D.).

[231] Egypt was the winner of the football (soccer) African cup of nations in 2006.

[232] It took place at Queen Hatshepsut’s temple Al Deir Al Bahari on the west bank of

      the city of Luxor in November, 1997, when a group of Al Qa’eda jihadists killed    

      and injured more than 100 European, Japanese and American tourists and left

      most of the bodies disfigured.

[233] Verse # 224 of Surat Al-Shu'ara (The Poets), Sura # 26, [26.224] And as to the poets, those

     who go astray follow them.

[234] (915-965 AD). One of the greatest Arab poets, of Iraqi birth.

[235] (C. 1769- 1849 AD).Governor of Egypt; founder of modern Egypt and of the

     dynasty which ruled Egypt until the expulsion of King Farouk on July 26, 1952

     (followed by the abolishment of the monarchy on June 18, 1953)

[236] (1918-1981 AD) Egyptian President from 1970 to 1981 AD Graduated from the

     Military Academy in 1938. Expelled from the army and imprisoned in the 1940’s

     subversive political activities and suspicion of participation in plots to assassinate

     senior political figures. When he was released he rejoined the armed forces in

     1950. He took part in the 1952 Free Officers Revolution and was a close ally of

     Gamal Abd-Al Nasser, who appointed Sadat in 1969 as his vice-president. When

     Nasser died, in September 1970, Sadat succeeded him as president. During the first

     years of  his presidency Sadat quelled leftist opposition, surprised Israel in what

     was considered the victory of the 1973 war (see note 255), reoriented Egyptian

     foreign policy towards the West (especially towards the USA), reversing its long

     pro-Soviet inclination. He introduced a series of economic and political reforms,

     promoting liberalization. In 1977, in a dramatic act and as a gesture demonstrating

     his will for peace, Sadat flew to Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset

     (parliament). The culmination of the process initiated by his visit was the signing

     of an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement at Camp David (see note 257). In his last

     years in power, Sadat’s rule suffered from growing disillusionment and opposition

     (mainly from Islamic elements), manifested in the popular riots that broke out in

     1977 and his assassination, during a victory parade, on 6 October 1981 by Islamic

     militants belonging to the Jihad group.

[237] (Born 1923 AD).Leading Arab/Egyptian journalist; editor in chief of Al Ahram

      newspaper from 1957 to 1974, commentator on Middle-East affairs for the last 50

      years.

[238] The most widely read Egyptian daily newspaper, founded in 1875 AD

[239] Verse by Al Mutanabbi (see note 234).

[240] One of the most famous publishing houses in the Arabic speaking countries,

      established in Cairo in 1892 by the Lebanese novelist Georgi Zeidan; still

      publishing its monthly cultural magazine “Al Hilal”.

[241] (1893-1961 AD).Egyptian poet of Tunisian descent. Renowned for his poetry

     in Egyptian dialect.

[242] (1724-1804 AD).German philosopher, one of the most influential thinkers of

      modern Europe.

[243] Cultural movement which started in Italy in the 14^th century and spread across

      Europe until the 17^th century.  “Renaissance” is the French word for “rebirth”.

[244] (The Egyptian General Book Organization, 470 pages, Second Edition, November

      2003). 

[245] (1917-1978 AD).Egyptian writer who held several official positions, among which

     that of Minister of Culture (1973). He was assassinated by an extremist Palestinian

     group in Nicosia, Cyprus, where he was attending a conference dedicated to peace

     and security for the nations of the world.

[246] See notes 263 & 178 respectively.

[247] In November 1947, the UN resolution 181 was adopted by the majority of the

     members of the General Assembly of the UN. According to this resolution, the

     international legitimacy endorsed the partition of the historic Palestine into 2

     states: a Jewish state and an Arab state.  This resolution was objected by the Arab

     members of the UN.

[248] Mountainous region at the south of Lebanon, of high strategic importance. Israel

      captured the Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War. The

      territory was successfully defended by Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War though

      a portion was later returned to Syria. The Golan Heights remain disputed.

[249] Dates of wars between Israel and the Arabs.

[250] Prominent Egyptian professor of economics, and the former general director of the

     Arab Monetary Fund (AMF).

