There have been many indications of late, particularly during the past year, that the Egyptian administration has come to realize the failure of the policies that have governed our economic and political life since the late 1950s and through the ‘60s. Specifically, I am referring to the policies limiting the role of the private sector and reducing areas of cooperation with multinational companies, and to those governing agriculture, industry, housing and education—policies to which all of Egypt's major problems can be traced. But while recognizing that no cure is possible without radical reform, the administration believes that any change has to consider the requirements of political and social stability. Several serious incidents have made the situation even more sensitive and complex: the 1977 riots,60 the assassination of President Sadat and the workers’ strike at the Hilwan steel mills in 1987. As we consider how to balance the inevitability of change with the imperative need for stability, we would do well to keep a popular Egyptian adage in mind: “He whose hand is in water is not like he whose hand is in fire.” While it is natural for all the opposition wings to favor change, it is equally natural for the ruling administration to be more concerned with stability. The focus in the opposition press has always been on the need for change, regardless of how it might affect stability and political and social security. The Tajamu’ Party61 calls for changes of a socialist nature, in line with its ideology. The Wafd Party aims at changes of a liberal nature, based on the amendment of the constitution in the direction of political liberalization. The Labor Party is clamoring for changes that remain undefined, even in the minds of its leaders whose orientations have become more obscure than ever following the recent merger between this successor of the old fascist party, Jeune Egypte, the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party and the Moslem Brotherhood. As fervently as it reiterates the need for change (of whatever nature), the opposition remains curiously silent about the need to effect change in a way that would not jeopardize political and social stability and plunge Egypt into the anarchy raging through the Middle East today. There are, as we all know, a number of regional and global parties with an interest in keeping the political pot on the boil in various parts of the world, and they would not be averse to seeing a similar situation erupt in Egypt. An observer confronted with the two positions may wonder where the truth lies—in the over-sensitivity to and awareness of security requirements or in the relentless call for change? Actually, both positions contain a modicum of truth. But to date none of the opposition parties has come up with concrete proposals for change. They have stuck to generalities and catchcries, disregarding the effects of change on stability and forgetting that, as an opposition, they have never been involved in any form of administrative government. With the exception of the Wafd Party, all the factions of the Egyptian opposition share a common past: totalitarianism, fascism or theocracy. With such a legacy, is it any wonder that their strident calls for change should blithely disregard the disastrous consequences of instituting change without careful planning? There was an opposition party that could have formed an objective and balanced counterpoise to the party in power had it not, regrettably, fallen under the influence of one man's overriding ambition, a man whose race against time is doomed to failure. These reservations on the opposition’s attitude to change do not imply unqualified support for the administration's excessively cautious position in this respect. Although it is wise to aim for change without affecting political and social stability, any error in timing could cause the foundations of security to crack and upset stability. Time is not an ally for anyone called upon to tackle the massive problems of contemporary Egypt. On the contrary, it can work against him and hinder the possibility of reaching comprehensive solutions to our chronic problems. In other words, while it is right to insist on maintaining security and stability when contemplating changes in political and economic orientations in matters as important as education, industry, agriculture and housing, it is equally true that to postpone instituting the necessary changes is to jeopardize stability. Let us turn to a notorious historical example of the fatal consequences of indecision. Had the French monarchy in 1789 not refused to institute the democratic reforms that the French people aspired to, had Louis XVI sided with the Commons and not with the Nobles during the constitutional crisis, the French Revolution may not have taken place and the monarchy may have survived, as did its counterpart in England. Scores of examples attest to the validity of the dictum that to postpone taking action may itself be twice as dangerous as the immediate tackling of problems, however intractable they seem to be. Yet in Egypt today we are treated to the spectacle of armchair critics loudly denouncing any attempt to change systems which have become enshrined idols protected by a priesthood whose members jealously guard their privileges. One system that needs to be changed, and without further delay, is that of housing. The most critical aspect of the housing problem in Egypt is the enormous discrepancy between dwindling supply and burgeoning demand. In the late-50’s and through the ‘60s, the state enacted laws which served to deter the private sector from investing in the construction of housing units, particularly those for rent. Faced with an alarming drop in the number of rentals, the state was forced to step into the housing market to meet the demand, which was growing as fast as the population. The state, of course, failed to satisfactorily perform the task it had set itself, not because of any inherent failing but because it is impossible for a state to accomplish such a formidable task. The only practical solution is to repeal the housing laws that created the imbalance between supply and demand in the first place. The problem will not disappear through such palliatives as prohibiting the sale of apartments, key money or rent advances. Moreover, the longer we wait the more acute the disparity will become between the demand for and the supply of housing units. As the disparity grows, so too does the pressure of the housing problem on society’s nervous system, which is growing more intolerable. Eventually, the strains and stresses of the situation may cause cracks in the foundations of political and social stability and security. The agricultural problem is another example. Agriculture is the mode of production most closely associated with the idea of private initiative, in the sense that it epitomizes more clearly than any other the organic link between private initiative, as represented in an individual's direct personal interest in the success of a private venture, and the overall success of this mode of production. In the area of agriculture, the concept of private property is more firmly entrenched than in other spheres of production. That is why agriculture succeeds brilliantly under systems which encourage private ownership and recognize that individual creativity stemming from personal interest fuels productivity and success. Agricultural production in the US, Canada, France,  Germany and France is a success story. In the socialist countries it suffers greatly from the lack of enthusiasm of farm workers, from low productivity and from visible degradation. If we compare Algeria and Morocco—two adjoining countries with nearly identical geographic and demographic conditions but with different political systems—we see that in the former, a socialist state, agricultural production is a complete failure, whereas in Morocco, with its free system of agricultural production, this sector is highly successful. In Egypt the system is mixed and highly intricate. The general framework is socialist, based on severe limitations of agricultural land holdings, and a legal system that has transformed the landlord into a hired hand and made the tenant farmer the real owner. Moreover, a large number of agricultural products, some of them strategic, must be sold to the government. The problem, of course is that any attempt at reform will necessarily entail changes that could affect political and social stability. But failure to act would be even worse. Postponing the necessary decisions could only lead to the further degradation of agricultural productivity and swelled tension between the parties concerned. As agricultural production drops and the demographic explosion continues to send ever-widening ripples through society, the state will be subjected to enormous pressure to provide large amounts of foreign currency to import more and more food. Another example of the importance of timely decisions is the mutiny of the Central Security Forces in February 1986. 62 The spark that ignited the incident was the deplorable living conditions of the soldiers. Had a decision been taken in time to improve their conditions, there would have been no mutiny and the agents provocateurs would have remained silent. Countless examples show that the dangers inherent in delaying the adoption of decisions concerning crucial problems far outweigh any short-lived continuity and stability that ignoring the problems can provide. In conclusion, it can be said that the real difficulty lies not in having to choose between change and stability but in coming to realize that both factors are necessary: change for the better while ensuring stability and fulfilling security needs.