[251] The coordinated attack of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France in October-

      November 1956, in which Israel occupied the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and

      the Sinai Peninsula and Britain and France landed ground troops in the Suez Canal

      area.  The parties were forced to withdraw and cease all action because of heavy      

      UN pressure and US and Soviet intervention. The attack followed a period of

      mounting tension between the parties, during which Egypt’s new regime  

      nationalized the Suez Canal Company and was perceived as threatening other  

      interests of the former colonial powers of the region.  The tension between Egypt

      and Israel originated in the 1954 Egyptian imposed blockade on Israeli navigation

      in the Gulf of Aqaba (Eilat) and the cross-border infiltration and sabotage raids

      into Israel by Palestinian guerrillas (fidaiyyin), for which Israel held Egypt

      responsible.  As a result of the war Egypt consolidated its control of the Suez

      Canal, Israel’s navigation rights in the Gulf of Aqaba were guaranteed, and a

      special UN force, the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), was created and

      stationed in the Sinai tom patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border.

[252] In January 1958, after a long period of internal instability and under the threat of

      its own army, the Syrian government found itself compelled to request a union

      with Egypt. On 1 February, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was proclaimed.

      The union did not survive for long due to growing Syrian disillusionment and   

      animosity towards what was perceived as an Egyptian takeover rather than a true

      union. Syrian antagonism was further fuelled by the Egyptian attempt to impose

      socialist reforms, effected also in Egypt. On 28 September 1961 the Syrian Army  

      staged a coup and declared the union dissolved. Egypt retained the title UAR until   

      1971.

[253] The struggle between the Saudi-backed royalists and the Egyptian-backed

      republicans for the control of the Yemen state. On 26 September 1962 the latter

      overthrew the royalist Saudi-backed regime. The Egyptian government almost

      immediately committed troops to protect the fragile new regime. With Saudi

      support, and using Saudi Arabia as their base, the royalists waged a guerrilla war

      against the republicans and their Egyptian allies. With no clear winner, after five

      years of costly and demoralizing involvement, the Egyptians withdrew from  

      Yemen (as agreed in the Khartoum Summit, August 1967). The fighting between

      the factions in Yemen continued until 1970.

[254] The war between Israel and its Arab neighbors – Egypt, Jordan and Syria – waged

      between 5 and 10 June 1967. As a consequence, the Arab states lost to Israel’s

      control the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, the entire West Bank of the Jordan

      River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights, respectively. During the

      period preceding the war the already tense relations between the sides deteriorated

      over the continuing actions of Palestinian guerrillas against Israel, the

      strengthening of the Palestinian national movement, and the dispute over

      utilization of the waters of the Jordan River. The situation was exacerbated by the

      signing of the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Defense Agreement in November 1967, the

      Israeli shooting down of a Syrian aircraft (April 1967) and erroneous Soviet

      reports of an Israeli amassment of troops in the Golan Heights. Friction peaked

      when, on 18 May, complying with Egyptian demands the UN withdrew its forces

      from the Sinai Peninsula (see note 251). This was followed by the arrival of large

      numbers of Egyptian forces in the Peninsula. The Egyptians imposed a blockade

      over Israeli navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba (21 May) and signed defense

      agreements with Jordan (30 May) and Iraq (3 June). On the morning of 5 June,

      Israel launched a large-scale air strike, practically destroying the air forces of all

      Arab countries involved, and thus began the war. Apart from the territorial losses,

      Egypt saw most of its army destroyed in the fighting and its hegemony in the Arab

      world greatly weakened. The defeat also affected the regime, causing the

      resignation of President Gamal Abd Al-Nasser (see note 264), which he retracted

     24 hours later. Another of its important results was the adoption of Resolution 242

     by the UN Security Council, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied

     lands in return for peace and Arab recognition.

[255] The war between Israel and its neighbors, Syria and Egypt, in which the latter

      attacked Israel. It was waged between 6 and 22 October 1973.  After the failure of

      peace efforts in 1971 and the Israeli refusal to withdraw from the Sinai, President

      Anwar Al-Sadat (see note 236) was convinced that the only way to regain Egypt’s

      lost territories and to force a breakthrough in the impasse situation was another

      war. Plans for a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack were drawn up and implemented in a

      surprise attack on Israel, on 6 October. The Egyptian force managed to cross the

      Suez Canal and occupy its west bank but in a counter-offensive Israeli forces

      crossed the Canal, occupying part of its eastern bank and surrounding the

      Egyptian Third Army on the Suez western bank. In the Golan, Israel managed to

      push back the Syrian offensive and reoccupy the heights. The war witnessed also

      the involvement of the world’s two great superpowers of that time, the USSR on

      the Arab side and the ISA on the Israeli side, which manifested itself in masssive

      arm shipments to both sides and rising tensions between the powers themselves.

      The perception of Iraeli invincibility was shattered during the war, causing social

      and political unrest in Israel, which would bring about the fall of the long-ruling

      Labor Party and a new Likud-ruled government. The Egyptian leadership had

      been given, by what was considered a victory, leverage for its future peace

      negotiations with Israel and it also regained its standing in the Arab world. During

      the war, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, which primarily

      reiterated Resolution 242 (see note 254).

[256] See note 236.

[257] The agreements signed between Israel and Egypt with US mediation on 17

     September 1978 at Camp David, the official retreat of the U.S. president. The

     agreements were reached after hard and tense negotiations (5-17 September 1978)

     between Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat (see note 236) and Israeli Prime

     Minister Menachem Begin; President Jimmy Carter acted as intermediary. The

     accords set up the framework for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement, which was

     signed on 26 March 1979, and for the solution of the Palestinian problem. The

     former called for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the

     establishment of normal and peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt, and the

     latter for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the

     establishment of Palestinian self-rule there and recognition of Israel’s right to exist

     within secure and recognized borders.

[258] In the late 1980’s, and following an economic and political crisis, the republics of

      the Soviet Union (USSR) started working on getting their sovereignty.  In 1991,

      the  Belavezha Accords were signed between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to

      dissolve the Soviet Union and replace it by the “Common Wealth of Independent

      States”.  By early1992 the dissolution of the USSR was complete.

[259] The General Agreement on Tariffs and Tirade (GATT), an international agreement

     created in 1947 which stipulates reductions in tariffs and other measures for trade

     liberalization between its members. In 1993, the member countries signed the most

     comprehensive and liberalizing agreement ever, under which a new organization,

     the World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed, with the function of

     supervising the implementation of the GATT and mediate in trade disputes among

     the signatories.

[260] See note 178.

[261] Al-Gamma, or Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiya, is a general term denoting extreme Islamic

     groups, first formed under the Sadat regime (see note 236). These include the

     Takfir wa Al-Hijra, the Jihad (see note 262) and the Jamaa Al-Islamiya (the last

     two are the most prominent). Such groups preach extreme Islamic ideology,

     oppose the regime and use violence and terror to achieve their goals. Generally,

     they distance themselves from the Muslim Brothers. They were responsible for the

     assassination of President Sadat in 1981, for the attempted assassination of

     President Husni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1995, and were also

     accused of involvement of the New York Trade Center bombing in 1993. In the

     1990’s they launched a terrorist campaign against tourism and tourists in Egypt,

     deeming them the corrupting agents of Egyptian society. They realized that this

     would enable them to hurt the regime economically (Tourism is one of Egypt’s

     main sources of income) and to discredit it both internally and internationally. The

     Luxor terrorist attack of 1997, in which 57 tourists and Egyptians were killed (see

     note 225), is the last big example of this campaign. In response to this and other

     attacks the regime launched a fierce counter-offensive, mainly in Upper Egypt (the

     southern part of the country), where these groups rallied more support and

     influence, arresting and executing many of their members. An unofficial truce

     seemed to have been reached in the last years.

[262] The Jihad, or Al-Jihad Al-Jadid, is an extreme Islamic group, part of the Jamaat

     Al-Islamiya (see note 261), which was behind the Sadat assassination in 1981. Its

     founder and main ideologue was Abd Al-Salam Faraj. He was executed with

     Khaled Al-Islambuli, the principal assassin of the president, in 1982. The group

     and its offshoots are credited with involvement in numerous terrorist acts in Egypt

     and abroad through the 1990’s.

[263] The Nasserites are the followers and adherents of the political ideology known as

     Nasserism. This was the term applied to the political philosophy of former

     Egyptian President Nasser (see note 264). It included international neutralism,

     Arab nationalism and socialism. Following Sadat’s reforms (see note 236)

     Nasserism came to represent the views of those opposed to his policy, i.e. political

     but mainly economic capitalist liberalization. On 19 April 1992 the Nasserite Arab

     Democratic Party was formally approved and given permission to participate in

     Egyptian elections.

[264] Jamal Abd Al-Nasser (1918-1970 AD). Second Egyptian President 1954-1970.

     Graduated from the Military Academy in 1938. Participated as battalion

     commander in the 1948 War between the Arabs and the fledging State of Israel.

     After the war, he organized the Free Officers group, which consisted mainly of

     low-ranking officers, mainly from humble backgrounds, whose objective was to

     revamp what was believed to be a corrupt system (implying the ousting of the

     then-called royal dynasty). On 23 July 1952 they successfully executed a coup.

     Initially the officers installed coup leader General Mohamed Naguib as president.

     After growing dissent and rivalry, Nasser ousted Naguib and became the official

     president in 1954. Under his leadership Egypt underwent a series of economic,

     social and political reforms. He banned all parties except his own Arab Socialist

     Union. In the economic sphere he pursued a socialist policy, nationalizing in 1961

     all major industries and utilities and adopting an ambitious development plan, with

     the project of the Great Dam of Aswan being one of his main achievements. His

     regime also carried out agrarian reform, redistributing agrarian lands in Egypt. In

     the international and inter-Arab sphere he adopted a nationalistic revolutionary

     Arab policy and was one of the co-founders of the non-alignment bloc in 1955.

     During his time in office Egypt’s foreign policy tilted towards the Soviet Union

     and the Eastern bloc. Some of his most salient actions in the international arena

     were the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the union with Syria, the

     Egyptian involvement in Yemen and the 1967 War after which he resigned for 24

     hours only to be reinstated following popular clamor. After his death, Nasser was    

     succeeded by Anwar Al-Sadat (see note 236).

[265] Jihad is the struggle or holy war in the defense of Islam against its attackers. It has

     come to mean the holy war of Islam against all non-Muslims or unbelievers so as

     to spread the rule of Islam and the word of God and his Prophet Mohamed. In

     modern times it has also taken on some new meanings. The Islamic extreme

     groups advocate Jihad against Arab regimes that do not comply with Islam as they

     perceive it. Some Islamic modernists and other moderates advocate Jihad in a

     peaceful manner. In other circles, mainly of official, it refers to a major effort

     towards advancement, in general or in a specific field (e.g. the economy).

[266] The Crusades were the Christian-driven military campaigns that originated in

     Europe against the Muslim-dominated territories of the Near East, especially

     Palestine (the Holy Land). The campaigns and invasions took part between the end

     of the eleventh century to the thirteenth. Their main objective was to save those

     territories from what was perceived as a Muslim desecration and to restore 

     Christian control there. In modern times the Crusades have come to symbolize in

     some Muslim/Arab circles Western aggression, colonialism and imperialism in the

     area, of which the State of Israel is considered to be the gravest manifestation.

[267] The Ministry of Information is found in many Arab countries. Among its

     responsibilities are the regulation and control of State and non-governmental 

     media. In many cases the ministry also acts as the government’s main official

     mouthpiece.

[268] The Ottoman Empire was founded by Turkish-origin tribes in Anatolia at the end

     of the thirteenth century. At its peak it comprised most of southwestern Asia, the

     Balkans, Egypt and large portions of the North African coast. The capital of the

     empire during most of its existence was Istanbul (Constantinople). The Ottoman

     Empire was a multinational Islamic state dominated by elements of Turkish

     descent or affiliation. It ceased to exist in 1919. Egypt was ruled by the Empire

     between 1517 and 1798 or 1517 and 1882 (differences originated in historic

     exegesis). During the nineteenth century the Ottomans granted much of their

     power to their governor Mohamed Ali (see note 235) and his dynasty, which

     became the Egyptian royal family, who ruled the country until overthrown by the

     Free Officers Revolution in 1952 (see note 264).

[269] Zionism was the movement seeking the creation of an independent national Jewish

     home in Palestine or Israel. The movement originated in the late nineteenth century

     among Eastern European Jewry. From 1896 the term was adopted by Theodor

     Herzl (see note 270) for the political movement founded by him and which   

     eventually led to the formation of the State of Israel.

[270] Theodor Herzl (1860-1904 AD). The founder of the political worldwide Zionist

     movement. An assimilated Jew, Herzl became aware of the Jewish problem during

     his work in Paris for a Viennese newspaper (1891-1895) and his coverage of the

     trial of his Jewish army officer Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused of treason. The

     anti-Semitic atmosphere surrounding the trial, and prevalent in France in general

     led him to write and publish The Jewish State (1896), in which, after an assessment

     of the Jewish situation, he proposed a plan for the establishment of a Jewish state.

     Herzl began to travel to publicize his ideas and try to gain support for them. On 23

     August 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, the first Zionist Congress was convened, in

     which Herzl and Jewish representatives from the world over laid the foundations of

     the World Zionist Organization, which became the main organ of the newly

     established Jewish national movement.

[271]  (469-399 BC). Influential Classical Greek philosopher, one of the founders of

     Western philosophy, renowned for his contribution in the field of ethics.

[272] (1872-1970 AD).British philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate

     for social reform, pacifist, and prolific writer and commentator on various topics.

[273] See note 235.

[274] For more of the author’s writings on the suffering of minorities (like women, the

     Copts in Egypt and the Shiites of the Gulf region) visit his website  available at

     “www.tarek-heggy.com”.

[275] An annual prize offered to those who “benefit mankind” in the diverse fields;

      established in 1895 AD after the will of Swedish chemist and inventor of

      dynamite, Alfred Nobel. 

[276] (1867-1934 AD).Born Maria Sklodowska, physicist and chemist of Polish origin

     and French citizenship.  The only person who won the Nobel Prize in two

     different disciplines (Physics, 1903 AD and Chemistry, 1911 AD).

[277] A terrible mechanism that is adopted by some Islamic jurists, according to which

     the police could force the wife to stay with her husband at the same place

     regardless of her will.

[278] A mechanism in Islamic jurisprudence that allows women to get divorced against

     the will of the spouse (with a number of financial consequences and burdens).

     When this mechanism was legally introduced in Egypt (approximately one decade

     ago), it was faced with a strong wave of opposition from the conservative segment

     of the society.

[279] (1868-1936 AD) The “blackguard” prince Ahmed Fouad (see chapter nine); Sultan

     of Egypt in 1917 AD, then King in 1922 AD  Father of King Farouk the last King

     of Egypt.       

[280] Islamic government, the head of the state is the Caliph.

[281] Egyptian Islamic institution of higher learning.

[282] Verse # 61, Surat Al-Anfal (Surah # 8) ([8.61] And if they incline to peace, then incline

      to it and trust in Allah; surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing.)..

[283] (699-767 AD). Sunni Muslim jurist, founder of the Hanafi School of jurisprudence.

[284] Abu Hanifah (see note 283) is the founder of Islamic jurisprudence, and the first of

     the four leaders of the main Sunni jurisprudence, i.e. Abu Hanifah, Malik, Shafei,

     and Ibn Hanbal. The four of them lived and died between around 700 and 900 AD

     Abu Hanifah left verbal teachings and insisted not to write at all, giving a direct

     message of relativity to whatever he has expounded.  While Abu Hanifah accepted

     less than 100 hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohamed), the fourth Sunni Imam (a

     jurist) accepted in excess of 20’000, which resulted in leaving a very thin margin

     to reason.

[285] Oral traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet.

[286] (780-855 AD).Muslim scholar, founder of the Hanbali "textualist" school,

     followed by Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.

[287] Tiny Shiite mosques (the equivalent of “chapel” vs. “church” in English).

[288] Koshh is a village in Upper Egypt in which hostility from rigid and intolerant

     Muslims took place more than once and ended (in 1999) by a massacre in which

     more than 20 Copts were murdered.

[289] See note 236.

[290] Assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981, attempt to the life of Egyptian

     President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995 ... (see note 261).

[291] Name of a suburb of the greater Cairo area where the Copts were subjected to

     Savage and intolerant hostility in 1972.

[292] Egyptian Minister of Culture under President Sadat.

[293] (1859-1927 AD).Egyptian political figure; served as prime minister of Egypt from

26 January 1924 to 24 November 1924.

[294] These reasons were exhaustively addressed in an old article of mine which was

      published in Al-Akhbar newspaper on 19 February 1987 under the title “Sa’d

      Zaghloul and the Unity of the Two Elements of the Egyptian Nation” and re-  

      published later as a chapter in the author’s book, “The Four Idols”.  Also available

      at “www.tarek-heggy.com”.

[295] An unexpected attack launched by the Japanese navy against the U.S. naval base

      (Pearl Harbor) in Hawaii in 1941, during World War II (see note 165).